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Abstract 
 
This thesis is the result of my experience as a PhD student taking part 
in the Joint Doctoral Programme at the University of York and the University 
of Bologna. In my thesis I deal with topics that are of particular interest in 
Italy and in Great Britain.  
Chapter 2 focuses on the empirical test of the existence of the 
relationship between technological profiles and market structure claimed by 
Sutton’s theory (1991, 1998) in the specific economic framework of hospital 
care services provided by the Italian National Health Service (NHS). In order 
to test the empirical predictions by Sutton, we identify the relevant markets 
for hospital care services in Italy in terms of both product and geographic 
dimensions. In particular, the Elzinga and Hogarty (1978) approach has been 
applied to data on patients’ flows across Italian Provinces in order to derive 
the geographic dimension of each market. Our results provide evidence in 
favour of the empirical predictions of Sutton.  
Chapter 3 deals with the patient mobility in the Italian NHS. To analyse 
the determinants of patient mobility across Local Health Authorities, we 
estimate gravity equations in multiplicative form using a Poisson pseudo 
maximum likelihood method, as proposed by Santos-Silva and Tenreyro 
(2006). In particular, we focus on the scale effect played by the size of the 
pool of enrolees. In most of the cases our results are consistent with the 
predictions of the gravity model.  
Chapter 4 considers the effects of contractual and working conditions 
on self-assessed health and psychological well-being (derived from the 
General Health Questionnaire) using the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS). We consider two branches of the literature. One suggests that 
“atypical” contractual conditions have a significant impact on health while 
the other suggests that health is damaged by adverse working conditions. The 
main objective of our paper is to combine the two branches of the literature 
to assess the distinct effects of contractual and working conditions on health. 
The results suggest that both sets of conditions have some influence on 
health and psychological well-being of employees.  
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Chapter 1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This thesis is the result of my experience as a PhD student taking part 
in the Joint Doctoral Programme at the University of York and the University 
of Bologna. Since my research activity has been conducted partly at the 
University of Bologna and partly at the University of York, in my thesis I 
deal with some topics which are of particular interest in Italy and others 
which are relevant in Great Britain.   
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 refer to the Italian public hospital care sector. 
The study of the Italian public hospital care sector is particularly interesting 
due to the reforms that occurred in the Italian National Health Service (NHS) 
in late 1990s. The Italian NHS was created in the late 1970s as a regionally 
based system providing universal coverage free of charge at the point of 
service. The regions were funded by the central government, which was also 
responsible for determining the amount of resources to devote to health care 
and for general planning. The reforms in the late 1990s promoted a certain 
level of competition in the public hospital sector, by the introduction of 
prospective payments for hospital admissions via the Diagnosis Related 
Groups (DRGs) classification scheme. 1  The reforms also introduced 
elements of regional federalism, introducing sources of autonomous 
financing for the regions and giving them the main responsibility for their 
funding.2 Regions can choose the level of resources to spend in the health 
care sector and, apart from fulfilling a series of essential services, they are 
free to choose the quality level and amount of services to provide. Since in 
Italy patients are free to select the hospital in which they are treated, overall 
                                                 
1 According to Cellini et al. (2000), the adoption of the DRG-payment system, giving the 
patients` right to freely choose the accredited facilities that best meet their requirements, 
have to some extent introduced a ‘yardstick competition’ scheme in the health care system  
Although hospitals do not compete on prices (since their services are substantially free-of-
charge), they try to attract patients competing on the quality of the services provided 
(Mapelli, 2000; Levaggi and Zanola, 2004) 
2 To allow some fiscal equalization across regions the National Solidarity Fund has been 
introduced. This Fund is financed by the central government.  
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these changes have made the hospital care sector more similar functionally to 
the traditional manufacturing sectors, where consumers are free to choose 
their suppliers and suppliers are free to choose which product to offer and its 
quality. These structural changes, considered in the light of the rapid pace of 
technological development that generally has characterized health care 
markets, offer a motivation to investigate the relationship between 
technologies and market structure in the Italian public hospital care sector. 
We investigate this relationship in Chapter 2. The analysis of the hospital 
care market structure is relevant from the policy point of view given the 
possible consequences that market concentration may have on social welfare. 
Considering markets with a high level of product differentiation (as in the 
case of the hospital care markets), in the literature there is not a clear 
consensus about the sign (positive or negative) of the effect of competition 
on social welfare (Spence, 1976; Dixit and Stigliz, 1977; Salop, 1979; 
Anderson et al., 1992). Considering the hospital care sector, in particular, 
some work states that competition reduces costs and increases quality and 
production efficiency (Melnick et al.,1992; Dranove et al., 1992; Vistnes, 
1995; Town and Vistnes, 1997), while others state that in this sector 
competition leads to a decrease in social welfare (Feldstein, 1971; Held and 
Pauly, 1983; Robinson and Luft, 1985). The presence of health insurances or 
regulated prices, indeed, can induce hospitals not to compete on prices to 
attract patients, but to start a so called “medical arms race”, which implies 
offering un-necessary services to attract patients. The adoption of one of the 
two points of view leads to opposite policy implications. Adopting the 
former view, the policy makers should be concerned about the market 
concentration in the hospital care sector and they should try to reduce it. In 
contrast, adopting the latter view, market concentration should not cause 
concern but should be considered positively (Robone and Zanardi, 2006).             
In recent years the choice of health care provides has been considered 
as a means of improving health care services and an aim to pursue by the 
policy makers in many European countries, as Denmark, Sweden, Norway, 
Holland and Britain. Considering hospital care, the literature suggests that 
patient freedom to choose the hospital can improve health outcomes, 
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although the institutional setting of the health care systems is a critical 
element in this regard (Propper et al., 2006). Since the hospital of “choice” of 
patients might not be the local provider, patients might need to travel outside 
their area of residence to be able to choose the hospital they prefer 
(Exworthy and Peckham, 2006). Patient mobility across different 
geographical areas is a phenomenon widely spread in the hospital care sector 
in Italy. This phenomenon causes concern particularly if considered with 
respect to the reforms that took place in this sector in the 1990s. Since patient 
mobility is likely to be from regions offering less and lower quality hospital 
care services to regions providing more and better services (which are likely 
to be the richest ones), the former regions are required to pay the latter 
regions for the services received by mobile patients. This mechanism could 
create deep and long lasting imbalances across regions leading to the 
rationing of health services to patients living in the poorest regions. These 
considerations motivate our analysis of the determinants of patients’ mobility 
in Chapter 3.  
 Chapter 4 refers to the UK. Over the past 20 years or so, changes in the 
labour market have had a huge impact on the working arrangements of 
employees. For example, the number of “standard” full-time permanent jobs 
has decreased, while “atypical” contractual arrangements (temporary work, 
part-time contracts, unregulated work etc.) have become more common 
(Kivimäki et al., 2003). In the European Union, for example, workers with 
atypical contractual arrangements now account for 12–15% of paid 
employees (Virtanen et al., 2003). Some studies have underlined that 
workers with atypical contractual conditions are often characterized by 
adverse working conditions (Aronsson G et al., 2001; Artazcoz et al., 2005; 
Letourneux, 1998). Whether and how these changes to employment patterns 
affect health and well-being is a key question. This question is particularly 
relevant if placed in the context of Great Britain, where the labour market 
appears to be more flexible compared to other European countries (Bartley et 
al., 2004).  
In the following of this introductory section I provide a short summary 
of the research objectives of each Chapter. In particular, I briefly discuss the 
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data analysed, the methods used and the way these studies contribute to the 
literature.  
 
Chapter 2 “Market Structure and Technology: Evidence from the 
Italian National Health Service” focuses on the empirical test of the 
existence of the relationship between technological profiles and market 
structure claimed by Sutton’s theory (1991, 1998) in the specific economic 
framework of hospital care services provided by the Italian NHS. Sutton 
theorised that industries evolve into distinct market configurations in terms 
of concentration, depending upon product homogeneity and whether R&D 
and advertising are relevant in relation to set-up costs. In particular, Sutton`s 
empirical predictions imply that, in markets characterized by low 
technological intensity, the lower bound to market concentration converges 
monotonically to zero when the market size increases, for any level of 
product homogeneity. Conversely, in markets characterized by high 
technological intensity, the lower bound to concentration converges to a 
positive value different from zero when the market size increases, while the 
lower bound increases from zero with the level of product homogeneity. To 
test these predictions, we adopt Smith`s (1985, 1994) two step procedure for 
the estimate of lower bounds for scatters of observations. The first step of the 
procedure requires making some a priori decision about the form of the 
schedule that describes the lower bound. In our application we specify the 
lower bound for the observations about market concentration and market size 
as the positive section of a rectangular hyperbolic function, and as a ray 
through the origin when considering the observations about market 
concentration and market homogeneity. The second step involves the use of 
pseudo-maximum likelihood methods to check that the pattern of the 
estimated residual fits a Weibull distribution. In order to test the empirical 
predictions by Sutton, we identify the relevant markets for hospital care 
services in Italy in terms of both product and geographic dimensions. In 
particular, the Elzinga and Hogarty (1978) approach has been applied to data 
on patient flows across Italian Provinces in order to derive the geographic 
dimension of each market.  
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The data we use are provided by the Italian Ministry of Health and 
contain information about the services (discharges) offered by all the public 
hospitals operating in the Italian NHS during 1999. For any single discharge, 
the data-set reports the corresponding DRG, the tariffs corresponding to each 
DRG, the hospital where the service was provided together with the Province 
where that hospital was located, and the Province where the patient resided. 
Moreover, the Italian Ministry of Health assembles the DRGs into 25 MDCs 
(representing specific diagnostic groups). To get information about the 
technological characteristics of the relevant markets we resort to more 
detailed data available for a particular Italian region (Emilia-Romagna), 
assuming that the technology adopted in the production of each category of 
health care is analogous across regions.  
The study provides original contributions to the literature. To our 
knowledge, our study is the first to test if Sutton`s empirical predictions are 
valid when considering the Italian public hospital care sector. Moreover, no 
previous study has utilized the Elzinga and Hogarty (1978) approach to 
derive the geographic dimension of the markets in the Italian hospital care 
sector. 
 
Chapter 3 “The Geography of Hospital Admissions in a National 
Health Service with Patient Choice: Evidence from Italy” deals with the 
phenomenon of patient mobility in the Italian National Health Sector. In the 
Italian NHS patients are enrolled into health plans managed by Local Health 
Authorities (LHAs). Enrolment is based on patients’ place of residence. A 
distinctive feature of the Italian NHS is that hospital care is subject to 
unconstrained patient choice of the provider. Each year, it is estimated that 
35% out of the 10 million hospital admissions in Italy take place outside the 
LHAs of residence. This figure increases to almost 42% for cancer treatment 
and more than 58% for complex surgery. We observe geographical 
imbalances in patient mobility. For example, exit rates and average travelled 
distance to access hospital care are larger for enrolees in southern LHAs. In 
this paper we aim to evaluate the extent to which the observed imbalances 
are due to scale effects or reflect a deeper, long lasting north/south divide. In 
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particular, we focus on the scale effect played by the size of the pool of 
enrolees.  
The data we analyse are made by an origin/destination matrix provided 
by the Italian Ministry of Health and comprise all ordinary admissions to 
public hospitals for the year 2001. These data are similar to those used in 
Chapter 2, but are at a more disaggregated level, since they give information 
about the LHAs where hospitals providing services are located and the LHAs 
where the patient resides. We classify admissions into 4 product groups: 
cancer, basic medicine, basic surgery and complex surgery. To control for 
distance, contiguity, institutional barriers, presence of autonomous hospitals 
and supply characteristics, and to net out the effects played by the 
composition of patients’ flows, we estimate a gravity equation for the full 
matrix of pair-wise flows. Following Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006), we 
estimate gravity equations in multiplicative form using a Poisson pseudo 
maximum likelihood method. This method is robust to different patterns of 
heteroskedasticy and provides a natural way to deal with the zero flows.  
The analysis contributes to the literature in several ways. This is the 
first study that analyses the determinants of patient mobility across LHAs in 
Italy using a gravity approach. Whereas the study of Levaggi and Zanola 
(2004) has used the gravity approach to analyse patient mobility across 
Italian regions, our paper is original since we investigate patient mobility 
across Italians LHAs. Considering the pairwise matrix of flows at LHA level 
instead of regional level allows our paper to gain both informational and 
policy relevance. Moreover, to our knowledge, the scale effect played by the 
size of the pool of enrolees is an aspect that has not been considered before 
in the context of the Italian NHS. Our study is also the first that in the 
context of the Italian NHS estimates a gravity equation using a Poisson 
pseudo maximum likelihood method, as proposed by Santos-Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006). 
 
Chapter 4 “Contractual Conditions, Working Conditions, Health and 
Well-being in the British Household Panel Survey” considers the effects of 
contractual and working conditions on Self-Assessed Health (SAH) and 
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psychological well-being (derived from the General Health Questionnaire - 
GHQ) using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). We consider two 
branches of the literature. One suggests that “atypical” contractual conditions 
have a significant impact on health while the other suggests that health is 
damaged by adverse working conditions. The main objective of our paper is 
to combine the two branches of the literature to assess the distinct effects of 
contractual and working conditions on health and psychological well-being. 
As part our analysis, we attempt to evaluate the role that preferences for the 
number of hours of work, the level of employability and family structure 
play in affecting the relationship between contractual/working conditions and 
health and psychological well-being. We also attempt to evaluate if our data 
provide some support to the “demand-control-support” model (Karasek et al., 
1988; Karasek and Theorell, 1990) and the “effort–reward imbalance model” 
(Siegrist et al., 1990; Siegrist, 1996), two of the most influential models 
developed to investigate the possible mechanisms underling the relationship 
between working conditions and health and psychological well-being.  
To estimate our econometric models for self-assessed health and 
psychological well-being we exploit the panel data available in the first 12 
waves (1991–2002) of the BHPS, a longitudinal survey of private households 
in Great Britain, including rich information on occupational, socio-
demographic and health variables. In our analysis we use an unbalanced 
sample, which also includes new entrants to the survey. We consider only 
employees, and we exclude from our sample people outside the job market or 
who are self- employed. 
In our analysis we adopt a dynamic approach, regressing the present 
level of self-assessed health and psychological well-being on past values of 
the variables of interest. For modelling self-assessed health, since the 
dependent variable is categorical, we estimate non-linear dynamic panel 
ordered probit models, while for modelling psychological well-being we 
estimate a linear dynamic specification. 
The study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. The 
evaluation of the distinct effects of contractual and working conditions on 
health and psychological well-being is an original point of our study. Further, 
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many of the previous studies in the literature focus on specific occupational 
groups (i.e.: civil servants, nurses, etc.), which makes it difficult to generalise 
results to the entire workforce. In contrast, the use the BHPS allows us to 
generalize our results to a population of employees in Britain. Whereas other 
studies considering contractual and working conditions have used this dataset 
in the past (Bardasi and Francesconi, 2003; Bartley et al., 2004; Rodrigues, 
2002), our paper is original since we analyse the effects of contractual and 
working conditions jointly and we exploit a larger number of waves in the 
BHPS dataset. Moreover, we estimate dynamic panel data models (linear for 
GHQ and non linear for SAH), which provide many advantages compared to 
cross sectional approaches. For example, they increase precision in 
estimation, account for unobserved individual heterogeneity and reduce 
concerns about endogeneity bias (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).  
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Chapter 2 
 
Market structure and technology: evidence 
from the Italian National Health Service 
 
 
2.1. Introduction  
In the past few decades health care markets generally have been affected by 
two distinct structural changes. On one hand, the rapid pace of technological 
development as well as the diffusion of new technologies has increased cost by 
improving the quality of care and introducing new and costlier products. On the 
other hand a clear trend has emerged nationally towards decentralization of public 
intervention in health care. During the 90s, reforms favouring regionalization have 
reshaped national health services in Canada, Italy, Spain and Sweden, determining 
the rise of regional health services differentiated on the basis of organization, 
institutions and services, and increasing the autonomy of agents operating in the 
health care markets on both the demand and the supply side. On the demand side, 
patients have gained the right to choose the facilities that best meet their needs or 
expectations, while on the supply side hospitals and other health structures, apart 
from fulfilling a series of essential services, have become more autonomous in 
concentrating their own resources on specific health care productions started by 
technological innovations.1 As a whole, these changes have made health care 
markets more similar functionally to the traditional industrial sectors, where it is 
generally assumed that consumers are free to choose their supplier, suppliers are 
free to choose which product to offer and its quality, and technology plays a 
crucial role. 
In Italy, insofar as hospital care is concerned, the adoption of the DRG-payment 
system and the patients` right to freely choose the accredited facilities that best 
meet their requirements have to some extent introduced a ‘yardstick competition’ 
scheme in the health care system (Cellini et al., 2000). Even if hospitals do not 
                                                 
1 In Italy, for instance, although a standard level of health care must be offered across different 
regions, the new system of regional funding has greatly increased interregional differences in the 
quality and quantity of the services provided by the National Health Service. 
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compete on prices (since their services are mostly free-of-charge), they try to 
attract patients by competing on the quality of the services provided (Levaggi and 
Zanola, 2004; Mapelli, 2000). We stress that the DRG-based payment system is 
not applied to all Italian hospitals. The Italian National Health Service includes 
two categories of public hospitals: the Hospital Trusts, which have the status of 
quasi-independent public agencies and have financial and technical autonomy, 
and hospitals run directly by Local Health Units. The Local Health Unit represents 
the lowest level in the organization of the health care system and are organized as 
nonprofit firms. Local Health Units are run by a general director, responsible for 
ensuring sound financial management and provided by law with substantial 
autonomy in managing human, financial and technological resources. Hospital 
Trusts are financed through a DRG-based payment system whilst the hospitals 
included in Local Health Units use a cost reimbursement system. Even if the latter 
are not financed by a DRG-based payment system, (and, therefore, their financial 
solvency does not strictly depend on the number of services provided), they are 
however subject to competitive pressures. If the hospitals belonging to a Local 
Health Unit provide services of low quality, patients would move towards others 
and consequently the manager of the Local Health Unit would loose credibility as 
an administrator and risk not to be appointed as manager again in the future. 
A number of empirical studies have stressed the relevance of the relationship 
between geographic mobility of patients and the technological complexity of 
health services provided by different regional Health Services in Italy (Degli 
Esposti et al., 1996; Fabbri and Fiorentini, 1996; Spampinato, 2001; Ugolini and 
Fabbri, 1998). Patients are more willing to travel, and therefore to bear the 
associated costs of transaction, if they need highly specialized care.  
The industrial organization literature has largely investigated the relationship 
between technology and market structure. In this regard a standard reference is 
offered by the theoretical and empirical contribution by John Sutton. A key 
feature of Sutton’s (1991, 1998) work on industrial organization is that industrial 
markets evolve into distinct configurations of varying concentration, depending 
upon product homogeneity and differentiable R&D or advertising costs. Sutton 
develops his analysis with reference to manufacturing sectors. A number of 
subsequent contributions perform empirical tests for several industries in the EU 
 23
and the US, all of which support Sutton's predictions about market size and 
market structure (Buzzacchi and Valletti, 2003; de Juan, 2003; Giorgetti, 2000, 
2002, 2003; Gruber, 2002; Lyons and Matraves, 1996; Marin and Siotis, 2002; 
Matraves, 1999; Robinson and Chiang, 1996). We argue that the same 
interpretation can be given to the health care system, and similarly test the 
predictions due to Sutton’s argument when applied to the National Health Service 
in Italy. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 the theoretical framework 
proposed by Sutton is briefly illustrated. Section 2.3 discusses the criteria 
followed for the identification of the relevant markets for the analysis of hospital 
care services. Section 2.4 describes the data on the hospital care services provided 
by the Italian National Health Service (NHS) that are at the basis of this empirical 
application and shows how the procedures presented in Section 2.3 have been 
applied to these data. Section 2.5 illustrates the statistical tests developed to test 
Sutton’s empirical predictions about the relation between market concentration 
and market size, and between market concentration and product homogeneity. 
Section 2.6 concludes. 
 
2.2. Technology and market structure: the Sutton’s approach 
Sutton (1991, 1998) investigates the relationship between an industry’s R&D 
intensity (measured by the ratio of R&D spending on sales) and its level of 
concentration (measured by the combined market share of some specified number 
of firms). Although this relationship has been debated at length, empirically and 
theoretically, no consensus has formed. From a purely theoretical basis the 
direction of causality was originally disputed. 2  During the 70’s however, the 
endogeneity of concentration and R&D intensity became accepted, such that both 
should be determined simultaneously within an equilibrium system. When tested 
empirically, no clear consensus emerged from cross-industry analyses concerning 
                                                 
2  The latter stance is mainly based on appeal to the structure/conduct/performance paradigm 
developed by Bain (1956). Within that paradigm, it is claimed that a one-way chain of causation 
runs in each industry from structure (the level of concentration) to conduct (the degree of 
collusion), and from conduct to performance (profitability). Structure, in this setting, is explained 
by the degree of scale economies in the industry and by observed levels of advertising and R&D 
outlays relative to industry sales. 
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the sign and the form of the relationship, with all of positive, negative and no 
correlation found. 
The starting point of the theory developed by Sutton lies in the observation 
that R&D (and advertising) outlays can be considered as sunk costs incurred by 
the firm in order to enhance consumers’ willingness-to-pay for the firm’s product 
(Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1987; Sutton, 1989, 1991, 1998). Thus R&D and 
advertising outlays can be chosen by firms, and their levels can be determined 
endogenously as part of the specification of industry equilibrium: thus they can be 
considered as endogenous sunk costs. 
Here we are interested in two predictions put forward by Sutton (1991).  
 
Prediction 1: In exogenous sunk-cost markets (where R&D is low) the lower 
bound to equilibrium concentration converges monotonically to zero as the ratio 
between the market size and the set up costs increases (see Figure 1).  
Prediction 2: In endogenous sunk-cost markets (where R&D is intensive) 
concentration remains bounded away from zero as the ratio between the market 
size and the set-up costs increase (see Figure 2).  
 
The intuition behind is the following. In exogenous sunk-cost markets, a 
continuing increase in market size gives entrants the opportunity to build a 
profitable scale of operations. Alternatively in endogenous sunk-cost markets a 
firm is willing to suffer short-term losses in order to gain long-term revenues. As 
market size increase, long-term revenues increase. Through this mechanism, 
increasing market size leads to a competitive escalation in short-term spending: 
eventually, when this spending becomes too high for new entrants entry is 
blocked. The degree to which concentration is bounded away from zero is an 
empirical matter. 
 In a later contribution, Sutton (1998) derives two distinct empirical 
predictions regarding the joint distribution of R&D intensity, concentration, and 
product homogeneity. 
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Prediction 3: In industries where R&D intensity is low, the lower bound to 
concentration converges to zero as the size of the market becomes large, 
independently of the degree of product homogeneity (see Figure 3). 
Prediction 4: On the contrary, in industries where R&D intensity is high, the 
lower bound to concentration increases from zero with product homogeneity (see 
Figure 4). 
 
Therefore, if R&D is ineffective in raising consumers' willingness-to-pay, it 
can be shown that R&D intensity is necessarily low. Following this, if we select a 
set of industry for which the R&D/sales ratio is high, we know that for this group 
R&D effectiveness is high. Whether this necessarily implies a high level of 
concentration depends on the strength of the linkages between sub-markets, which 
in turn depends on the scope economies and the degree of substitutability across 
products associated with different R&D trajectories. Where these are relevant (so 
homogeneity is high), concentration will be necessarily high since, if all firms 
have a low market share, an escalation of R&D spending will be profitable. A 
high-R&D-spending firm can capture sales from low-R&D-spending rivals on its 
own trajectory and on the others. On the contrary, when the scope economies and 
the degree of substitutability across products are limited (so homogeneity is low), 
concentration may be low in spite of the effectiveness of R&D spending. There 
are many product groups, associated with different R&D trajectories, and 
therefore escalation can yield only poor returns. If on the other hand R&D 
intensity is low, the absence of an escalation mechanism involving R&D makes 
the market able to support an indefinite number of firms, and therefore the theory 
predicts that the lower bound to concentration is zero independent of product 
homogeneity. 
The empirical predictions by Sutton place only weak restrictions on 
observable industry characteristics such as R&D intensity, market size, product 
homogeneity and market concentration, leaving the predictions quite general. 3  
                                                 
3 We underline that Sutton`s predictions hold independently of the level of price competition 
present in the markets. The theoretical framework of Sutton (1991, 1998), indeed, can be adopted 
in the context of different industrial organization models, such as Bertrand, Cournot or the 
Monopoly model. The theoretical framework of Sutton, therefore, can be applied even to markets 
where the economical agents do not behave according to the model of perfect competition, such as 
the Italian hospital care market.      
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This generality is exploited by Sutton (1991, 1998) by following two different 
paths of analysis, by developing a statistical test of his empirical predictions based 
on data from a selection of industrial sectors, then by discussing a series of 
industry cases (from flow-meters to turbine generators) that, through a detailed 
collection of qualitative information, enable further probing of the theory and its 
validity. 
 
2.3. The identification of relevant market: methodological issues 
In order to test the empirical predictions claimed by Sutton in the case of the 
hospital care services provided by the Italian NHS the relevant markets must first 
be identified. This issue is crucial when considering the anticompetitive strategies 
firms eventually undertake after mergers and acquisitions. Indeed, much of the 
literature about the identification of the relevant markets has been developed with 
the aim of detecting such strategies. In general, a relevant market can be 
characterized according to two different dimensions: the “product” dimension and 
the “geographic” dimension. 
As underlined by Sutton (1991), the product relevant to identify a market 
can be characterized with either reference to the demand side by considering the 
substitutability of products in consumption, or to the supply side by focusing on 
the similarities in production techniques. The demand side criterion is used more 
frequently, although the latter is convenient when barriers to mobility between 
markets are relevant in the industry under consideration (Caveas and Porter, 1978).  
Two different approaches are usually seen when identifying the relevant 
geographic markets for a product. The first is based on the evolution of prices in 
different geographic areas; the second on the movement of physical quantities of 
the product across different areas. Since in Italy hospital care is essentially free-
of-charge and, as a consequence, the market equilibrium is not reached through 
the price mechanism, we focus on the second approach.  
Within this general perspective, the method developed by Elzinga and 
Hogarty (1973, 1978) is most useful. This is a shipment-based technique 
involving measurements of product flows across areas, which is based on the 
application of two different tests: 
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1. the Little Out From Inside (LOFI) test. The LOFI test concerns the supply 
side of the market and is based on the question, “What is the smallest 
geographic region required to account for nearly all shipments from a given 
producing area?”; 
2. the Little In From Outside (LIFO) test. The LIFO test refers to the demand 
side of the market and centres around the question, “Of total purchases within 
the region identified by the LOFI test do nearly all emanate from within that 
region itself?”. 
 
The logic behind this approach is simple. If a certain area meets both of 
these tests, and this occurs when outflows to other areas and inflows into that area 
are relatively small, then that area is taken as a relevant market according to the 
Elzinga and Hogarty criterion. It is usually required that those outflows and 
inflows do not exceed a given threshold, which is often set to 10% or 25% of the 
total amount of production or consumption.  
The implementation of the Elzinga and Hogarty procedure requires the 
following steps. The first step in the definition of the geographic market requires 
the identification of a geographical area as the starting point. Conventionally, the 
area characterized by the biggest volume of production is considered as the staring 
point. In our work the starting point is the Province providing the largest share of 
hospital care treatments in a MDC. Then a “hypothetical market” is defined as the 
“macro” area formed by the smallest number of areas whose residents consume, in 
the aggregate, at least 90% of the goods produced in the area assumed as the 
starting point. Notice that the Elzinga and Hogarty procedure does not require the 
areas forming the hypothetical market to be contiguous. Those areas do not need 
to share some geographical border. If at least 90% of the goods consumed within 
that hypothetical market are produced by the areas that form that market, the 
LIFO test is met, and then the procedure moves to the next step, the LOFI test. If 
the LIFO test is not met, it is necessary to enlarge the hypothetical market area by 
including one (or more) additional areas until the LIFO test is satisfied. If the 
hypothetical market area satisfies even the LOFI test, then that area is assumed to 
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be a relevant market for that product. Otherwise, analogously to the approach 
followed before, additional areas are added to the original hypothetical market till 
the LOFI test is passed. Annex 1 provides more details about the way the Elzinga 
and Hogarty procedure has been implemented with regards to the Italian hospital 
care markets.  
The Elzinga and Hogarty method was originally developed with reference to 
commodity markets, like beer (Elzinga and Hogarty, 1973) or coal (Elzinga and 
Hogarty, 1978; Warell, 2005). It has been recently applied to the context of 
hospital care as well. During the 90s the US Department of Justice relied on the 
analysis of patients flows in order to assess a number of cases of hospital mergers 
(Capps et al. 2002, 2003). Moreover, Dalmau-Matarrodona and Puig-Junoy (1998) 
estimated geographic hospital markets in Catalunya as a first step in evaluating 
the potential effect of market structure on hospital technical efficiency. 
The Elzinga and Hogarty method has been criticized on several grounds. 
Capps et al. (2001) discuss the so-called ‘silent majority fallacy’ of the Elzinga 
and Hogarty criterion, “If travellers differ significantly from non-travellers, then 
the presence of a minority of travellers does not imply that local firms lack market 
power vis-à-vis the majority of consumers who are non-travellers” (Capps et al., 
2001, 2002). 
Non-traveller customers can be considered a ‘silent majority’, which has 
fewer choices after a merger. Thus, in markets with heterogeneous tastes for 
different services the relevant market according to the definition of Elzinga and 
Hogarty could be too broad. Werden (1981, 1989) has put forward two other 
arguments. First, the Elzinga and Hogarty method does not account for potential 
competition because if the price cross-elasticity of demand is high the firms in the 
different regions are not likely to set prices independently. In this situation, the 
Elzinga and Hogarty criterion would identify markets too narrowly. Secondly, the 
Elzinga and Hogarty method follows a static, rather than a dynamic, approach to 
the identification of relevant markets. In fact, it fails to analyze post-merger 
shipment patterns and never answers the question of whether firms could 
profitably raise prices after a merger. This criticism implies that in some cases 
markets are defined too broadly. 
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Although we recognize that no criterion for market identification is ideal for 
all kinds of markets, we believe that the Elzinga and Hogarty method suits the 
case of the Italian hospital care market quite well, for both practical and 
theoretical reasons. On practical grounds, the empirical application in this paper is 
based on data for patients’ mobility for hospital treatment across Italian Provinces 
that, as discussed in details in Section 2.4, are organized in the form of an 
origin/destination matrix. This kind of structure is particularly suitable for the 
implementation of the Elzinga and Hogarty approach. Moreover, since Italian 
hospitals do not compete directly according to price, the use of alternative 
methods based on price competition would not fit this case. On the theoretical 
ground, the ‘silent majority’ argument seems not to apply to our case because we 
consider the flows of patients across Provinces for each Main Diagnostic Category 
(MDC) separately, and in each MDC some degree of patient homogeneity is likely. 
Blackstone and Fuhr (2000) support this argument, underlining that the Elzinga 
and Hogarty criterion may be more appropriate if applied by Diagnosis Related 
Group (DRG) or by some procedural category. In order to make our analysis more 
robust with regards to the “silent majority” argument, we should consider also the 
heterogeneity of the socio-economic conditions of the patients. Unfortunately, the 
data about patient flows we use for our analysis are collected at aggregated level 
and do not contain any information about the patients at individual level. Due to 
these data limitations, therefore, we cannot consider this further feature. 
Accordingly, while a DRG may be homogenous clinically, they may mask 
differences across individuals in terms of their socio-economic characteristics. 
We believe that the arguments put forward by Werden (1981, 1989) seem 
not to be relevant in this case, because our aim is not to detect anti-competitive 
strategies, as in most of the studies to which Werden refers. In our analysis it 
would not be useful to adopt a dynamic definition of the relevant markets, since 
we are interested only in providing a snapshot of the concentration of the market 
for hospital care. On a general ground, the use of longitudinal data and the 
adoption of a dynamic approach could provide useful insights about the 
relationship between market concentration and technological intensity in the 
Italian hospital care market. Considering that the panel dataset we have access to 
is very short (it comprises only the years 1999 and 2001), however, the adoption 
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of a dynamic perspective would not increase the informative content of our 
analysis in a significant way. Accordingly, we specify cross-sectional models. 
Also, as stressed by Blackstone and Fuhr (2000), the empirical application of the 
dynamic definition is very demanding due to the difficulty of predicting the future 
of such a rapidly-changing industry.  
 
2.4. The identification of relevant markets: empirical application 
 
2.4.1. The data 
The structure of the hospital markets in Italy is analyzed in this paper with 
data containing information about the services (discharges) provided by all the 
public hospitals operating in the Italian NHS during 1999. For any single 
discharge, the data-set reports the corresponding DRG according to the 
classification adopted by the Italian Ministry of Health, the tariffs corresponding 
to each DRG by which the Local Health Units were reimbursed, the hospital 
where the service was provided together with the Province where that hospital 
was located, and the Province where the patient resided. The data includes all the 
492 DRGs covered by the classification by the Italian Ministry of Health as well 
as the 103 Provinces into which the Italian territory is partitioned.4 Moreover, the 
Ministry of Health assembles the DRGs into 25 MDCs (representing specific 
diagnostic groups). Some observations are excluded due to incomplete 
information (the tests are performed considering 480 DRGs).5 The data is in the 
form of an origin-destination matrix, which allows direct investigation of each 
patients’ mobility across Italian Provinces. 
 
2.4.2. Product and geographic dimension of the markets 
Testing the empirical predictions due to Sutton (1991, 1998) requires 
identification of the relevant markets, in terms of both the product and the 
                                                 
4 No medical care services corresponding to DRG numbers 109, 438 and 474 are reported in the 
1999 data-set, even if those DRGs are included in the official classification. 
5  In order to perform statistical tests on the data, we have excluded from the data-set those 
observations that do not report complete information about the corresponding DRG, the hospital 
where the service is provided, the Province where the hospital is operative. A number of health 
services corresponding to DRG numbers 468, 469, 470, 476, 477, 480, 481, 482 and 483, which 
the official classification does not include in any MDC, have been removed as well. 
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geographic dimensions. For the product dimension we define the relevant markets 
in such a way that the criteria referring to the demand side and the supply side are, 
at least to some extent, both satisfied. If we consider the demand side criterion, we 
should only focus on the substitutability across hospital treatments, which is very 
low here because of the characteristics of the services in question. As a 
consequence, according to this criterion, each DRG should be regarded as a 
separate product. When considering the supply side however, the DRGs included 
in a specific MDC generally share many similarities in the production techniques. 
A hospital producing a DRG included in a specific MDC can easily provide 
another DRG not as yet provided in that MDC, while it is much more difficult 
technologically to provide a new DRG in an MDC that is not currently provided. 
Thus, considering these two perspectives jointly, it seems reasonable to regard the 
MDCs as the relevant main products that include the DRGs as sub-products. 
The Elzinga and Hogarty criterion has then been applied distinctly for each 
MDC to the Provincial origin-destination matrix, in order to add the geographic 
dimension and to identify the relevant markets. 6  As a result, 1,425 distinct 
relevant markets have been identified. Figure 5 and 6 report respectively the 
geographic sub-division of Italy into the relevant markets identified in the case of 
Burns and of Neonatal period diseases, taken as examples of products 
characterized by relatively few markets (42 in the case of Burns) and by a more 
fragmented market structure (83 in the case of Neonatal period diseases). 
Some summary statistics of the structure of relevant markets classified 
according to product are provided in Table. 1. The characterization of the relevant 
markets is much diversified across different products. First of all, the various 
products are sharply differentiated in terms of the number of services provided, of 
sub-products included and of hospitals producing those services. For example, the 
number of health services ranges from 1,097,901 (Cardio-vascular apparatus 
diseases) to 7,268 (Burns). Variability is marked also as far as the number of sub-
products included in different product categories is concerned, which have a 
coefficient of variation 0.68, whereas dispersion is much more limited when we 
look at the number of hospitals operating in each product, showing a coefficient of 
variation of only 0.14. 
                                                 
6 Annex 1 presents the empirical procedure employed in detail. 
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We consider the size of the relevant markets by the number of the residents in 
the corresponding geographic area as a measure of composition, which differs 
according to the products. The distribution of this index, summarized in terms of 
average and coefficient of variation, greatly vary across products. In general, 
markets that are large on average are, to some extent, associated with higher 
variability in that product compared to the others (compare for example Myelo-
proliferative and Neonatal period diseases). 
Another way to characterize the composition of the relevant markets is to 
look at the number and the territorial localization of the institutional entities (in 
this case the Provinces) composing those markets. Table 1 shows for each product 
the percentage of the relevant markets including more than one Province 
(multiprov), that provides a measure of fragmentation of markets in territorial 
terms.7 Again a large dispersion is noticeable across products, ranging from a 
minimum of 18.1% (Neonatal period diseases) to a maximum of 52.1% (Factors 
affecting health and health services demand). Moreover, the composition of 
relevant markets by Provinces highlights possible territorial discontinuities in 
their geographic structure. The last column of Table 1 (discontinuity) contains the 
number of non-contiguous Provinces in the same market for each product. For 
some specific products the structure of the relevant markets shows a relatively 
high number (up to 5) of non-contiguous Provinces. Upon closer investigation, 
those Provinces are usually located in Southern Italy as opposed to the central 
group of the (contiguous) Provinces constituting the market in Northern or Central 
Italy. This result is consistent, with previous research on patient mobility that 
shows relevant interregional patients flowing from South to Centre-North of the 
country.8 In summary, for the products where the markets are larger on average, 
they are also generally more differentiated in size within the same product 
category, they are more likely composed of more than one Province and those 
                                                 
7 Given the different size of the Provinces in which the Italian territory is partitioned, it is obvious 
that the number of Provinces provides only a prima facie measure of the territorial dimension of 
the markets. 
8  For instance, Donatini et al. (2001), claim that Northern regions attract more interregional 
patients than they lose to other regions, whereas the opposite occurs for Southern regions. This is 
because people in Northern Italy tend to receive care in their own or nearby regions, unlike their 
Southern counterparts.  
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Provinces are sometimes not contiguous, such that patients flow generally from 
Provinces in South Italy to Centre-North. 
 
2.4.3. Market concentration, product homogeneity and technology 
To analyze the market structure of the Italian NHS through Sutton’s 
theoretical framework, some correspondences between the theoretical setting and 
the data need to be established. Thus (i) within each market hospitals operate as 
firms; (ii) revenue is measured by the number of services provided, multiplied by 
their corresponding tariff; (iii) the share of each hospital in each market is 
measured by the sales revenue gained by that hospital over the total revenue 
gained in that market. 
In order to test the consistency of our data with the empirical predictions from 
Sutton’s theory, three indices have been derived for each market: 
1. The concentration index C1, defined as the market shares corresponding to the 
firm providing the largest number of health services in the market; 
2. The homogeneity index h , determined as the fraction of sales revenue 
corresponding to the largest sub-market (in terms of number of health 
services produced) in the market; 
3. The size index size, determined as the revenue realized in the market, divided 
by the revenue of the median hospital. 
Information about the technological characteristics of the relevant markets is 
also required. Given that information of this kind is not included in our data, we 
resort to more detailed data available for a particular Italian region (Emilia 
Romagna). We assume that the technology adopted in the production of each 
category of health care is analogous across regions, unlike the composition of 
health care productions, which differs across regions. This data contains the 
number of health care services provided by every hospital distinctly by DRG and 
hospital ward and, on the other hand, total costs classified by main items (medical 
staff, paramedic staff, executive staff, non-durable goods purchases, etc.) incurred 
by hospital wards of each hospital. The basic cost items by hospital wards and 
services provided (measured in terms of hospitalization days) classified by 
hospital wards and DRG have then been aggregated across hospitals. Among the 
cost items the category of capital costs (depreciations plus capital goods hiring) 
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have been selected. A capital intensity index has then been derived for each DRG 
as the product of the ‘weight index’, which measures, according to the Italian 
Ministry of Health, the overall amount of human and physical resources necessary 
to provide the services corresponding to that DRG, and the weighted average of 
the ratio of capital costs to total costs for each hospital ward, where the weights 
are given by the share of the total number of services each hospital ward provides 
in each DRG.9 The capital intensity index is then considered to be a proxy for the 
technological intensity of each DRG.10 Finally, the technological intensity index 
tech  for each relevant market has been derived as the weighted average of the 
capital intensity index for the DRGs included in that market, where the weights 
are given by the share of the total production of that market concerning for each 
sub-product (that is, each DRG).11 
The average values of tech , C1, h  and size  for the relevant markets 
classified by products are given in Table 2. The values of tech  shows limited 
variation across products (coefficient of variation equal to 0.094) in comparison 
with the other indices reported, especially in the case of h  and C1 (0.535 and 
0.506 respectively). Since, as discussed in Section 2.2, Sutton’s theory provides 
different empirical predictions depending on whether the market considered is 
characterized by high or low technological intensity it is interesting to evaluate the 
relationship between the variation of the index tech  and that of some of the other 
characteristics of the relevant markets presented in Table 1. In particular, the 
technological intensity of the market turns out to be significantly correlated with 
                                                 
9 More precisely, for the ith DRG and the jth hospital ward, capital intensity index ti is derived as: 
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where k, c, s and w denote capital costs, total costs, the number of services (measured in terms of 
hospitalization days) and the weight index respectively. 
10 Higher research intensity might require more medical staffing (Blank and Vogelaar, 2004). To 
consider this we have also tried to approximate the R&D intensity of the DRGs by defining a 
‘physician intensity index.’ This is computed, analogously to the ‘capital intensity index’ with 
reference to the ratio between the costs for physicians and the total cost. The distribution of the 
values of the physician intensity index across different DRGs is similar to the capital intensity 
index one (the correlation between the two is 0.98). Therefore, resorting to the physician intensity 
index instead of the capital intensity index seems not to affect the results of our analysis 
significantly. 
11 We are aware that the index adopted here (the share of capital costs) is not an optimal proxy for 
the R&D intensity since it neglects relevant components of R&D, such as that provided by 
hospitals as units and by university hospitals. However we stress that, as stated in Sutton (1991), 
the R&D intensity is considered only in order to partition the markets into two groups. Thus, 
possible measurement errors in this variable are not expected to affect the results of the analysis. 
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both market size and variation of market size within the corresponding product 
category, with multi-Province composition and with the probability of non-
contiguous Provinces being in the same market. 
 
2.5. Empirical results 
The consistency of the empirical predictions by Sutton with the market 
structure of the Italian NHS is tested here on the basis of the relevant markets as 
identified and characterized in Section 2.4. Given that Sutton makes different 
predictions according to the technological intensity of the considered markets, we 
first partition the sample into two different groups, one with a relatively high level 
of technological intensity (high-tech markets) and a control group in which the 
technological intensity is relatively low (low-tech markets). A rather crude way to 
proceed is to order the markets by the tech  index, and to choose as cut-off the 
average (0.062).12 To distinguish the two groups more sharply, we exclude from 
each group the 30% of the total number of markets whose tech  value is closest to 
the cut-off level. As a result, the high-tech and the low-tech group include 592 and 
406 markets respectively. 
The partitioning of the sample into the high-tech and low-tech groups makes 
it possible to stress some preliminary descriptive statistics. In particular, high-tech 
markets are characterized on average by lower values of h  (0.284 and 0.442 
respectively), higher levels of C1 (0.508 and 0.447 respectively) and size (18.17 
and 17.35 respectively). 
 
2.5.1. Market concentration and market size 
The relationship between C1 and size in each market is given in Figure 7 and 
8. Our concern is comparing these diagrams with the predicted lower bounds from 
Figure 1 and Figure 2, which reflect Predictions 1 and 2 respectively. Following 
Sutton, we adopt Smith’s (1985, 1994) use of a two-step procedure to estimate the 
lower bound for the scatters of observations shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8. The 
first step of the procedure requires making some a priori decision about the form 
of the schedule )(zf  that describes the lower bound. We can then obtain a 
                                                 
12 Notice that our choice of the cut-off point is to some extent arbitrary and that other criteria could 
be adopted to define it. 
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consistent estimator of the actual schedule by minimising the sum of )( ii zfy −  
subject to the constraint that all residuals shall be non-negative. The second step 
involves employing the method of pseudo-maximum likelihood to check that the 
pattern of the estimated residual fits a Weibull distribution.13 14 
 
The three-parameter Weibull distribution is defined on the domain µ≥t  by: 
⎪⎭
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where 0>β  and 0>δ . The three parameters (β , δ , µ ) denote shape, scale and 
location respectively. The location parameter µ  represents the lower bound to the 
support of the distribution. If µ = 0 the distribution simplifies to the so called two-
parameter Weibull. 
The procedure rests on the assumption that the distribution of residuals is 
identical at all values of the independent variable. This assumption would be 
unrealistic if applied directly to the values assumed by C1, considering the upper 
limit of 1C  is equal to 1. For this reason we take the logit transformation of C1: 
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The first step of the estimate procedure implies making some assumptions 
about the form of the schedule describing the lower bound and estimating the 
parameter of the schedule. A reasonable family of candidate schedules would 
be:15 
                                                 
13  We have chosen to use a Weibull distribution as the distribution generating the level of 
concentration in the markets because it is a very flexible functional form. It can assume different 
shapes and different position in the plane according to the values given to its parameters. For this 
reason it has been widely used in fitting bounds to various empirical distributions (references). 
14 As underlined by Giorgetti (2003) and Robinson and Chiang (1996), the presence of outliers in 
the data could influence the estimate of lower bound functions. Other estimation techniques, such 
as Koenker et al. (1994) are more robust to the presence of outliers. However, following the 
approach of Robinson and Chiang (1996), we adopt Smith`s lower bound estimation method 
because this is the method used by Sutton to estimate lower bound functions and the adoption of 
this method allows us to avoid possible inconsistencies that may arise using a different estimation 
technique. Accordingly we can compare our results to those of Sutton.     
15 Considering the relationship between market structure and market size, Sutton (1991) states 
that, in markets with endogenous sunk costs, the lower bound to market concentration not only 
does not converge to zero as the ratio between market size and set up cost increases, but also does 
not necessarily follow a decreasing (or even monotonic) pattern. Insofar as product differentiation 
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Figure 7 and Figure 8 show the estimated schedules describing the lower 
bound in the high-tech markets (the dotted line) and in the low-tech markets (the 
thick line). As shown in Table 3, the estimated parameter a  is equal to –3.773 and 
–6.161 for the high-and low-tech markets respectively. The estimated values for 
the parameter b  result in a higher slope for the lower bound for low-tech markets 
(6.418) than for high-tech markets (3.744). Moreover, the parameters a  and b  are 
significant at a confidence level higher than 99% for both the two groups of 
markets. The standard errors of a  and b are obtained with a Monte Carlo 
simulation of 10,000 repetitions, and support the generation of error terms from a 
Weibull distribution characterized by the estimated parameters. The estimated 
schedules in the high-tech and low-tech markets give support to Prediction 1 and 
2 presented in Section 2.2. 
As second step of this procedure, we check whether the associated set of 
residuals fits a Weibull distribution. Assuming that the set of residuals is 
distributed as a two-parameter Weibull, we show that residuals fit that distribution 
well for both high-tech and low-tech markets.16,17 To test the hypothesis that the 
estimated schedules for both groups of markets converge to the same value as the 
market size goes to infinity, we examine the values assumed by *1C  distinctively 
for high-tech and low-tech markets when size  goes to infinity. That value equals 
–3.773 (which corresponds to C1 = 0.026) and –6.418 (C1 = 0.002) for high-tech 
and low-tech markets respectively. These results are consistent again with 
Predictions 1 and 2.18 
                                                                                                                                     
renders advertising or research costs more effective in increasing the consumer willingness to pay, 
the outspending in advertising or R&S could even raise the concentration levels. In the present 
study we have not considered this further prediction but this might be a suitable topic for further 
study.  
16 The assumption that the residuals follow a two-parameter Weibull is made even by previous 
studies in the literature (Giogetti (2003), Marin and Siotis (2002)). 
17 We define µ−=tR ii , given a reasonable value for µ , and rank Ri  in ascending order. Then we 
define the cumulative distribution )(RiF . If the Ri  is defined as having a two-parameter Weibull 
distribution, a plot of )))(1/(1(ln RFy ii −=  against Riln  yields a straight line. Our analysis shows 
that the previous relationship is supported by the data (for simplicity, we omit the graphics) the set 
of residuals is well approximated by a Weibull. 
18 The estimated β < 2 is a known indicator of the appropriateness of Smith’s procedure. The 
maximum likelihood is a more common method than Smith’s procedure to estimate lower bounds, 
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2.5.2. Market concentration and market homogeneity  
The relationship between C1 and h  is shown in Figure 9 and 10 for the high-
tech and low-tech markets respectively. We compare these diagrams with the 
predicted lower bounds shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4, which represent 
graphically Predictions 3 and 4. The data from the Italian NHS does not appear to 
contrast those theoretical predictions at face value. The high-tech group does not 
include observations where high values of h  are coupled with low values of C1, 
whereas some low-tech markets are characterized by both low product 
homogeneity and low concentration. This encourages a formal statistical 
procedure in order to test Sutton’s predictions. Sutton’s theory makes no general 
assumptions as to the functional form of the lower bound, however in the limiting 
case where all sub-markets are completely independent, the theoretical framework 
states that the bound for the high-tech group takes the form of a ray through the 
origin.19 
For the same matters discussed in Section 2.5.1, before running the statistical 
test we apply to the C1 index the transformation: 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−= 1
*
1 1
1ln
C
C  
As far as the form of the schedule describing the lower bound, a reasonable 
family of candidate schedules would be: 
haC **1 =  
When Smith’s procedure is applied, the estimated parameter a  is equal to 
0.177 and 0.069 respectively for high-tech and low-tech markets (as shown in 
Table 3). Therefore, the slope of the lower bound for the low-tech markets, even if 
not exactly equal to zero, is very close to zero and is much lower than the slope of 
the lower bound for the high-tech case. The estimate of parameter a  is significant 
                                                                                                                                     
but when β < 2 its usual asymptotic results do not hold (Smith 1985, 1989). In our case the 
estimated value of the parameter β  is less than 2 for both low-tech and high-tech markets (equal 
respectively to 1.349 and 1.795) and thus it is appropriate to use the Smith’s approach. 
19 These predictions have been tested previously using a procedure due to Mann, Scheuer and 
Fertig (1973). This method is useful because it bypasses the estimation of the shape and scale 
parameters of the distribution and constructs directly a confidence interval for the lower bound. 
Thus it involves less computation than Smith’s approach, however it requires dealing with samples 
of dimensions up to 100 observations, far smaller than ours. For this reason we continue with 
Smith’s procedure. 
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at a confidence level higher than 99% for both groups of markets. Thus the 
relationship between the estimated schedules in the high-tech and low-tech 
markets gives support to Predictions 3 and 4. 
As for the relationship between C1 and size , considering the relationship 
between C1 and h  we assume that the residuals are distributed as a two-parameter 
Weibull and, following the procedure described in Section 2.5.1, we show that 
they fit that distribution both in high-tech and in low-tech markets case.20  
 
2.6. Final remarks 
In this paper we have tested empirically the existence of the relationship 
between technological profiles and market structure claimed by Sutton’s theory in 
a specific economic framework, that of health care services provided by the Italian 
NHS. 
In order to test the empirical predictions by Sutton, we have identified the 
relevant markets for hospital care services in Italy in terms of both product and 
geographic dimensions. In particular, the Elzinga and Hogarty approach has been 
applied to data on patients’ flows across Italian Provinces in order to derive the 
geographic dimension of each market. To our knowledge, this is the first time this 
approach has been utilized with reference to the Italian hospital treatments sector. 
Our results support the empirical predictions by Sutton, that in markets where 
technological intensity is low the lower bound to market concentration converges 
monotonically to zero when the market size increases, for any level of product 
homogeneity. Conversely, in markets where technological intensity is high the 
lower bound to concentration converges to a positive value different from zero 
when the market size increases, while the lower bound increases from zero with 
the level of product homogeneity. 
These results provide some useful indications to the policy–makers about 
the functioning of the Italian NHS. In order to enhance the relevance of this 
evidence however, the institutional setting and the regulation constraints affecting 
the hospital treatment sector in Italy should be investigated more thoroughly. 
                                                 
20 Even in this case, the estimated value of the parameterβ  is less then 2 for both the categories of 
markets (respectively equal to 0.844 and 0.952), proving the suitability of the Smith’s 
methodology.  
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Moreover, the structure of hospital care markets identified here through the 
Elzinga and Hogarty approach could be further exploited in order to examine the 
potential effect on hospital technical efficiency. 
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Annex 1. The application of Elzinga and Hogarty 
procedure 
 
The application of the Elzinga and Hogarty procedure includes a number of 
different steps. First of all, for each product (that is, for each MDC as discussed in 
the main text) the Province providing the largest share of hospital care treatments 
is taken as the starting point in the identification of the geographic market. We are 
aware that any procedure of selecting a starting point is somewhat arbitrary. 
Indeed, Elzinga and Hogarty (1978) recognize that the role of subjective judgment 
is relevant in postulating the “potential” market area, especially when the anti-
competitive strategies carried out after a merger is not a central concern. 
Then a “hypothetical market” is defined as the area formed by the smallest 
number of Provinces whose residents consume, in the aggregate, at least 75% of 
the hospital care services produced in the Province assumed as the starting point. 
We adopt here the 75% threshold (and not a more binding condition, such as 90%) 
to reduce the risk, as stressed by Elzinga and Hogarty (1978), that markets overlap 
and are not independent. This would not be acceptable for our analysis since 
Sutton’s framework requires dealing with independent markets. 
If at least 75% of the services consumed within that hypothetical market are 
produced by the Provinces that make up that market, the LIFO test is met, and 
then the procedure moves to the next step, the LOFI test. If it is not the case, it is 
necessary to enlarge the hypothetical market area by including one (or more) 
additional Provinces up to the LIFO test is satisfied. The LOFI test requires that at 
least 75% of the services produced in the market is consumed within that area. If 
the hypothetical market area satisfies even the LOFI test, then that area is assumed 
to be a relevant market for that product. Otherwise, analogously to the approach 
followed before, additional Provinces join the original hypothetical market till the 
LOFI test is passed. The LIFO test is then applied again on the new area, and so 
on. Once a relevant market is identified, another round of the Elzinga and Hogarty 
procedure just described is applied to the remaining Provinces not included in that 
market, until all the Provinces are allocated in the corresponding relevant markets. 
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Figure 5. The relevant markets for “Burns”  
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Figure 6. The relevant markets for "Neonatal Period Diseases" 
3
454 5 
23
7 6 42
77
7 3 
1 8 18 68
16 28
6 4 
1
8 7
42 5 4 4 6 
19
22
9
11
67
13 13
13
71
27 80
60
6 5 38
2 0 20 14
55
48
37
43 29
29 29
68
44 63
10
5 1 
1 0 49
56
75
21
58
58 81
2
33 30
5 5
5 57
26
69
52
36
36
61
17
4
25 40
15
41
70
24
32
39
47 6 66
6
50
72 12
31 31
3 4 
5 9 
35
62
82
79
45
5 3 
7 4 
37
10
32
83
7 8
 Note: the reported numbers denote the inclusion of Provinces in the relevant markets. 
 
 
 46
Figure7: Market concentration and size in high-tech markets
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Figure 8: Market concentration and size in low-tech markets
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Figure 9: Market concentration and product homogeneity in 
high-tech markets
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Figure 10: Market concentration and product homogeneity in 
low-tech markets
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Table 1: relevant market description  
 
# % # % # % average coeff variation
1 Nervous system diseases 643,878        7.63 35 7.29 817 99.63 977,625       2.02 27.1% 0
2 Eye diseases 312,153        3.70 13 2.71 760 92.68 1,253,911    1.55 37.0% 2
3 Ear, nose, mouth and throat diseases 436,194        5.17 31 6.46 806 98.29 961,332       1.17 38.3% 1
4 Respiratory apparatus diseases 583,960        6.92 29 6.04 810 98.78 769,065       1.29 24.0% 0
5 Cardio-vascular apparatus diseases 1,097,901     13.01 44 9.17 813 99.15 812,393       1.39 25.4% 0
6 Digestive system apparatus 888,333        10.53 40 8.33 809 98.66 720,999       1.29 21.3% 0
7 Hepatobiliary and pancreatic diseases 331,566        3.93 18 3.75 797 97.20 1,011,928    1.69 29.8% 5
8 Muscle-skeletal system diseases and disesas of connective tissue 707,931        8.39 40 8.33 811 98.90 1,281,776    1.53 37.8% 1
9 Skin, subcutaneous tissue and breast diseases 583,268        6.91 38 7.92 809 98.66 961,332       1.32 30.0% 1
10 Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases 172,431        2.04 17 3.54 808 98.54 1,441,997    1.67 42.5% 5
11 Kidney and urinary system diseases 385,963        4.57 32 6.67 798 97.32 1,068,146    1.61 31.5% 4
12 Male reproductive system diseases 146,877        1.74 19 3.96 778 94.88 994,481       1.28 29.3% 1
13 Female reproductive system diseases 277,077        3.28 17 3.54 779 95.00 1,088,300    1.35 41.5% 1
14 Gestation and birth 680,852        8.07 15 3.13 652 79.51 769,065       1.13 25.3% 0
15 Neonatal period diseases 412,222        4.89 7 1.46 648 79.02 694,939       1.11 18.1% 0
16
Diseases of the blood, of the haemopoietic organs and of the immune 
system 80,442          0.95 8 1.67 801 97.68 915,554       1.55 27.0% 5
17 Myelo-proliferative diseases 198,833        2.36 17 3.54 802 97.80 1,558,916    2.29 40.5% 5
18 Infectious diseases 70,018          0.83 9 1.88 792 96.59 1,130,978    1.10 33.3% 0
19 Mental diseases 179,980        2.13 9 1.88 803 97.93 873,938       1.38 24.2% 3
20 Alcohol/drugs abuse and induced organic mental diseases 32,289          0.38 5 1.04 756 92.20 860,894       1.52 23.9% 1
21 Traumatisms, poisonings and tossic effects of medicines 96,211          1.14 17 3.54 801 97.68 994,481       1.43 31.0% 2
22 Burns 7,268            0.09 6 1.25 616 75.12 1,373,331    1.66 28.6% 0
23 Factors affecting health and health services demand 83,820          0.99 7 1.46 798 97.32 1,696,468    1.04 52.9% 5
24 Serious multiple traumatisms 9,401            0.11 4 0.83 601 73.29 1,088,300    1.49 41.5% 1
25 HIV infections 18,035          0.21 3 0.63 360 43.90 1,478,798    0.98 52.6% 0
Total 8,436,903     100.00        480 100.00 820 100.00 1,071,158    1.43            32.6% 1.72                  
discontinuitymultiprov
size number of hospitalsnumber of services number of DRGs
Product 
number Product
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Table 2: Technological intensity, product homogeneity, concentration and size of the markets 
Product 
number Product tech h C1 size 
1 Nervous system diseases 0.0474 0.4666 0.4597 17.9059 
2 Eye diseases 0.0519 0.6654 0.4247 15.5411 
3 Ear, nose, mouth and throat diseases 0.0549 0.3639 0.4800 17.3861 
4 Respiratory apparatus diseases 0.0576 0.2716 0.5387 18.6868 
5 Cardio-vascular apparatus diseases 0.0599 0.5115 0.4259 17.1099 
6 Digestive system apparatus 0.0602 0.3383 0.4072 17.9716 
7 Hepatobiliary and pancreatic diseases 0.0605 0.3323 0.3878 17.8155 
8 Muscle-skeletal system diseases and disesas of connective tissue 0.0605 0.6164 0.6059 17.2347 
9 Skin, subcutaneous tissue and breast diseases 0.0606 0.2067 0.4516 18.9330 
10 Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases 0.0618 0.2193 0.4279 16.8962 
11 Kidney and urinary system diseases 0.0623 0.2051 0.4338 18.4210 
12 Male reproductive system diseases 0.0625 0.1522 0.4132 18.8856 
13 Female reproductive system diseases 0.0625 0.3954 0.3881 18.1526 
14 Gestation and birth 0.0628 0.3733 0.3828 17.9747 
15 Neonatal period diseases 0.0634 0.1810 0.4550 18.9333 
16 Diseases of the blood, of the haemopoietic organs and of the immune system 0.0636 0.1262 0.4419 18.4780 
17 Myelo-proliferative diseases 0.0639 0.2623 0.5014 19.0146 
18 Infectious diseases 0.0641 0.1551 0.4782 19.7165 
19 Mental diseases 0.0642 0.2530 0.4122 19.3412 
20 Alcool/drus abuse and induced organic mental diseases 0.0648 0.4865 0.3724 18.0296 
21 Traumatisms, poisonings and tossic effects of medicines 0.0656 0.6366 0.6326 14.6717 
22 Burns 0.0664 0.4236 0.5137 16.0294 
23 Factors affecting health and health services demand 0.0690 0.1840 0.4927 18.9380 
24 Serious multiple traumatisms 0.0713 0.2021 0.4751 17.8962 
25 HIV infections 0.0744 0.5396 0.5706 20.2641 
  average value 0.0617 0.3345 0.4584 17.9151 
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Table 3: Estimated parameters (standard errors in parenthesis) 
    size   homogeneity 
parameter  a b  a 
 -3.773 3.744  0.178 High-tech 
 (0.200) (0.251)  (0.007) 
 -6.161 6.418  0.069 Low-tech 
  (0.558) (0.688)   (0.015) 
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Chapter 3 
 
The Geography of Hospital Admission in a 
National Health Service with Patient Choice: 
Evidence from Italy  
 
3.1. Introduction 
In the Italian NHS patients are enrolled into health plans managed by Local 
Health Authorities (LHAs). Enrolment is based on a patient’s place of residence, 
while financing accrues from general taxation according to a capitation payment 
per enrolee. With the resources available the LHAs are responsible for the health 
care consumption of the enrolees. A distinctive feature of the Italian NHS is that 
within this institutional framework (similar to many other “decentralized” tax-
funded NHS systems, for example, Spain, Norway, Denmark, and the UK) 
hospital care is subject to the patient’s unconstrained choice of provider. Patients 
are entitled to completely free hospital treatments and interregional flows are 
compensated for according to centrally set prices. Each year, it is estimated that 
35% of the 10 million hospital admissions in Italy take place outside the patients’ 
LHA of residence. This figure goes up to almost 42% for cancer treatment and 
more than 58% for high surgery.  
This situation raises policy concerns. Equity of access and financial 
sustainability are the main issues at stake. Exit rates and average distance travelled 
to access hospital care are, for instance, much larger for enrolees in southern 
LHAs. Observed imbalances in patient mobility make the distribution of private 
mobility costs uneven and promote the accumulation of financial resources 
towards the already better endowed LHAs. In this paper we aim to evaluate the 
extent to which the observed imbalances are due to scale effects, depend on a 
core/periphery equilibrium, or reflect a deeper, long lasting north/south divide. In 
particular, we focus on the scale effect played by the size of the pool of enrolees. 
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25% of Italian LHAs have less than 150,000 enrolees, while 20% have more than 
400,000 enrolees. Since funds accrue on a capitation basis, and smaller LHAs 
suffer larger outflows while receiving smaller inflows, this policy variable is 
crucial in determining LHA financial stability. 
We work on an origin/destination matrix provided by the Italian Ministry of 
Health, comprising of all ordinary admissions to public hospitals for the year 
2001. We classify admissions into 4 product groups. To control for distance, 
contiguity, and supply characteristics, and to net out the effects played by the 
composition of patients’ flows, we estimate a gravity equation for the full matrix 
of pair-wise flows. We estimate gravity equations in multiplicative form using a 
Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood method, as proposed by Santos-Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006). This method is robust to different patterns of heteroskedasticity 
and provides a natural way to deal with the zero flows.  
Our results suggest that the gravity model is a good framework for 
explaining the patient mobility phenomenon for complex surgery and cancer. 
Indeed, with reference to the main features of this model, the number of enrolees 
of the LHAs of origin and destination affects patient flows in a positive way, 
while the distance between LHAs affects patient flows in a negative way.  
 
3.2. Institutional Background and Motivation  
Patient mobility causes concern, particularly in relation to the reforms that 
occurred in the Italian health care sector in the late ’90s. The National Health 
Service (otherwise known as SSN - Servizio Sanitario Nazionale) was created in 
1978 as a regionally based system providing universal coverage free of charge at 
the point of service. The central government was responsible for determining the 
amount of resources to devote to health care, for general planning, and for funding 
Regions through general taxation and compulsory health contributions.1 The 20 
Regional authorities were responsible for local planning according to the 
objectives specified by the central government, and for allocating resources to the 
third level of the system, the Local Health Units. These were operational agencies 
                                                 
1 Depending on a citizen's income, age and health condition, co-payments are also charged for 
drugs, out-patient treatment, some diagnostic and laboratory tests, and medical appliances. 
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in charge of providing services to patients through their own facilities or through 
contracts with private providers. They provide a wide range of services, at 
hospital and community level, in geographical areas with populations of about 
300,000. The LHAs do not have revenues collection responsibilities, but they are 
funded by the Regions through a capitation system (France et al., 2005)   
The Italian National Health System is quite fragmented in terms of 
organization of the regional services. At one end of the spectrum there is the 
“LHA-centred model”, where the LHAs have substantial freedom in negotiating 
service agreements with public and accredited private providers. At the other end 
of the spectrum there is the “Region-centred model”, where the regions exercise a 
purchaser role and fund the providers directly, while the LHAs have little 
organizational freedom and act mainly as providers (France et al., 2005)  
The SSN guaranteed the provision of hospital treatments at a given level of 
quality and free of charge. On the supply side, the SSN largely relies on public 
production supplemented by privately licensed hospitals. Public hospitals are run 
by LHAs or by autonomous public trusts (Aziende Ospedaliere, Policlinici and 
Istituti di Ricovero e cura a carattere scientifico (IRCCS)). Privately licensed 
hospitals can treat patients within the SSN, i.e. free of charge, and are refunded 
afterwards by the LHA to which the patient is enrolled. Patients are completely 
free to choose their hospital; it may be publicly or privately licensed, and within 
or outside the LHA where they are enrolled. Since patients are totally unaware of 
treatment costs and can choose freely between publicly financed hospitals, choice 
is essentially determined by distance from home, hospital specialization, waiting 
lists, and perceived quality. 
The functioning of such a decentralized public health care service has 
recently been reformed through the approval of Legislative Decrees 502/1992 and 
517/1993 with the purported aim of introducing some elements of internal market 
competition. Significant managerial autonomy has been devolved to larger 
hospitals and LHAs, and, at the same time, a partial split between health care 
production and purchasing has been introduced. Competition has been promoted 
by the introduction of prospective payment for hospital admission through the 
Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) classification scheme. Since the year 2000, 
public hospital treatments have been priced through the DRG scheme according to 
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fixed prices set at national level. Regions sets their tariffs referring to national 
tariffs rates, which represents a ceiling and allow flexibility downward (so far they 
have been reduced by up to – 30% of national tariffs) (France et al. 2005). The 
Legislative Decrees have also introduced some elements of regional federalism, 
which were strengthened by Legislative Decree 446/1997 (introducing sources of 
autonomous financing for the regions) and Decree 56/2000 (stating that the 
funding of the NHS is mainly the responsibility of the Regions).2 3 Regions can 
choose how many resources to spend in the health care sector, subject to some 
constraints. They have to guarantee a minimum level of health care (livelli 
essenziali di assistnza – LEAs) but they are free to choose the quality level and 
the amount of services to provide.4 This implies that the quality and quantity of 
health care might vary across Regions. Regions are free to provide non-LEA 
services, but they must be financed with resources raised autonomously. Since the 
patients’ right to refer themselves to any hospital has not been limited so far, in 
the emerging environment publicly financed hospitals, including those run by the 
LHAs, are strongly motivated to invest in quality and to establish a good 
reputation in order to attract patients and to generate a stable cash flow. 
We would expect patient mobility to cause expenditure uncertainty for the 
LHAs’ planners, at least in the short term, since it is hard to predict. Regions 
providing treatments to patients who are resident in other Regions receive 
financial compensation for the treatment offered. National tariffs, which are DRG-
based, are used to fund interregional patient flows. It is likely that Regions 
providing fewer and lower quality health care services have to pay the regions 
providing more services (which are probably the richer ones) because of the 
treatment received by mobile patients. This mechanism could create deep and 
long lasting imbalances across regions and bring rationing of health services to 
                                                 
2 A portion on national income taxes (the IRPEF) was transferred to regions (the regional IRPEF), 
and health insurance contributions were replaced by regionally collected taxes on the value added 
by companies and on the salaries of public sector employees (the IRAP) 
3 The National Solidarity Fund has been introduced in order to allow fiscal equalization across 
regions; it is financed by funds coming from central government.  
4 The bunch of LEAs was defined on the basis of effectiveness, appropriateness and efficiency 
criteria. 
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patients living in the poorest regions. For these reasons, we believe that it is 
important to analyse the determinants of patient mobility.  
Patient mobility is partly unavoidable. It would be inefficient to provide 
more specialized or very rare treatments at every hospital. On the contrary, it is 
efficient, to some extent, to concentrate their production in a few centres. Apart 
from these treatments, it makes sense to consider the decision to move as the 
manifestation of dissatisfaction for the local supply of health care, as suggested by 
Tiebout’s “voting with the feet” mechanism. In this paper, we are not going to 
formulate considerations about the welfare consequences of patient mobility, but 
we aim to provide some insights into the determinants of this behaviour in order 
to let health care planners make more informed policy decisions.  
 
3.3. The Geography of Hospital Admission in the Italian NHS 
3.3.1. Mobility flows data 
We analyse patient mobility across Italian LHAs using data on hospital 
admissions that occurred in all public hospitals during the year 2001. Patient 
flows are reported in an origin/destination matrix provided by the Italian Ministry 
of Health. For each single DRG the matrix reports the corresponding flow of 
patients occurring between each pair of origin-destination LHAs, where the origin 
refers to the LHA where the patients are enrolled, and the destination refers to the 
LHA where the patients receive the hospital treatment.  
In the reference year, the Italian territory is partitioned into 197 LHAs. 
However, only 190 LHAs are present in our dataset due to the fact that we were 
forced to aggregate those LHAs operating in a single municipality.5 Moreover, we 
disregarded all the flows generated and directed to the LHAs of Sardinia and 
Sicily because these two regions are islands and the patient flow to and from them 
may follow peculiar patterns. We end up with a set of 173 LHAs. 
To provide a comprehensive and significant analysis of mobility patterns in 
hospital admission, while maintaining manageability, we reduced the dimension 
                                                 
5 The municipalities of Turin and Rome are articulated into 4 and 5 LHAs, respectively.  
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of the matrix by aggregating the DRGs into 7 broad groups (PRODUCT). In order 
to account for different patient severity we considered the following groups of 
clinical procedures and/or conditions: complex surgery (CS), emergencies (EM), 
cancer (CA), HIV, delivery (DE), basic surgery (BS) and basic medicine (BM). 
Table A1 of the appendix details the aggregation, reporting the sub-product 
constituting each product. It also reports the share of hospital treatments occurring 
in each main category at national level. The share of these categories varies 
significantly, from the largest categories, BM (47.6%) and BS (23.6%), to the 
smallest ones, HIV (0.5%) and complex surgery (1.7%).  
In the following analysis, we disregard the HIV, DE and EM products.  
There are too few observations present in HIV to make the analysis reliable. For 
DE and EM, we expect patient flow to be affected by “occasional mobility”. This 
kind of mobility is not due to a deliberate decision by the patient to search for 
hospital treatment in a LHA different from the assisting one, but to the patient’s 
need for hospital admission when she/he happens to be far from home for reasons 
of holiday, working, or family links. In order to exclude flows potentially flawed 
by “occasional mobility” we also excluded the observation corresponding to 
“small flows” for the product categories included in the analysis: that is flows 
made by 1 patient for CS and CA and by 2 patients in the case of BM and BS. The 
resulting dataset is made up of 119,716 observations, referring to 173 LHAs.  
 
3.3.2. Summary Indicators of Patient Mobility 
Our preliminary analysis is based upon a set of summary indicators of 
patient flows across the LHAs. We consider the following indicators: 
• Exit rate: the share of hospital admissions (in a certain product) received 
by LHA enrolees outside that LHA. 
• Inflow rate: the share of hospital admissions (in a certain product) in a 
given LHA that are provided to non-enrolees. 
• Accessibility: the weighted average of the distance covered by all the 
enrolees travelling outside a specific LHA of residence to receive hospital 
treatments in another LHA (in a certain product), where the weights are 
the percentage of enrolees from the LHA of origin travelling to each LHA 
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of destination. This represents travelling outside a LHA for receiving 
treatments. Note that this is a negative measure of accessibility, i.e. the 
higher its value the poorer the accessibility. 
• Attractiveness: the weighted average of the distance travelled by enrolees 
outside the LHA of residence to receive hospital treatment in a specific 
LHA of destination (in a certain product), where the weights are the 
percentage of enrolees from each LHA of origin entering the LHA of 
destination. This represents travelling into a LHA for receiving treatments.  
 
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics about the overall summary 
indicators of the LHAs, and of the LHAs classified according to two dimensions: 
the presence of an autonomous hospital (Azienda Ospedaliera, Policlinico or 
IRCCS) and the dimension of the pool of enrolees. To this purpose, we grouped 
the LHAs into 4 classes, approximately close to the quartiles.6 As expected, the 
exit rate from the LHAs with an autonomous hospital (13.8%) is lower than the 
overall rate (18.3%), while the exit rate from the LHAs without an autonomous 
hospital is higher (20.4%). Inversely, the inflow rate for the former LHAs (18.1 
%) is higher than the overall rate (11.4%) and lower for the latter LHAs (8.2%). 
As expected, attractiveness is higher for the former LHAs (56.00) than for the 
latter (42.05), indicating that patients cover longer distances to access LHAs with 
an autonomous hospital. Accessibility is also higher for the former (90.15), than 
for the latter (55.94) but the interpretation is less straightforward. This may be 
explained by considering that there are fewer patients living in an LHA with an 
autonomous hospital that decide to exit and therefore those that do are more 
severe cases than those exiting from an LHA without an autonomous hospital. 
More severe patients usually seek appropriate care further. In relation to the 
dimension of the pool of enrolees, we observe that the LHAs with more enrolees 
have larger inflow rates (13.7% for more than 400,000) than the LHAs with fewer 
enrolees (9.8 % for less than 150,000), as expected. What is puzzling and 
                                                 
6 For the computation of these summary indicators we have not considered the LHAs of Rome and 
Turin. However, since patient flows involving these LHAs are not negligible, for the estimate of 
the gravity model we consider them by introducing a dummy variable for Rome and another one 
for Turin. 
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unexpected is that the exit rates are also higher for the former (15% for more than 
400,000) than for the latter (24%).  
In Table 2 the summary indicators of patient flows are considered by 
grouping the flows according to the PRODUCT defined above. Results are 
reported at national level, and then broken down into the four Italian macro 
geographical areas. Considering Italy as a whole, the exit and inflow rates are very 
high for complex surgery (57.6% and 21.1% respectively) and cancer (36.0% and 
16.7%) while they are lower for basic surgery (20.7% and 13.9%) and basic 
medicine (12.7% and 8,2%). This basic fact applies to all geographical areas. As 
expected, the exit rates from the South are always much higher than the average 
values. However, it is surprising that in the North-West the exit rates are also 
higher than the average for basic surgery and basic medicine. In contrast, the exit 
rates are always lower than average in the North-East and in the Centre (except 
for the complex surgery in the Centre). Another unexpected observation is that not 
only the exits but also the inflows are higher than the average in the South. In the 
Centre the inflows are always lower than the average, while within the North the 
results are mixed: inflows are higher than the average for complex surgery in the 
North-West and High and basic surgery in the North East, but lower otherwise. 
The other two summary measures, accessibility and attractiveness, are useful for 
interpreting these results.  
At the national level, accessibility for complex surgery (109.7) and cancer 
(99.5) is almost double that for basic surgery (51.0) and basic medicine (54.0). 
Accessibility is below the average value for every macro product in the North 
West, the North East and the Centre. In particular, it is about half the average 
value in the North West and the East for complex surgery (51.7 and 53.1, 
respectively) and cancer (54.2 and 54.6, respectively). This measure is always 
above the average in the South, where it assumes very high values for all the 
products: 226.9 for complex surgery, 182.0 for cancer, 74.8 for basic surgery and 
83.3 for basic medicine. This striking difference between the North-Centre and the 
South seems to suggest that patients in the North-Centre, if they exit their LHA, 
do not travel very long distances (particularly in the North), while patients in the 
South might do.  
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At the national level, attractiveness is similar for three of the products (41.4, 
42.7 and 41.3 for complex surgery, basic surgery and medicine, respectively) 
while it is higher for cancer (60.8). For complex surgery and cancer, the North 
(particularly, the West) has much higher values of attractiveness than the South. 
Indeed, for complex surgery the values are 50.7 and 45.9 in the North West and 
the East respectively, and 94.6 and 55.8 for cancer respectively. In contrast, they 
are just 36.4 and 42.5 in the South. The Centre shows values higher that the 
average for basic surgery and medicine (48.3 and 45.0 respectively). Thus, the 
North, for complex surgery and cancer, and the Centre, for basic surgery and 
medicine, seem to be more “attractive” than the South.  
Based on these results, the following conclusions could be drawn. Patients in 
the North and Centre do not exit much from their LHAs. Exceptions to this are 
patients in the North West for basic surgery and basic medicine, since their exit 
flows seem to be above the average, but they just cover short distances. In 
contrast, LHAs in the South are subject to both high levels of exit and inflows. 
Since the patients in the North and Centre are not travelling long distances, patient 
flows in the LHAs of the South are most likely to be coming from other LHAs in 
the South. Thus, there are two different types of patient mobility present in the 
South: short distance mobility, towards other LHAs in the South, and long 
distance mobility, towards LHAs in the North and Centre. The flows seem to be 
directed to the North for complex surgery and cancer and to the South for basic 
surgery and medicine.  
In order to gain some additional insights into the factors behind the observed 
mobility patterns we rely upon the estimation of gravity models for patient flows. 
After a review of the most relevant literature related to gravity models and 
hospital choice, the remaining part of the paper details our empirical strategy. 
 
3.4. Literature Review 
 
3.4.1. Gravity Models 
For our study we will adopt the framework of the gravity models. The social 
gravity model of spatial interaction has been developed as an analogy to the 
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Newtonian gravity model of Physics. In this model it is hypothesized that a 
greater level of spatial interaction should occur between two points in space the 
greater are the two population masses at those points and the lesser is the spatial 
distance between them (Stewart, 1948). 
These models have been widely used in the field of Migration, where the 
baseline gravity model specification implies that the flow of residents between 
two areas is directly proportional to the population present in those areas and 
inversely related to the distance between the areas (Congdon, 1991). They have 
also been extensively used in the field of Trade, in order to explain the 
commercial flows between countries on the basis of their dimension (measured as 
GDP or population) and their distance (examples are given by Dalgin et al., 2004, 
and Rauch, 1999).      
We can distinguish between the approaches based on micro or individual 
decision-making and those that deal with macro effects on aggregate flows. This 
has been clearly pointed out by Stillwell (2005) referring to the migration models 
literature. Micro approaches relate to the individual migrating unit (person, group 
or household) and involve the identification of those factors that influence this 
decision-making process. The factors having a bearing on these decisions include 
both the characteristics of individual persons (such as age, marital status, 
household status), or wider family units (such as family size and structure), and 
the wider characteristics of the potential destinations (such as regional relativities 
of unemployment, wages or house prices). In contrast, macro approaches relate to 
aggregate migration flows and investigate the relationships between migration and 
macro variables such as population size, unemployment rates or environmental 
conditions. 
Another important distinction we have to consider is between the so called 
“push” and “pull” factors influencing the aggregate flows. The former are the 
elements of “propulsiveness” of an area (the characteristics of an area that make 
the residents want to exit that area) and the latter are the elements of 
“attractiveness” (the characteristics that make the area appealing). In this regard, 
three separate types of gravity models can be identified (Fotheringham and 
O`Kelly, 1989):  
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1. the “unconstrained” of “total flow constrained” models yield insights 
into interaction patterns by providing information on the attributes of 
both the origins and the destinations of the interactions; 
2. the “production constrained” models only provide information on the 
destination characteristics, and thus do not consider the pushing factors 
of the origins; 
3. the “attraction constrained” models only give insights into the origin 
characteristics, and thus do not pay attention to the pulling factors of the 
destinations. 
Researchers could think that the unconstrained models are the most useful 
since they provide greater amounts of information. Unfortunately, as shown by 
Fotheringham and O`Kelly (1989), in the spatial interaction models there is often 
a trade-off between the quality and the quantity of information provided. Thus, 
according to the finalities of the study, attraction or production constrained 
models could be more appropriate.   
 
3.4.2. Hospital Choice 
We believe it is important to consider the past literature on hospital choice 
models in order to be aware of the main variables that can influence patient choice 
and how they influence it. This analysis allows us to form some expectations 
about the signs with which these variables will enter into our gravity equation.  
One issue that has to be considered in modelling hospital choice is the role 
that is played by physicians. In many of the countries considered, the patient 
needs the request of the physician to be admitted to hospital, or may strictly 
follow the suggestions of the physician regarding which hospital to choose. Some 
authors have assumed that the physician acts as an agent for the patient and thus 
she is the key decision maker for hospital admission (Burns and Wholey, 1992; 
Luft et al., 1990; McGuirk and Porell, 1984). In most of the studies, however, the 
individual is assumed to play an active role in making their choice of hospital. 
Indeed, patients could choose physicians on the basis of the doctor’s privileges of 
admission (Dranove et al., 1992) and they may also directly express their 
preferences over hospitals to the physicians (Tay, 2003).  
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The variables that are considered most may be grouped under some 
categories: distance, hospital characteristics, area characteristics, and individual 
characteristics. In many of the earliest models of hospital choice the gravity model 
framework was adopted and the variables considered were mainly distance and 
hospital characteristics. Since McFadden`s (1974) pioneering work, conditional 
choice models have become very popular among researchers studying hospital 
choice. These models have the advantage that they allow for an estimation of 
effects of patients` and hospitals` attributes on hospital choice. More recently, 
most of the studies take into account not only the hospitals` and areas` variables 
but also the patients` individual characteristics.  
Distance 
Earlier studies on patients’ choice of hospital have already focused on 
distance to the hospital facilities, highlighting the “distance decay” pattern 
phenomenon: people tend to use the service of closer, over more distant, health 
providers so that the number of persons using particular providers declines at 
greater distance (Bashshur et al., 1971; Morill and Earickson, 1968; Morrill et al., 
1970; Roghmann and Zastowny, 1979; Studnicki, 1975). In general, distance has 
been widely recognised as a powerful predictor of hospital choice (Basu and 
Friedman, 2001; Burns and Wholey, 1992; Dranove and Shanley, 1989; Goodman 
et al., 1997; Seniger, 1999; Tai et al., 2004; Tay, 2003)7. More recently, other 
variables, such as travel time and travel costs, have been used instead of distance 
in order to represent the difficulty for the patient in reaching the hospital. They 
have also been shown to negatively affect the probability of choosing the hospital 
(Bessho, 2003; McNamara, 2003; Varkevisser and van der Geest, 2006). 
Hospital Characteristics 
Between the various hospital characteristics the quality of the hospital is 
usually taken into consideration. Variables capturing hospital quality include both 
input and output measures. Between the more used input measures, there are 
number of nurses/doctors per bed (McNamara, 2003; Tay, 2003), the range of 
                                                 
7 In studies where the physician is considered the decision maker, the distance of the physician to 
the hospital is often considered and it is found to negatively influence admission to the hospital 
(McGuirk and Porell, 1984; Burns and Wholey, 1992). 
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specialized services offered (Tai et al., 2004); and teaching status (Basu and 
Friedman, 2001; Burns and Wholey, 1992; Goodman et al.,1997; Tay, 2003), 
while between the more popular outcome measures, there are mortality rates 
(Burns and Wholey, 1992; Tay, 2003) and complications of the patients admitted 
to the hospital (Tay, 2003). There is strong evidence showing that patients tend to 
choose higher quality hospitals.   
These variables are often hard to measure and if just considered individually 
could be misleading. As outlined by Tay (2003), the use of patient outcomes as a 
proxy for quality is complicated for two reasons. Firstly, outcome measures can 
be very noisy, especially if considered for hospitals with low patient volume. 
Secondly, a selection bias problem could arise: good quality hospitals could 
attract sicker patients, with the higher probability of having complications or 
dying, and thus they may report lower outcome performance. A way to address 
this problem is to adjust the outcome for the differences in the case-mix of 
hospitals. The use of the input measures as indicators of hospital quality can be 
problematic, as well. To some extent, indeed, these variables represent the amount 
of resources that are utilized and the “effort” a hospital is putting in, but this 
doesn’t automatically imply a good quality result. Thus, it seems very important 
to consider not just a single indicator, but many indicators simultaneously. 
Hospital size (measured as the number of beds) is another common hospital 
level variable used in this literature (Goodman et al., 1997; McGuirk and Porell, 
1984; McNamara, 2003; Tai et al., 2004; Tay, 2003; Varkevisser and van der 
Geest, 2006). It is often considered as a proxy of hospital quality and it positively 
affects the probability of choosing the hospital. As stressed by Varkevisser and 
van der Geest (2006), the use of this variable may raise a problem of endogeneity: 
is it the larger hospital size that increases the likelihood of selecting that hospital, 
or do the high selection rates lead to the larger hospital size?  
Some recent studies have considered waiting times as a relevant hospital 
characteristic that may influence patient choice (Bessho, 2003; Varkevisser and 
van der Geest, 2006). Low levels of waiting time seem to strongly attract patients. 
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Area Characteristics 
Some studies have tried to take into consideration how the characteristics of 
the area where people live could affect hospital choice. Some studies have 
considered metropolitan vs. non-metropolitan areas, and rural vs. urban (Basu and 
Friedman, 2001; Goodman et al., 1997; Varkevisser and van der Geest, 2006). 
The evidence from these studies is mixed. For example, in the study by Goodman 
et al. (1997) belonging to a rural area does not significantly affect the probability 
of referring to a hospital further away, while in the study by Basu and Friedman 
(2001) a patient’s residence in a rural county adjacent to a metropolitan area 
increased the likelihood that they would cross the county boundary. Other studies 
have considered median household income (Basu and Friedman, 2001; Goodman 
et al., 1997), showing that a high level of this variable increases the probability of 
referring to a hospital further away.  
A critical issue in the hospital choice model regards the definition of the 
areas to consider as geographic entities. Arbitrary jurisdictional geographic 
boundaries (e.g., counties or zip code clusters) are often used in order to define the 
market in which the hospitals are operating, without checking the consistency of 
market area definitions adopted with the economic principles and/or the more 
accepted methods for deriving market definitions. Our choice of using the LHA as 
the geographical area of reference seems the most appropriate choice in relation to 
the Italian context. As mentioned above, indeed, the LHAs are the administrative 
entities with significant managerial autonomy at the lowest level of the 
organization of the Italian NHS. 
Individual Characteristics 
Among individual level characteristics, the most common ones included in 
the studies are gender, age, education, race, income, insurance status (Basu and 
Friedman, 2001; Bessho, 2003; Goodman et al., 1997; Tai et al., 2004). In 
general, women and old people are less likely to travel long distances to receive 
hospital services, but the results are not conclusive. High levels of personal 
income and belonging to the white ethnic group seem to increase the probability 
of referring to hospitals further away. 
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A very important variable considered by many studies is the severity of the 
conditions of the patients referring to the hospitals. Most of the authors dealing 
with this issue develop their analysis by considering DRGs of different severity 
separately, for example orthopaedics vs. neurosurgery (Basu and Friedman, 2001; 
Goodman et al., 1997; Tai et al., 2004; Varkevisser and van der Geest, 2006), 
while others consider whether the health conditions of the patients are life 
threatening or not (McNamara, 2003). This variable has been proved very 
significant for the choice of hospital. The literature, indeed, suggests that there is a 
wide consensus that willingness to pay for referring to higher quality hospitals 
further away is significantly higher for patients with more severe conditions. 
 
4.3. Patient Mobility and the Gravity Approach 
Some papers have recently dealt with the patient mobility phenomenon by 
developing a gravity model. We are going to briefly describe the study of 
Congdon (2001) and Levaggi and Zanola (2004). 
The central focus of Congdon (2001) is on modelling patient flows to 
emergency units and describing how such models may be adapted to allow for 
unit closures and expansion, or the opening up of other units. The paper deals with 
five boroughs in North East London (part of North Thames Health Region) and an 
adjacent LHA in Essex, where the total resident population (1991 Census) was 1.1 
million. This area has been subdivided into 127 electoral wards, and the analysis 
relates to 84,500 patient flows (resulting in inpatient admissions) from these small 
areas of residence to eight hospitals with emergency patient facilities. The 
estimation of the gravity model is based on simulation based Bayesian methods. 
The main regressors are the distance from the hospital, the population and the 
hospital mass (in terms of number of beds).8 The first regressor negatively affects 
the hospital inflows, while the other two positively affect inflows.    
Levaggi and Zanola’s (2004) article is a benchmark for our study because it 
is the first one analysing patient mobility across Italian Regions by adopting a 
gravity approach. In this paper, the number of people moving from one region to 
                                                 
8 In an extension of the model the author also considers the health needs (measured by the York 
Acute Needs score) and the percentage of the population aged over 65. 
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another is related to the quality of the service offered and to the distance between 
them. The structure of the empirical specification of the cross-migration measure 
is the following: 
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where µir = net patient flow, i.e. inflows – outflows, from each region (i is the 
region of origin or the flow while r is the rest of Italy), yi = per capita income in 
region i, yr = national per capita income, z(.) = function of relative regional 
hospital quality attributes of the region and the rest of Italy and εi is the error term. 
The regressors considered in the models are per capita income, the 
percentage of people aged over 65 years (considered as a proxy of the regional 
need of health care) and hospital quality, measured in terms of structure indicators 
(number of beds for 1000 people, number of hospitals for 1000 people, public 
expenditure at regional levels in nominal values), outcomes indicators (ratio 
between the number of inpatients and the number of beds) and process 
measurement (index of turnover). 
The dataset used is made up of a sample of panel observations covering 
regional mobility and other indicators over the period 1994-1997. The assumption 
of fixed coefficients over time and over cross-section units has been checked 
through an F-test. Since the null hypothesis of equal coefficients for each year 
could not be rejected the data are considered as a pool. All the regressors (apart 
from the number of beds for 1000 people and regional expenditures) are 
statistically significant. The authors find that per capita income has a positive 
impact on inflows (thus it has to be interpreted as ability to pay for quality at the 
regional level), older people seem less prone to travel and the quality variables 
have a positive impact on the net inflow of patients.  
 
3.5. Econometric Model and Estimation 
As far as the empirical estimation of the gravity models is concerned, there 
is a long tradition in the literature of taking the stochastic version of these models, 
making a log-linearization of them and using the OLS model to estimate the 
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parameters of interest. This procedure is appealing because it is very simple but it 
can have serious drawbacks.  
First, this way of proceeding can create problems when the flow between 
two areas is zero and thus the dependent variable in the regression is zero (Porell 
and Adams, 1995; Stilwell, 2005; Santos-Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). Several 
methods have been developed to deal with this problem. In a number of studies, 
the pairs with zero flows have just been dropped from the dataset and the log 
linear form of the gravity model has been estimated by OLS. Rather than throwing 
away the observations with zero flows, some authors have attributed the value of 
1 to the dependent variables with zero flows. Others have used a Tobit estimator 
(for a more complete description of the various procedures see Frankel, 1997). 
These procedures will generally lead to biased estimators for the parameters of the 
model, and the bias will be particularly strong when there are a large number of 
zero flows.9 
Secondly, as pointed out by Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006), when the 
error term in the log gravity equation is heteroskedastic, the OLS method leads to 
inconsistent estimates. The expected value of the logarithm of a random variable 
depends both on its mean and on the higher-order moments of the distribution. 
Hence, if the variance of the error term in the gravity equation depends on the 
regressors, the expected value of the logarithm of the error term will also depend 
on the regressors, violating the condition of consistency of OLS.   
To address these two problems Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006) proposed 
to use a pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator, which they show to be robust to 
different patterns of heteroskedasticity and to provide a natural way to deal with 
the zero flows.10  
Using a different approach, some authors make reference to the Non-inear 
Least Squares method (NLS) to estimate the gravity models in their multiplicative 
form instead of the log-linear form (see, for instance, Frankel and Wei, 1993). The 
                                                 
9 An example of how biased these sorts of estimates could be is provided by Santos-Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006). 
10 For the sake of completeness, we underline that the Poisson regression has already proposed in 
the literature as a way to address the problem of zero flows (See for instance, Goodman et al. 
(1997)). However, to our knowledge, Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006) are the first ones to use 
this method to address the issue of heterogeneity.  
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NLS estimator is an asymptotically valid estimator for the gravity equation, but it 
can be inefficient because it does not address the issue of the heteroskedasticity 
that might characterize the data. The use of the pseudo likelihood maximum 
method, therefore, seems preferable because it allows an estimator that is more 
efficient than the NLS estimator to be obtained (Santos-Silva and Tenreyro, 
2006).    
Under the assumption that the conditional variance is proportional to the 
conditional mean, the pseudo maximum likelihood estimator is numerically equal 
to the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator which is often 
utilized to estimate count data models (Santos-Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). The 
only requirement to ensure that the estimator based on the Poisson likelihood 
function is consistent is the correct specification of the conditional mean. The data 
do not need to follow a Poisson distribution and the dependent variable does not 
even need to be an integer (Gourieroux et al., 1984) 
In case the assumption that the conditional variance is proportional to the 
conditional mean does not hold (which is often likely), the estimator does not 
fully account for the heteroskedasticity in the model. For this reason, the inference 
has to be based on an Eicker-White robust covariance matrix estimator (Eicker, 
1963; White, 1980).  
In our empirical analysis we are forced to adopt a macro approach, since we 
work on a matrix of aggregated flows. We develop an “unconstrained” model for 
patient mobility across LHAs, in order to allow for a flexible analysis of the 
interaction between pushing and pulling factors. This does, however, result in a 
low predicting power. Moreover, we do not explicitly account for the role played 
by the referring physician in the choice of the treating hospital. 
We assume that:  
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where: 
Mijp = the number of patients living in LHAi moving to LHAj for a hospital 
admission in the PRODUCT group p, with p = CS, CA, BS, BM; 
Pushi = set of push factors in origin LHAi; 
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Pushi = set of pull factors in destination LHAj; 
f = deterrence function; 
Dij  = distance between LHAi and LHAi; 
Xij = pair-specific impeding factors other than distance; 
Fi and Fj  = other controls for the origin and destination characteristics; 
In our analysis we estimate the stochastic version of equation (1):   
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where: 
ηij is an error term assumed to be statistically independent of the regressors. We 
estimate this model with the PPML estimator utilized by Santos-Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006), and adopting the Eicker-White robust covariance matrix 
estimator. 
 
3.6. Data and Model Specification 
We consider, as dependent variables, the flows occurring from each possible 
LHA of origin to all the LHAs of destination. The original matrix includes all the 
489 DRGs present in the classification made by the Italian Ministry of Health. 
After applying our aggregation along the product categories defined above, and 
also our exclusion criteria, the final dataset comprises 6808 non-null pair-wise 
flows. Since our aim was to analyse all the possible origin-destination LHA pair-
wise flows we enlarged the dataset, attributing a zero value flow to the LHA 
combinations for which no patient flows occur. We therefore end up with four 
matrices, one for each product, each made up of 29,929 flows.  
Our specification includes a set of control variables for spatial deterrence, 
and a set of push and pull factors plus some additional controls. We provide some 
details in the following. Table 3 contains the definition of each variable used in 
the empirical analysis, while Table 4 provides summary statistics. 
 
3.6.1. Spatial Deterrence 
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The DISTANCE between each pair of LHAs has been calculated as the 
Euclidean norm between LHAs' centroids.11 Geo-referenced coordinates of the 
centroids were constructed from ESRI Dataset reporting geographical coordinates 
(in metres) for each municipality of Italy. The variable was finally expressed in 10 
kms. In our model we let DISTANCE enter the deterrence function according to a 
power instead of a, more common, exponential function. To allow for more 
flexibility we specify the power function as a cubic polynomial.  
CONTIGUITY is a dummy variable, specific to each combination of LHAs 
of origin and destination, which assumes a value of 1 when the LHA or origin and 
destination share a border (or if the LHA or origin and destination coincide), and 0 
otherwise. This variable is often included in the gravity models (see, for instance, 
Santos-Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) because the contiguity of the two “trading 
areas” may be an important factor to facilitate trade. Finally, to control for the 
presence of “institutional flow barriers” that can affect patient flows, we inserted 
the dummy for BARRIERS, assuming a value of 1 if the LHA of origin is 
different from the LHA of destination, and 0 otherwise.  
 
3.6.2. Push and Pull Factors 
We are particularly interested in analysing the effects on patient flows of 
some LHA specific variables. Note that all these variables enter the model both as 
pushing factors (i.e. referred to the LHAs of origin) and pulling factors (i.e. 
referred to the LHAs of destination). 
POP indicates the number of enrolees of the LHA. The Ministry of Health 
provides this information. We will consider this measure in 100,000 units. Since 
enrolment is basically defined on the place of residence we might consider Italian 
LHAs as quite similar to US health maintenance organizations (HMOs) but for the 
absence of any adverse selection. From a theoretical perspective, the greater the 
                                                 
11 Other measure of distance could have been adopted in our analysis. We could have considered, 
for example, the “road distance” between the LHAs` centroids or the “driving time” required to 
travel from one LHA to another. The computation of these measures of distance, however, is more 
complex and requires the formulation of more assumptions (for example, travelling routes, average 
driving speed) than the Euclidean distance among LHAs` centroids. This also require adding data 
not available to our study. Therefore, we have chosen to rely on the Euclidean measure as a more 
objective measure of distance.    
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pool of enrolees the greater should be the possibility of risk sharing among them, 
leading to economies of scale in insurance cost. This implication has found 
empirical support in the analysis of Wholey et al. (1996). In our exercise we try to 
test the presence of scale effect due to the size of the pool of enrolees. We expect 
the population of the LHAs of origin and destination to have a positive impact on 
patient flows, as predicted by the standard gravity models. 
HOSPITAL indicates the presence of Aziende Ospedaliere (AOs), 
Policlinici or IRCCSs in the LHA. The AOs mainly provide tertiary care and they 
comprise many teaching hospitals. The Policlinici are multi-ward acute trusts 
where wards corresponding to the different medical or surgical specialties are 
present. The IRCCSs are hospitals of excellence aimed at performing scientific 
research in the areas of bio-medicine and health services management. All of them 
are public enterprises with a legal status broadly similar to that of the British trust 
hospitals. Information about the number of AOs, Policlinici or IRCCSs present in 
each LHA is provided by the Italian Ministry of Health. Since these hospitals are 
providing highly specialized health services, we expect them to have a high 
potential attraction to patients. We therefore expect their presence in an LHA to 
positively affect the inflows and negatively affect the exits. 
 
3.6.3. Additional Controls 
First, we consider some variables representing hospital quality. The 
information about the values assumed by these variables in 2001 is provided by 
the Italian Ministry of Health. We consider the BED_POP and the DOC_BED. 
They are defined as the number of hospital beds for 1,000 inhabitants of the 
LHAs, and the number of doctors for 100 hospital beds, respectively.12 As shown 
in the literature on hospital choice, these characteristics of the LHA of origin 
should negatively influence the exit flows and positively influence the inflows. 
We also consider THEIL, a variable representing the Theil concentration index of 
the sub-PRODUCTs in PRODUCTs. This index is a proxy for the ability of the 
                                                 
12 We have also considered the per capita expenditures of the LHAs (in 1,000 euros) as a possible 
indicator of hospital quality. However, it has been impossible to include it in our analysis due to 
the high level of collinearity with the population of the LHAs, which is one of the main variables 
of interest for our study.   
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LHA to provide all the typologies of treatment present in PRODUCT. The lower 
the value of Theil, the greater the ability of the LHA, and the lower the exits from 
the LHA, and the higher the inflows into it will be.  
Secondly, we consider some socio-economic characteristics of the 
population, such as age, education and employment, for which information is 
provided by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). To approximate 
these variables, we consider the ratio of the LHA population over 65 and under 14 
(expressed in %) (ELDERLY), the index of not completing compulsory studies in 
the LHA (ILLITERACY), and the unemployment rate in the LHA 
(UNEMPLOYMENT). 
Thirdly, we consider some of the LHAs’ geographical characteristics, which 
can indicate the difficulty of exiting for the residents in the LHAs. We control for 
the average altitude (in metres) of the centroid (ALTITUDE), derived from the 
data about the altitude of each municipality provided by ISTAT. This variable 
picks up additional deterrence effects due to the poor accessibility of LHAs 
located in mountain or hill areas. Moreover, we consider the dimension 
(SURFACE) of the LHAs, measured in 10 square kms.  
The variable REMOTENESS is another geographical control we include in 
our analysis. It is defined as the mean distance (in kms) of the LHA from all other 
LHAs, weighed by the number of inhabitants of each LHA. The REMOTENESS 
variable is expected to negatively affect patient mobility, because for people 
living in an LHA relatively far from another LHA the costs of moving are higher. 
Results in this direction are also found in the literature on hospital choice (on this 
point, see Congdon, 2001).  
Lastly, some of the main variables include interaction terms with dummies 
indicating the Italian macro geographical areas AREA_NW, AREA_NE, 
AREA_C, AREA_S). AREA_NE is the base category. The classification of the 
Regions of continental Italy as four macro areas was done by ISTAT. Moreover, 
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we control for the belonging of the LHAs to the 18 Italian Regions considered 
including regional dummy variables.1314 
 
3.7.  Results 
After some initial cleaning of the data, as detailed in Section 3.4.1, we 
performed the PPML estimate on the sub-samples of complex surgery, cancer, 
basic surgery and basic medicine separately.15 The models have been estimated 
using the STATA 9.2 software. 
3.7.1. Specification Analysis 
As a first step, we checked the correct specification of our models by 
performing the RESET test (Ramsey, 1969). This test is performed by computing 
the predicted values from the regression function, calculating the square of those 
values, and estimating again the original model adding this new variable to the 
regressors. If this variable is not significant then the model should be considered 
correctly specified. As shown by Table 5, the models regarding complex surgery 
and cancer successfully pass the RESET test, the model for basic surgery is most 
likely considered “on the edge of rejection” (the p-value of the square of the 
predicted is 0.03), while basic medicine does not pass the test. 
Another test that we performed to verify the correct specification of our 
model is the Link test (Pregibon, 1980). This is similar to the RESET one, but it 
implies adding not only the square values of the predicted (“predicted2”) as 
regressors but also the predicted values themselves (“predicted”). If the latter are 
insignificant, then the model has serious problems of specification, while if only 
the former are insignificant the problem of specification is milder. Table 6 shows 
the results of this test. Cancer is the model with best performance: “predicted” is 
strongly significant while “predicted2” is not significant at a level of 95%.  
Complex surgery does not pass the test in strict terms, since its “predicted2” is 
                                                 
13 In our analysis we also include a dummy variable for the LHAs of Rome and of Turin in order 
take into consideration the peculiarity of these two “artificial” LHAs, which, as explained above, 
in reality are made up of more than one LHA.    
14 It would be interesting  
15 We tried to estimate a pooled model, taking into consideration all four categories at the same 
time. This model was rejected by the specification tests we are adopting in our analysis. Therefore, 
the results are not presented in the paper. 
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significant at a level higher than 99%. However, the misspecification problems are 
not very severe since the z value of “predicted2” is moderate. The basic surgery 
and the basic medicine model definitely do not pass the test. 
Therefore, by considering both the results of the RESET test and the Link 
test, we believe that our gravity model provides an adequate frame to explain the 
patient mobility phenomenon in the case of complex surgery and cancer, but not 
in the case of basic surgery and basic medicine. 16    
Although the PPML estimator is consistent even if the variance function is 
not well specified, it is interesting to test the specific pattern of heteroskedasticity 
assumed by the estimator. For example, if the relationship between the conditional 
variance and the conditional mean is: 
[ ] [ ] 10 λλ xyExyV ii =  (3) 
it is possible to estimate λ1, following the approach suggested by Manning and 
Mullahy (2001). Assuming yi* denotes the estimated value of E[yi| x] , λ1  can be 
estimated from  
( ) iiii yyy ξλ λ +=− 1)( *02*  (4) 
using the appropriate PPML estimator. This approach is asymptotically valid and 
the inference about  λ1 can be made using the Eicker-White robust covariance 
matrix estimator. 
If we want to check the assumption that the conditional variance is 
proportional to the conditional mean, a simpler method based on the Gauss-
Newton regression is available (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). Indeed, to 
check if λ1=1 (that would imply proportionality between the conditional variance 
and mean) equation (4) can be expanded in a Taylor series around λ1 =1 
( ) iiiiii yyyyy ξλλλ ++−+=− )ln()1( **10*02*   (5) 
                                                 
16 To try to improve the model specification we have considered also alternative specifications. For 
instance, we have run models without including the square or the cubic term of DISTANCE. The 
specification we present in this chapter is the one that presents the better performances with 
regards to the Reset and Link tests.   
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Therefore, checking the significance of the parameter λ=λ0(λ1-1) allows for 
testing the hypothesis of proportionality between the conditional variance and 
mean. Use of the weighted least square is recommended because the error term ξi 
is unlikely to be homoskedastic. 
Table 7 reports the results for the Gauss-Newton regression, estimated 
separately for each of the four product categories. For each product we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of proportionality between the conditional variance and 
the conditional mean. In fact, in all four cases, the estimates for the λ coefficient 
are not significantly different from zero at a level superior to 95%. 
 
3.7.2. Estimated Results 
Table 8 reports the results of the gravity models for High Surgery, cancer, 
basic surgery and basic medicine.  The estimated coefficients, robust standard 
errors and level of significance for the main variables, hospital characteristics, and 
remoteness of the LHAs are presented. The results for the other controls are 
available on request. Since we are dealing with a non-linear model, the 
coefficients presented in Table 8 have only qualitative informational content. We 
focus our attention on the models for complex surgery and cancer since the 
models for basic surgery and basic medicine do not pass the specification tests. 
They are presented, however, for the sake of completeness. For complex surgery 
and cancer, the Pseudo-R2 is 0.92 and 0.94, respectively.    
We also include the interaction terms of the logarithm of POP the dummy 
variables indicating the four macro geographical areas. North-East is the base 
category. For both complex surgery and cancer in all areas this variable has a 
positive effect on patient flows (the only exception is POP for the LHAs of origin 
in the Centre for cancer). This result is consistent with the predictions of the 
traditional gravity model according to which the dimension of both the LHAs of 
origin and destination have a positive effect on the flows.  
In the model of High Surgery, the population of the LHAs of origin has a 
greater effect in the North West and South than in the North East (the coefficients 
are 1.41, 1.32 and 1.15, respectively) while in the South it has a lower effect (its 
coefficient is 0.95). The same ranking of the coefficients also hold when 
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considering the population of the LHAs of destination. Notice that only the 
coefficients for the North West and East are significant for both the LHAs of 
origin and destination.    
In the model for cancer, the effect of the population of the LHAs of origin is 
greater in the North West than in the North East (the coefficients are 1.10 and 
0.21, respectively) but lower in the South (its coefficient is 0.09). This effect is 
not significant in the North East and South. Considering the population of the 
LHAs of destination, the greatest effect is for the South (1.46), followed by the 
Centre (0.93), the North East (0.61) and the North West (0.46). The effect is 
significant in all areas, apart from the North West.    
In the estimated gravity models, we also use the interaction term of 
DISTANCE for the macro geographical areas of origin and of destination of the 
flows. If we consider the availability of patients to travel a certain distance as a 
proxy of their willingness to pay for the transaction costs linked to the exit, the 
interactions of DISTANCE with the macro-geographical areas represent the 
different willingness to pay patients have in different macro-areas. The category 
of reference is the distance patients travel from an LHA in the North East to reach 
another LHA in the North East. The distance always has a negative effect for both 
complex surgery and cancer. This effect is always significant apart from when the 
area of origin is the North West or the area of destination is the Centre for High 
Surgery, and when the area of destination is the North West for cancer. 
Considering the interactions with the areas of origin, the effect of distance is 
greater in the North West and the North East, while it is lower in the Centre and 
South.  However, the opposite holds when the interactions with the areas of 
destination are considered. These results are valid for both complex surgery and 
cancer. The results imply that when patients are considering moving from their 
LHA of origin, distance is a much higher determining factor if the LHA of origin 
is in the North West or East than in the Centre or South. If the availability for 
patients to travel a certain distance is equivalent to the willingness to pay for the 
transaction costs linked to the exit, then patients living in the Centre and South 
have a higher willingness to pay. In contrast, when patients are considering where 
to be treated, the deterrence power of distance is lower if the LHA of destination 
is in the North West or East, rather than in the Centre or South. This can also be 
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interpreted as a patient’s higher willingness to pay to be treated in the former 
areas than in the latter ones.    
In our regression models we also estimate the quadratic and cubic terms of 
distance (DISTANCE2 and DISTANCE3). The sign of these terms (positive for 
the quadratic and negative for the cubic ones) confirm that distance has a negative 
effect overall on patient flows, but the relationship between the two variables is 
not linear. In particular, when the distance is increasing, patient flows tend to 
decrease at a decreasing rate until a saddle point, beyond which they decrease at 
an increasing rate. The value assumed by the distance in correspondence to the 
saddle point depends on which PRODUCT and which geographical area is 
considered.  
As expected, in both the models of complex surgery and cancer, 
CONTIGUITY has a positive effect on patient mobility across LHAs (the 
coefficients are 0.24 and 0.03, respectively) while BARRIER has a negative effect 
(the coefficients are -1.52 and -0.92, respectively). However, the effect of the 
former variable is significant only in the case of High Surgery, while the effect of 
the latter is significant for both the macro categories of products. The interaction 
between the two variables is positive but insignificant for both complex surgery 
and cancer.  
In the model for High Surgery, HOSPITAL has a clear negative and 
significant effect on the exits and a positive and significant effect on the inflows. 
Indeed, the coefficient relating to the variable of LHA of origin assumes a value 
of -0.25 while the one relating to the LHA of destination assumes a value of 0.63. 
Therefore, as expected, the presence of autonomous hospitals in an LHA is a 
strong attraction factor. For cancer, unexpectedly, this variable is not significant 
and, when referred to the LHAs of destination, its sign is different from that 
expected.   
When we consider the controls shown in Table 4 relative to the hospital 
characteristics, they have the expected signs and tend to behave as good proxies of 
the hospital quality of the LHAs. Indeed their sign is positive if they are referred 
to the LHAs of destination (“BED_POP” assumes a value of 0.47 for complex 
surgery and 0.42 for cancer, “DOC_BED” 1.94 for complex surgery and 1.17 for 
cancer) and their sign is negative if they are referred to the LHAs of origin (the 
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former variable is -0.13 for complex surgery and -0.17 for cancer, the latter is -
0.42 for complex surgery and -0.65 for cancer). These effects are all significant, 
with the exception of “DOC_BED” for the LHAs of origin). For THEIL, complex 
surgery reflects our expectations. The corresponding coefficient is positive and 
highly significant for the LHAs of origin (0.30) while it is negative and highly 
significant for those of destination (-0.40). For cancer, this variable is not 
significant when referred to the LHA of origin, while for the LHA of destination it 
has a negative and significant effect on patient mobility; a result which is quite 
puzzling.  
For both complex surgery and cancer, REMOTENESS has the expected 
negative sign when referred to the LHAs of destination even if the coefficient is 
significant just for cancer. Unexpectedly, it has a positive and significant sign 
when referred to the LHAs of origin. This means that patients in the more remote 
LHAs tend to exit more. However, this unexpected result is coherent with the 
results of the descriptive statistics shown in Section 3.4.2. These statistics 
highlighted the presence of patient flows from the South to the North and Centre 
of Italy, showing a relevant exit phenomenon from the “remote” LHAs of the 
South. 
 
3.8. Final Remarks 
In most of the cases our results are consistent with the predictions of the 
gravity model. In particular, the number of enrolees of the LHAs of origin and 
destination affects patient flows in a positive way, while the distance between 
LHAs affects patient flows in a negative way. The contiguity of the LHAs plays a 
positive role, while the presence of institutional barriers to mobility plays a 
negative one. For High Surgery, the presence of autonomous hospitals has a 
negative role on exits and a positive role on inflows. Therefore, in general, the 
gravity model can be regarded as a good framework for explaining patient 
mobility for hospital care treatments across LHAs in Italy. 
The analysis conducted so far has some limits. 
The models proposed just seem to be reliable for treatments regarding 
complex surgery and cancer. Indeed, in the case of basic surgery and basic 
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medicine the specification test adopted suggests that the gravity model is not 
correctly specified. Maybe the decision process ruling the patient mobility 
phenomenon for these treatments has peculiarities requiring the development of a 
different model. Moreover, focussing on complex surgery and cancer, some of the 
variables considered are not significant and (in very few cases) they do not have 
the expected sign. 
 In our analysis we have not considered the role played by waiting times in 
hospital choice, which has been shown in the literature to be of great importance 
for the choice of hospitals and patient mobility. Data about waiting times are only 
available at the regional level. Therefore it has been impossible to include this 
variable in the present exercise. 17  Perhaps the omission of this variable is 
particularly relevant for the case of basic surgery and basic medicine. This could 
be a path for future research. 
Some of the choices we made for the estimation procedures may be 
questionable. In our econometric specification we did not include LHA fixed 
effects. In a recent paper Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) argue that the 
traditional gravity equation suffers from a problem of omitted variable since it 
does not take into account the multilateral resistance term, which is very relevant 
in trade. Following these authors, many recent studies estimating a gravity 
equation include importers and exporters fixed effects as regressors in order to 
take into account the presence of these multilateral resistance terms (for instance 
Cheng and Wall, 2004; Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004; Westerlund and 
Wilhelmsson, 2006; de Frahan and Vancauteren, 2006). The problem with the 
inclusion of “importer” and “exporter” fixed effects is that if we work with cross-
sectional data the model cannot be fully identified and we cannot estimate the 
effect on the dependent variable of the regressors that are importer or exporter 
specific.  
Some authors have addressed this issue by exploiting the panel nature of 
their data. For example, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004) estimate a linear gravity 
model with fixed effect using the Hausman and Taylor (1981) estimator. Others 
                                                 
17 If we had included them in our regression model, their effects would have been captured by the 
regional dummies. 
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have modelled the importer and exporter individual effects as random 
(uncorrelated) effects instead of fixed (correlated) effects (de Frahan and 
Vancauteren, 2006). Others, like Wei and Frankel (1997), have not included 
individual dummies in their gravity model. Including individual dummies would 
have undermined the efforts taken to estimate the effects of the variables that do 
not have variability over time (or other dimensions).  
In our paper we take a position similar to Wei and Frankel (1997) and adopt 
the traditional gravity equation, which does not include "individual effects". Since 
we are mainly interested in studying the effects of the LHAs’ populations and the 
presence of AOs and IRCCSs on patient mobility, we do not include any LHA 
dummy variables, because their presence would not allow the study of the main 
effect of interest.18 We recognize, however, the importance played in our model 
by the heterogeneity of the LHAs. Thus, “as a compromise”, even if we do not 
include LHA specific effects, we include Regional specific effects in our model in 
order to account for geographical heterogeneity.19 Moreover, we include many 
controls at LHA level to try to represent the more relevant characteristics of the 
LHAs.  
In future work we could try to perform some formal tests to detect the 
presence of spatial autocorrelation in the data regarding patient flows (using, for 
instance, the indexes developed by Moran (1950) and Geary (1954)). Testing for 
the presence of spatial autocorrelation in the data could be relevant because this 
sort of autocorrelation leads to spatial correlation in the residual of our model, and 
it leads to the violation of the assumption of independence of the residuals (Fisher 
and Griffith, 2006). In case we detect the presence of spatial autocorrelation in the 
data, to account for it we could include additional terms in our model, either in the 
deterministic part of the model or in the stochastic one (some recent applications 
of spatial models are, e.g., Sacerdote (2001), Kelejian and Prucha (2004) and 
Baltagi et al. (2007)) 
                                                 
18 We underline that the main aim of Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003) paper is studying the 
trade border effect and for their research hypothesis it does not matter if they cannot estimate 
individual specific variables. 
19 We include dummies at regional level because the Region is the administrative entity at the level 
higher than the LHA in the organization of the Italian NHS. 
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One aspect of our model that we could develop in the future relates to the 
role played by the hospital dimension in the patient mobility phenomenon. As 
shown in Section 3.5.2, in the literature about hospital choice this variable is often 
assumed to be an indicator of the quality of hospital, and thus an attraction factor. 
This assumption should be viewed with caution. By taking into account some 
“empirical” considerations, this variable can be thought of as either a pulling or a 
pushing factor. Generally, bigger hospitals should be able to sustain greater fix 
costs (because these costs are distributed amongst a higher quantity of consumers) 
and thus they should be able to guarantee better quality (for example, adopting 
more up-to-date technologies). Moreover, doctors working in these hospitals can 
treat a greater number of patients of the same type and thus they should be able to 
specialize and obtain better clinical results. For these reasons quality could be 
higher in larger hospitals and so patients should be attracted to them (Taroni, 
2001). However, due to congestion problems in larger hospitals, doctors and 
nurses may provide less care to patients and, in general, more managerial 
problems might arise. This could decrease the quality in larger hospitals and so 
potential patients may be incentivised to refer to other hospitals (Taroni, 2001). 
Moreover, large hospitals could also sustain higher average costs. A study of the 
University of York on the NHS, for example, has shown that scale economies on 
costs can be reached only until 200 beds for hospitals, above that threshold  
diseconomies appear (the average costs increase) (NHS Centre for Review and 
Dissemination, 1996). As a future extension of our paper, we could verify if our 
data corroborate the hypothesis of a U shape (inverse U-shape) relationship 
between the size of the hospitals and the exit flows (inflows) to address the 
potential issue of provider congestion. 
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Table 1. Performance measures 
 
Exit rate Inflow rate Accessibility Attractiveness N° obs. 
OVERALL 18.3% 11.4% 66.9 46.5 171 
REGIONAL      
North-West 19.8% 10.8% 45.3 49.2 39 
North-East 13.5% 11.1% 42.0 47.2 45 
Centre 17.1% 9.0% 54.9 47.9 36 
South 22.1% 13.8% 114.0 43.0 51 
ENROLLEES      
less than 150 15.0% 9.8% 61.4 45.1 44 
150 - 250 18.1% 9.8% 62.3 42.0 57 
250 - 400 17.8% 13.6% 81.3 50.0 41 
more than 400 24.3% 13.7% 64.1 52.8 29 
HOSPITAL      
NO 20.4% 8.2% 55.9 42.1 116 
YES 13.8% 18.1% 90.1 56.0 55 
PRODUCT      
complex surgery 57.6% 21.1% 109.7 41.4 171 
cancer 36.0% 16.7% 99.5 60.8 171 
basic surgery 20.7% 13.9% 51.0 42.7 171 
basic medical 12.7% 8.2% 54.0 41.3 171 
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Table 2. Performance measures by PRODUCT and AREA 
  ITALY North-West North-East Centre South 
Exit rate PRODUCT      
 complex surgery 57.6% 55.4% 47.3% 62.8% 64.8% 
 cancer 36.0% 33.8% 23.8% 32.8% 50.5% 
 basic surgery 20.7% 22.9% 16.2% 20.5% 23.0% 
 basic medical 12.7% 13.7% 8.4% 10.6% 17.1% 
Inflow rate PRODUCT      
 complex surgery 21.1% 20.8% 23.7% 14.3% 23.8% 
 cancer 16.7% 15.5% 15.7% 12.1% 21.6% 
 basic surgery 13.9% 12.1% 14.4% 13.1% 15.4% 
 basic medical 8.2% 8.3% 6.9% 5.7% 11.1% 
Accessibility PRODUCT      
 complex surgery 109.7 51.7 53.1 77.5 226.9 
 cancer 99.5 54.2 54.6 87.6 182.0 
 basic surgery 51.0 41.9 37.1 44.6 74.8 
 basic medical 54.0 43.0 36.6 46.0 83.3 
Attractivness PRODUCT      
 complex surgery 41.4 50.7 45.9 32.9 36.4 
 cancer 60.8 94.6 56.8 54.9 42.5 
 basic surgery 42.7 41.1 40.5 48.3 41.8 
 basic medical 41.3 42.7 38.8 45.0 39.9 
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Table 3. Definition of variables 
VARIABLE DEFINITION SOURCE UNIT OF MEASURE 
DEPENDENT    
FLOWij Number of patient enrolled to LHA i admitted in a public hospital of LHA j  Ministry of Health  
REGRESSORS    
PAIRWISE SPECIFIC    
DISTANCE Straight line distance between origin and destination LHA centroids  ESRI (elaboration) 10 km 
CONTIGUITY =1 if the origin LHA and the destination LHA share a border  Our elaboration  
BARRIERS =1 if the origin and destination LHAs belong to different Regions Our elaboration  
LHA SPECIFIC    
POP Number of enrolees in the LHA Ministry of Health 10,000 inhabitants 
HOSPITAL =1 if a big hospital (Azienda Ospedaliera, Policlinico, Irccs) is present in the LHA territory Ministry of Health  
BED_POP Number of hospital beds for 1,000 enrollees in the LHA Ministry of Health N°/1000 inhabitants 
DOC_BED Number of doctors for 100 hospital beds in the LHA Ministry of Health N°/100 hospital beds 
THEIL Theil concentration index of the product lines in macro product lines Ministry of Health  
REMOTENESS Mean distance of the LHA from all other LHAs (weighed by the share of inhabitants) ESRI (elaboration) KM 
UNEMPLOYMENT Unemployment rate in the LHA  ISTAT 2001 % 
ILLITERACY Share of the population not having completed the compulsory studies in the LHA ISTAT 2001 % 
ELDERLY Ratio of the elderly (+65) above the young (-14) in the LHA ISTAT 2001 % 
ALTITUDE Height above sea level of LHA centroid ISTAT 2001 10 meters 
SURFACE Geographical surface of the LHA ISTAT 2001 10 square km 
AREA_NW =1 if the LHA is locate in the North-West   
AREA_NE =1 if the LHA is locate in the North-East   
AREA_C =1 if the LHA is locate in the Centre   
AREA_S =1 if the LHA is locate in the South   
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
VARIABLE MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
FLOW 42.53 925.38 0.00 142883.00
DISTANCE 38.85 244.77 0.10 110.64
CONTIGUITY 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00
BARRIER 0.93 0.26 0.00 1.00
POP 29.23 27.07 1.40 254.08
HOSPITAL 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00
BED_POP 3.72 1.31 0.21 8.36
DOC_BED 0.45 0.12 0.24 1.05
THEIL 6.56 0.64 5.15 7.63
REMOTENESS 404.50 77.95 308.07 641.85
UNEMPLOYMENT 10.14 7.84 1.93 37.65
ILLITERACY 9.91 3.32 4.47 24.30
ELDERLY 153.80 50.84 42.49 284.22
ALTITUDE 23.13 19.95 0.12 104.20
SURFACE 144.94 94.50 8.82 620.71
AREA_NW 0.23  0.42  0.00  1.00
AREA_NE 0.26  0.44  0.00  1.00
AREA_C 0.21  0.41  0.00  1.00
AREA_S 0.29  0.46  0.00  1.00
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Table 5. Reset Test 
  chi2(1) Prob > chi2 
complex surgery 0.06 0.804 
cancer 0.76 0.384 
basic surgery 4.70 0.030 
basic medical 7.17 0.007 
Table 6. Link test 
  z   P>|z| 
complex surgery   
predicted 292.32 0.000 
predicted2 -8.08 0.000 
cancer   
predicted 377.26 0.000 
predicted2 1.66 0.097 
basic surgery   
predicted 2095.62 0.000 
predicted2 767.96 0.000 
basic medicine   
predicted 2650.03 0.000 
predicted2 1534.46 0.000 
Table 7. Gauss Newton Regression  
  chi2(1) Prob > chi2 
complex surgery 1.00 0.317 
cancer 1.09 0.278 
basic surgery 1.04 0.299 
basic medical 1.02 0.307 
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Table 8. Gravity model POISSON estimates 
 COMPLEX SURGERY  CANCER  BASIC SURGERY  BASIC MEDICINE 
 Coef. Std. Err.  Coef. Std. Err.  Coef. Std. Err.  Coef. Std. Err. 
DISTANCE -9.72E-01*** 5.67E-02  -1.23E+00*** 4.45E-02  -1.48E+00*** 8.21E-02  -1.90E+00*** 9.42E-02 
DISTANCE2 5.07E-02*** 6.62E-03  6.16E-02*** 5.60E-03  1.09E-01*** 1.94E-02  1.36E-01*** 2.00E-02 
DISTANCE3 -9.34E-04*** 1.91E-04  -9.82E-04*** 1.56E-04  -2.85E-03*** 9.12E-04  -3.31E-03*** 8.41E-04 
DISTANCExAREA_NW_o -7.08E-02 1.26E-01  2.09E-01** 9.64E-02  -9.28E-03 1.27E-01  2.01E-01 1.39E-01 
DISTANCExAREA_C_o 4.51E-01*** 1.02E-01  5.92E-01*** 8.02E-02  2.38E-01* 1.26E-01  4.61E-01*** 1.59E-01 
DISTANCExAREA_S_o 7.05E-01*** 9.49E-02  1.08E+00*** 6.87E-02  1.05E+00*** 1.08E-01  1.44E+00*** 1.26E-01 
DISTANCExAREA_NW_d 1.25E-01** 5.49E-02  3.79E-02 4.89E-02  7.14E-02 6.82E-02  2.07E-01*** 5.35E-02 
DISTANCExAREA_C_d -4.39E-02 7.85E-02  -2.12E-01*** 5.63E-02  8.84E-02 5.59E-02  1.01E-01 6.65E-02 
DISTANCExAREA_S_d -2.75E-01*** 8.90E-02  -4.94E-01*** 6.18E-02  -6.42E-01*** 9.29E-02  -7.18E-01*** 9.16E-02 
DISTANCE2xAREA_NW_o 2.17E-03 1.66E-02  -2.73E-02*** 7.85E-03  1.35E-02 3.61E-02  -2.75E-02 2.95E-02 
DISTANCE2xAREA_C_o -3.67E-02*** 7.18E-03  -4.12E-02*** 6.21E-03  -3.61E-02 2.42E-02  -6.45E-02*** 2.50E-02 
DISTANCE2xAREA_S_o -4.72E-02*** 7.02E-03  -6.04E-02*** 5.90E-03  -1.02E-01*** 1.95E-02  -1.29E-01*** 2.04E-02 
DISTANCE2xAREA_NW_d -1.69E-03 1.38E-03  -2.64E-04 1.21E-03  -2.66E-03 1.63E-03  -4.34E-03*** 1.50E-03 
DISTANCE2xAREA_C_d 3.08E-03 2.22E-03  7.18E-03*** 1.94E-03  -1.37E-03 1.81E-03  6.66E-04 2.51E-03 
DISTANCE2xAREA_S_d 1.53E-02*** 5.21E-03  2.05E-02*** 4.03E-03  5.91E-02*** 1.05E-02  5.72E-02*** 1.21E-02 
DISTANCE3xAREA_NW_o -1.10E-04 5.94E-04  6.28E-04*** 1.82E-04  -7.23E-04 1.98E-03  1.06E-03 1.26E-03 
DISTANCE3xAREA_C_o 8.01E-04*** 1.93E-04  7.74E-04*** 1.59E-04  1.42E-03 1.04E-03  2.19E-03** 9.35E-04 
DISTANCE3xAREA_S_o 9.17E-04*** 1.93E-04  9.79E-04*** 1.58E-04  2.81E-03*** 9.12E-04  3.28E-03*** 8.43E-04 
DISTANCE3xAREA_NW_d 8.33E-06 1.01E-05  7.82E-07 8.48E-06  2.21E-05** 1.13E-05  2.64E-05** 1.23E-05 
DISTANCE3xAREA_C_d -3.87E-05** 1.97E-05  -6.55E-05*** 1.94E-05  4.94E-06 1.68E-05  -2.34E-05 2.41E-05 
DISTANCE3xAREA_S_d -2.40E-04** 1.12E-04  -2.43E-04*** 7.79E-05  -1.40E-03*** 3.96E-04  -1.13E-03*** 4.21E-04 
CONTIGUITY 0.239** 0.116  0.031 0.116  0.531*** 0.121  0.391** 0.163 
BARRIER -1.516*** 0.219  -0.919*** 0.216  -2.106*** 0.258  -2.276*** 0.502 
CONTIGUITYxBARRIER 0.331 0.270  0.014 0.232  1.504*** 0.253  1.492*** 0.486 
ln(POP)_o 1.146*** 0.147  0.662*** 0.138  1.109*** 0.175  0.890*** 0.235 
ln(POP)_d 0.389** 0.160  0.215 0.133  -0.132 0.170  0.084 0.235 
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ln(POP)xAREA_NW_o 0.263* 0.177  -0.561*** 0.172  -0.841*** 0.203  -0.399 0.246 
ln(POP)xAREA_C_o -0.191  0.186  -0.127 0.202  -0.330 0.213  -0.253 0.273 
ln(POP)xAREA_S_o 0.170  0.211  -0.147 0.192  -0.758*** 0.234  -0.572** 0.276 
ln(POP)xAREA_NW_d 0.396* 0.198  0.610*** 0.170  0.872*** 0.197  0.396 0.244 
ln(POP)xAREA_C_d -0.133 0.194  0.320* 0.179  0.449** 0.204  0.303 0.268 
ln(POP)xAREA_S_d 0.076 0.245  0.854*** 0.187  0.928*** 0.230  0.688** 0.271 
HOSPITAL_o -0.250** 0.104  -0.088 0.095  -0.044 0.122  -0.235* 0.131 
HOSPITAL_d 0.627*** 0.116  -0.036 0.099  0.016 0.124  0.211 0.130 
BED_POP_o -0.134*** 0.043  -0.175*** 0.041  -0.222*** 0.051  -0.236*** 0.055 
DOC_BED_o -0.422 0.353  -0.650 0.415  -0.891*** 0.338  -0.631 0.426 
BED_POP_d 0.472*** 0.042  0.418*** 0.037  0.382*** 0.049  0.361*** 0.053 
DOC_BED_d 1.941*** 0.478  1.168** 0.466  0.387 0.357  0.297 0.445 
THEIL_o 0.299** 0.146  -0.391 0.280  -0.495* 0.282  -0.039 0.762 
THEIL_d -0.399** 0.193  1.710*** 0.293  1.205*** 0.289  1.407* 0.765 
REMOTENESS_o 2.556** 1.092  5.408*** 0.905  2.529* 1.327  1.319 1.821 
REMOTENESS_d -0.595 1.425  -5.992*** 0.986  -1.517 1.384  -0.777 1.865 
CONSTANT -14.020*** 5.188  -5.946* 3.436  -9.414*** 1.946  -11.008*** 2.615 
            
Log likelihood -69521.27   -103357.76   -202132.24   -342091.22  
N° obs. 29929   29929   29929   29929  
Wald chi2(90) 43344.700   41796.340   43750.240   42980.080  
Pseudo R2 0.924   0.941   0.972   0.977  
***, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Reported standard errors are robust. Each equation contains socio-
economic and geographic controls, plus 19 dummies for region of origin fixed effects and 19 dummies for region of destination fixed effects. 
Considering the LHA specific regressors, we use the suffix “_o”  to refer to the LHA of origin and the suffix “_d “ to refer to the LHA of 
destination. 
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Annex 1 
 
Table A1. Composition of PRODUCT groups  
PRODUCT Overall share of hospital treatments DESCRIPTION 
Surgical Neurology 
Pulmonary Surgery 
Cardiovascular Surgery CS = complex surgery 1.7 
Transplants 
Surgical Oncology 
Medical Oncology CA = cancer 7.8 
Chemotherapy and Radiotherapy 
Surgical Ophthalmology 
Surgical Otorhinolaryngology 
Surgical Gastroenterology 
Orthopedic Surgery 
Surgical Endocrinology 
Urologic Surgery 
Vascular Surgery 
BS = basic surgery 23.6 
General Surgery 
Medical Neurology 
Medical Ophthalmology 
Medical Otorhinolaryngology 
Pulmonary Medicine 
Cardiology 
Medical Gastroenterology 
Orthopedic Medicine 
Medical Endocrinology 
Urologic Medicine 
Psychiatry 
Vascular Medicine 
General Medicine 
BM = basic medicine 47.6 
Rehabilitation 
Surgical traumatology 
Major traumatology EM = emergency 4.0 
Minor traumatology 
HIV 0.5 HIV 
Gynecology 
Surgical obstetrics 
Medical obstetrics DE = delivery 14.8 
Neonatology 
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Chapter 4 
 
Contractual Conditions, Working conditions, 
Health and Well-Being in the British 
Household Panel Survey 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Over the past 20 years or so, changes in the labour market have had a 
substantial impact on the working arrangements of employees. For example, the 
number of “standard” full time permanent jobs has decreased, while non-standard 
work arrangements (temporary work, part-time contract, unregulated work etc.) 
have become more common (Kivimäki et al., 2003). In the European Union, for 
example, non-standard employment now accounts for 12–15% of paid 
employment (Virtanen et al., 2003). A key question is whether and how these 
changes to employment patterns affect health and well-being. Working conditions 
have also undergone significant changes over the past decades. The decline of 
manufacturing jobs, the growth of service oriented work and computerization 
appear to have made the “traditional” sources of adverse physical and 
environmental working conditions less relevant and have increased the scope for 
psychosocial job stressors (Cappelli et al., 1997). Given these changes, it is 
relevant to evaluate how working conditions affect health and psychological well-
being in society today. Moreover, some studies have underlined that workers with 
atypical contractual conditions are often characterized by adverse working 
conditions (Aronsson G., 2001; Artazcoz et. al., 2005; Letourneux, 1998). Given 
this evidence, it is important to take into consideration contractual conditions as 
well as working conditions.  
The analysis of the influence of contractual and working conditions on 
health and psychological well-being can also provide an empirical contribution to 
the debate about the neoclassical labour economics framework, which suggests 
that workers are induced to accept jobs with undesirable non-wage characteristics 
by compensating differences in their wage rates. The theory of compensating 
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wage differentials has proved to be an important tool in economists’ attempts to 
understand labour markets. But empirical research about the determinants of 
individual earnings has provided limited support for the theory (Brown, 1980). 
Workers experiencing adverse conditions for health and well-being, indeed, 
should be compensated through wage premiums, that they might invest in order to 
maintain their health and well-being stable. Therefore, the empirical investigation 
of the relationship between contractual and working conditions and health and 
psychological well-being can provide some evidence in favour or against the 
neoclassical theory of compensating wage differentials.        
 The influence of contractual conditions on health and well-being has been 
analysed in previous studies with respect to part-time and temporary employment 
(see, for instance, Benavides et al., 2000, Gash et al., 2006, and Kivimaki et al., 
2003). A common hypothesis in the literature when investigating contractual 
conditions is that people with a temporary or a part-time job constitute a 
“disadvantaged” group, who experience poor conditions of work, including, for 
example, low wages, few benefits, job insecurity, little training and no possibility 
of promotion, and are forced to take these jobs because they cannot find more 
“traditional ones” (Kunda et al., 2002; Segal and Sullivan, 1997). These 
characteristics have often been assumed to have a negative influence on health 
and well-being. However, some empirical evidence suggests that the reality is 
more complex. Not all individuals with these types of job contracts can be 
considered to be “disadvantaged” (Silla et al., 2005), and a worsening of health 
occurs only if these jobs are associated with low levels of employability, are 
involuntary or offer no contractual certainty (Artazcoz et al., 2005; Price and 
Burgard, 200; Silla et al., 2005). We attempt to investigate empirically the impact 
that temporary and/or part-time contractual employment has on health and well-
being and how these effects vary across individuals. We also evaluate how the 
effects of contractual and working conditions on health and well-being are 
influenced by family structure.  
When considering the effects of working conditions on health and 
psychological well-being, we refer to the “demand-control-support” model 
(Karasek et al., 1988; Karasek and Theorell, 1990) and the “effort–reward 
imbalance model” (Siegrist et al., 1990; Siegrist, 1996). These are two of the most 
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influential models developed to investigate the possible mechanisms underlying 
these effects. 
We consider the effects of contractual and working conditions on self-
assessed health (SAH) and psychological well-being (derived from the General 
Health Questionnaire (GHQ)) using twelve waves (1991/92 – 2002/2003) of the 
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). While one branch of the literature 
suggests that “atypical” contractual conditions have a significant impact on health 
and well-being, another suggests that health is damaged by adverse working 
conditions. As far as we are aware, previous studies have not explicitly considered 
the two factors jointly. Our aim is to combine the two branches of the literature to 
assess the distinct effects of contractual and working conditions on health and 
psychological well-being.  
Since the effect of contractual and working conditions on health and well-
being is unlikely to be immediate and takes time to manifest itself, we adopt a 
dynamic approach, regressing the present level of self-assessed health and 
psychological well-being on past values of the variables of interest. We also 
condition the present level of health and of psychological well-being on their past 
values. This allows us to reduce concerns about reverse causality. For modelling 
self-assessed health, since the dependent variable is categorical, we estimate non-
linear dynamic panel ordered probit models, while for modelling psychological 
well-being we estimate a dynamic linear specification.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 4.2 gives an overview of the 
existing literature on the associations between contractual and working conditions 
and health and psychological well-being. Section 4.3 introduces the BHPS data 
and describes the sample and variables we use for estimation. In Section 4.4 we 
describe the econometric models and the estimation strategy. Section 4.5 reports 
and discusses the results of our estimates and some conclusions and discussion are 
provided in Section 4.6. 
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4.2. Literature Review  
 
4.2.1. Contractual conditions  
The empirical evidence regarding the influence of contractual conditions on 
health is mixed. If we consider fixed versus permanent jobs, studies have reported 
that fixed-term workers have worse physical health than permanent workers (see 
for example, Klein Hesselink and Van Vuure, 1999, Benavides et al., 2000, and 
Gash et al., 2006, who make reference to Dutch data, to a set of 15 European 
countries and to Spanish and German data, respectively). Kivimaki et al. (2003) 
show that temporary employment is associated with higher mortality among 
respondents in the Town Study in Finland. In other studies fixed-term contracts 
have been shown to have either no influence (Virtanen et al., 2003) or positive 
influences on health (Sverke et al., 2000). 
As far as we are aware, few studies make reference to the association of 
general self-assessed health with having a part-time rather than a full time job. 
One study that does is Benach et al. (2004) who analyse data from 15 EU 
countries and report that full time workers have worse indicators of health 
compared to part-time workers.  
Psychological well-being is traditionally considered to be negatively 
affected by fixed-term employment. These contracts are considered stressful since 
they imply job insecurity (Bohle et al., 2001; Burchell 1994, 1999). The stressful 
influence of fixed term contracts could be explained, for instance, by considering 
the inability of fixed-term contract workers to plan and control their lives given 
the short-term nature of their jobs (Burchell, 1994).1 This traditional assumption is 
confirmed by several studies (Klein Hesselink and van Vuuren, 1999; Lasfargues 
et al., 1999; Martens et al., 1999). It is unlikely, however, that fixed-term 
contracts have the same impact on all workers. Individual characteristics, such as 
tolerance for ambiguity and self-control, play a relevant role in influencing 
responses to stress and the selection process into permanent employment (Bauer 
and Truxillo, 2000). Therefore, we are not surprised to find other studies in the 
                                                 
1 In this regard, for instance, there is evidence that having a non-permanent employment contract is 
associated with a lower probability of getting married and creating a family (Artazcoz et al., 2005). 
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literature that report no differences in psychological well-being between fixed 
term contract and permanent contract workers (Sverke et al., 2000). 
Evidence from recent papers suggests that people with atypical contractual 
conditions cannot be considered as a homogeneous group when comparing their 
health and well-being with that of permanent workers. Referring to temporary 
versus permanent work arrangements, for instance, Artazcoz et al. (2005) consider 
the Catalonian Health Survey and differentiate between workers with fixed-term 
contracts, with non-fixed term temporary contracts and working with no contract 
at all. They find fixed term contracts are not associated with poorer mental health 
status, while working with non-fixed term temporary contracts or with no contract 
at all is positively associated with poor mental health for many categories of 
workers. Silla et al. (2005) also consider Spanish workers, but differentiate 
temporary workers according to their preferences for contractual arrangements 
and level of employability. “Traditional” temporary workers (with low 
employability and low preference for temporary contracts) have lower well-being 
than permanent workers, but other temporary workers report higher well-being 
than permanent workers. Referring to part-time and full-time contracts, Price and 
Burgard (2006) consider the Americans` Changing Lives study in the US and 
show that women with a part-time contract have lower depressive symptoms and 
lower body mass indices than full-time workers, but only if the reduced working 
time is voluntary. 
Some caution should be exercised when considering the influence of 
atypical contractual employment arrangements on health across countries. 
Differences in national employment rates and employment regulations, for 
example, will determine what can be considered typical and atypical employment 
contracts and may serve to moderate their impact on health (Benach et al., 2004). 
Accordingly, generalising relationships formed at national level is often difficult 
(Virtanen et al., 2003). 
If we focus on British data, Bardasi and Francesconi (2004) use the first 10 
waves of the BHPS to investigate the influence on general health status and 
mental health of atypical employment (defined as temporary and part-time jobs). 
The authors find that atypical employment does not appear to be strongly 
associated with adverse general health. However, there is some evidence that 
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those in seasonal or casual jobs have poorer mental health. Rodrigues (2002) 
considers data from the BHPS for the years 1991-1993 and finds that the health 
status of part-time workers with permanent contracts is not significantly different 
from those who are employed full-time. However, part-time casual work without 
a contract is reported to be associated with poorer health. 
 
4.2.2. Working conditions 
Several studies present evidence that adverse working conditions have 
negative effects on health and psychological well-being. Many of these studies 
make reference to the broad categories of working conditions present in two of the 
most influential models developed to investigate these effects, the “demand-
control-support” model developed by Karasek et al. (1988) and Karasek and 
Theorell (1990) and the “effort–reward imbalance model” of Siegrist et al. (1990) 
and Siegrist (1996). The demand-control-support model considers the categories 
of job demand, decision latitude (job control, ie. high levels of decision authority 
and skill utilization) and social support at work. Job demand can be physical 
(regarding manual work), psychological (regarding pace of work, quantity of 
work and conflicts at work) and contractual (considering the number of working 
hours and irregular work schedule) (Marchand, 2005). The model postulates that 
negative health effects derive not from a single aspect of the work environment, 
but from the joint effect of the demands of a work situation and the range of 
discretion in decision-making available to the workers facing those demands. In 
particular, high job demand and low job control is the worst combination for 
health. Job demands place the individual in a state of “stress”. If no action can be 
taken by the individuals, then the unreleased stress may lead them to suffer from 
adverse health consequences (Henry and Cassell, 1969).2 Social relationships are 
a second analytical level added to this model. “Individuals who are ‘socially 
integrated’ link together their capacities for accommodating stress. […]social 
support buffering should reduce the strength of association between task 
characteristics and strain symptoms” (Karasek et al., 1982, pag. 182). 
                                                 
2 “The implied logical structure is roughly analogous to an 'energy reservoir' model; either the 
energy summoned by the individual to cope with his environment is used for active behavior, or it 
is focused internally with deleterious consequences” (Karasek et al., 1982, pag. 182). 
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  The effort–reward imbalance model considers the categories of effort, such 
as the demands of the job and the motivation of workers in challenging situations, 
and reward at work in terms of salary, esteem, job stability and available career 
opportunities. It predicts that a negative impact on health occurs when there is an 
imbalance between the two dimensions. The motivation behind this prediction is 
the following. Work has positive effects for individuals on their emotional and 
motivational level. Indeed, “occupational status is associated with recurrent 
options of contributing and performing, of being rewarded or esteemed, and of 
belonging to some significant group (e.g. work colleagues)” (Siegrist, 1996, pag. 
29). However, these potentially beneficial effects of work are contingent on the 
presence of reciprocity in the social exchanges. “The effort-reward imbalance 
model claims that lack of reciprocity between costs and gains (i.e., high-cost/low-
gain conditions) define a state of emotional distress with special propensity to 
autonomic arousal and associated strain reaction” (Siegrist, 1996, pag. 30) 
Several empirical studies considering physical and mental health have 
provided evidence in favour of the two models (see, for instance, Pikhart et al., 
2004, and Theorell and Karasek, 1996). Other studies, however, have failed to 
support the theories (for example, Vermeulen and Mustard, 2000) and overall 
there does not appear to be a clear consensus on the empirical validity of these 
models.  
Considering studies that focus on general health and that perform 
prospective analysis 3 Cheng et al. (2000), using a cohort of women working as 
nurses in the United States in 1992 and in 1996, show that those in jobs with high 
demands, low control, and low social support show the greatest declines in health 
status between 1992 and 1996. Niedhammer et al. (2003) make reference to the 
GAZEL cohort (a survey of workers at Electricité De France–Gaz De France) by 
considering individuals who were working and responded to both the 1997 and 
1998 questionnaire. The analysis shows that significant predictors of poor self-
reported health are psychological demands for both men and women, decision 
authority for men only, and social support and physical demands for women only. 
                                                 
3 An extensive literature exists about the effects of workplace factors on specific diseases like 
cardiovascular disease, muscle-skeletal problems etc (see e.g. Juul-Kristensen and Jensen, 2005; 
Andersen et al., 2004). We choose not to report these studies in this short review and instead 
concentrate on studies that investigate effects on more general measures of health.  
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Warren et al. (2002) use the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (WLS) and consider 
the influence of composite indices of physical and psychosocial job characteristics 
in 1975 and 1992 on respondents health outcomes in 1992.4 Respondents with 
adverse physical conditions, for example unclean working environment, and 
psychosocial conditions, for example limited authority and autonomy, were less 
likely to describe their health as excellent.  
The work by Datta Gupta and Kristensen (2007) is particularly significant 
for our study due to the methodology adopted. The authors make reference to the 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP) and consider data from Denmark, 
France and Spain for 1994-2001. By specifying a dynamic panel data model they 
evaluate the impact on self-assessed health of the variable “satisfaction with the 
work environment/working condition”. This variable is considered as a proxy of 
both the physical aspect (including chemical, ergonomic and climatic harmful 
exposures) and the psychological aspects of the work environment (for example, 
relations with co-workers, conflict resolution and discretion over work). The 
results of the analysis show that, in the three countries, having a satisfactory work 
environment significantly promotes employee health.  
Ferrie et al. (2002) use the Whitehall II survey, which covers London-based 
office staff, aged 35–55. They show that individuals with job insecurity report 
poorer self-rated health and well-being than those who have secure employment. 
Bartley et al. (2004) use the BHPS for 1991–2001 to analyze the relationship 
between employment status and occupational social class on limiting long-term 
illness. Social class, however, is defined on the basis of employment conditions 
such as autonomy, job security, and career prospects. Their analysis shows that 
men and women in routine occupations have a greater probability than those in 
higher professional or managerial classes to experience a spell of limiting illness 
together with a lower probability of recovery from such illness. More recently 
                                                 
4 The physical characteristics include whether the job always or frequently involved physical 
effort; whether the respondent ever got dirty on the job; how many hours per week they spent 
doing the same things over and over; how many hours per week they spent working with their 
hands; and whether they were ever exposed to dangerous conditions. Different psychological 
characteristics included whether the respondent had the authority to hire or fire other employees; 
whether employees controlled other employees’ rates of pay; whether they supervised other 
employees’ work; whether they were themselves supervised by someone else; whether their job 
always or frequently involved working under pressure of time; and how many hours per week they 
spent dealing with people about work (Warren et al., 2002).   
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Ahmed-Little (2007) shows that the increase in shift working of junior doctors in 
the UK caused great dissatisfaction, even if accompanied by a reduction in 
working hours. Fatigue and poor performance on night shift have been reported 
by junior doctors and there is evidence from outside medicine that suggests that 
shift work may have long term consequences on health.5   
Considering psychological well-being, Tennant (2001) and Michie and 
Williams (2003) provide reviews of studies that have investigated the impact of 
working conditions. The majority of the studies showing evidence that adverse 
working conditions affect negatively well-being are cross sectional (see, for 
instance, Kawakami et al., 1990, 1992, and Martens, 1999). Among the more 
recent studies, Godin and Kittel (2004) consider a sample of Belgian workers 
employed in four different firms and show that low control and low social support 
negatively affect mental health. Pikhart et al. (2004) analyse data from the Health, 
Alcohol and Psychosocial factors in Eastern Europe Study (HAPIEE) based on 
population samples from three cities in Russia, Poland and the Czech Republic. 
They find that depressive symptoms are strongly associated to effort–reward 
imbalance at work, material deprivation and marital status, but that they are not 
associated with job control.  
Few studies have performed a prospective analysis. Niedhammer et al. 
(1998) use the French GAZEL cohort and make reference to the “demand-control-
support model”. They show that high psychological demands, low decision 
authority, and low social support at work predict the onset of depression over a 
12-month follow-up. Rugulies et al. (2006) analyse data from the Danish Work 
Environment Cohort Study, considering the baseline variables in 1995 and the 
incidence of severe depressive symptoms in 2000. Low influence at work and low 
social support from supervisors, among women, and job insecurity, among men, 
seem to increase the risks of depression. Mixed evidence is found by Marchand 
(2005), who considers four cycles of Statistics Canada’s National Population 
                                                 
5 Shift work has been considered in a systematic review performed by Bambra et al. (2007). 66 
studies, set in Western Europe, the USA, Canada, Japan or Australia are considered in the review. 
The review focus on two types of organizational changes: compressed work week (CWW) and 
schedule redesign. The review suggests that while CWW interventions might not always improve 
the health of shift workers, they are seldom detrimental. Moreover the CWW may have positive 
effects on well-being, especially in terms of work/life balance. Considering schedule redesign, the 
review shows that interventions which changed the rotation of shift work have positive or null 
effects on health and well-being. 
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Health Survey (NPHS). Job insecurity appears to increase the probability of 
psychological distress, but, surprisingly, higher decision authority has the same 
effect.   
Our own study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. We assess 
the distinct effects of contractual and working conditions on health and 
psychological well-being, combining the two distinct branches of the literature. 
As far as we are aware, the two sets of conditions have not been considered by 
previous studies explicitly in a joint way.6 Notice that the working conditions we 
consider are numerous. Many of the previous studies in the literature focus on 
specific occupational groups (i.e.: civil servants, nurses, etc.), which makes it 
difficult to generalise results to the entire workforce. We use the BHPS, which is a 
longitudinal dataset providing rich information on occupational, 
sociodemographic and health variables of a sample representative of the British 
population. The use of this dataset allows us to generalize our results to a 
population of employees in Britain. Other studies have used this dataset (Bardasi 
and Francesconi, 2004; Bartley et al., 2004; Rodrigues, 2002), however, we 
analyse the effects of contractual and working conditions jointly and we exploit a 
larger number of waves in the BHPS dataset. Moreover, we estimate dynamic 
panel data models (linear for GHQ and non-linear for SAH). Dynamic panel 
models have many advantages compared to cross sectional ones. For example, 
they: increase precision in estimation; account for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity; and reduce concerns about endogeneity bias (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2005, p. 697, 743)  
 
4.3 . The BHPS Dataset 
We use panel data from the first 12 waves (1991/92–2002/2003) of the 
BHPS, a longitudinal survey of private households in Great Britain. This survey 
includes rich information on occupational, socio-demographic and health 
variables. The dataset was designed as an annual survey and the initial sample was 
                                                 
6 The only study we are aware of that considers both contractual and working conditions is 
Martens et al. (1999). In their study, however, only temporary and occasional contracts are 
considered as contractual conditions, and only rotating shifts and irregular working hours are 
considered as working conditions. In our study we also consider the effects of temporary 
employment and we refer to a much broader set of working conditions.    
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collected in 1991.7 It contains observations about each adult member (16+) of a 
nationally representative sample of more than 5000 households. Approximately 
10,000 individuals were interviewed in the first wave, and the same individuals 
were re-interviewed in successive waves. In case they split off from their original 
households, they were re-interviewed along with all adult members of their new 
households.8  
In our analysis we use an unbalanced sample, which contains all the 
available observations at each wave that provide complete information on the 
variables used in the model. The sample also includes new entrants to the survey. 
Given the objective of our analysis, we consider only employees, and we exclude 
from our sample people outside the job market or self-employed. The final sample 
consists of 45,658 observations (23,309 for women and 22,349 for men). We only 
use observations for which two consecutive waves are available, since we are 
conditioning health and psychological well-being on one-year lagged values. 
Table 1 summarizes the variables used in our empirical models. 
 
4.3.1. Dependent variables 
We use two dependent variables, SAH, a categorical variable for self-
assessed health, and the GHQ, which is a measure of psychological well-being.    
 
Self-assessed Health  
SAH has been used widely as a measure of health status (e.g. Adams et al., 2003; 
Benzeval et al., 2000; Ettner, 1996; Smith, 1999) and has been shown to be a 
powerful predictor of subsequent use of medical care (van Doorslaer et al., 2000) 
and mortality (Idler and Benyamini, 1997; Idler and Kasl, 1995). As a self-
reported subjective measure of health, SAH may be prone to the measurement 
error often referred to as ‘state-dependent reporting bias’ (Kerkhofs and 
Lindeboom, 1995), ‘scale of reference bias’ (Groot, 2000) and ‘response category 
cut-point shift’ (Sadana et al., 2000; Murray et al., 2001). This sort of 
measurement error occurs if the mapping of ‘true health’ into SAH categories 
                                                 
7 A two-stage stratified systematic sampling procedure was used to do the initial selection of 
households for inclusion in the survey. The procedure was designed to give each address an 
approximately equal probability of selection. 
8 For further details see Taylor et al. (1998). 
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vary with respondent characteristics, that is, if sample subgroups adopt different 
cut point levels in a systematic way when reporting their SAH, although they have 
the same level of ‘true’ health. To attempt to surmount this problem researchers 
could model the reporting bias making reference to more ‘objective’ indicators of 
true health (Kerkhofs and Lindeboom, 1995; Lindeboom and van Doorslaer, 
2004) or to ‘anchoring vignettes’ (Murray et al., 2001).9 We do not pursue the 
potential issue of reporting error further in the study. The BHPS has limited 
information on objective health variables and does not contain vignettes.   
The use of all the first 12 waves of the BHPS could be problematic. For 
waves 1-8 and 10-12 the SAH variable represents “health status over the last 12 
months”. Respondents are asked: “Compared to people of your own age, would 
you say your health over the last 12 months on the whole has been: excellent, 
good, fair, poor, very poor?”. The SF-36 questionnaire was included in wave 9. In 
this questionnaire, the SAH question was re-worded and included a modification 
to the response categories. The SAH variable for wave 9 represents the “general 
state of health”, using the question: “In general, would you say your health is: 
excellent, very good, good, fair, poor?”. To make wave 9 comparable to the other 
waves we collapse the original SAH variable to create a categorisation that has 
common support over the two versions of the question. The final SAH is a 
categorical variable that represents the following four health categories: “poor or 
very poor”, “fair”, “good or very good”, “excellent”.10  
In our analysis we always divide our sample by gender. Dividing the sample 
by gender is quite common in empirical studies about contractual conditions, 
working conditions and health and reflects the differential trends in health over 
time between men and women together with any differences in working 
arrangements between the sexes (Artazcoz et al., 2005; Bardasi and Francesconi, 
2004; Benach et al., 2004; Kivimäki et al., 2003; Rugulies et al., 2006).  
 
Psychological Well-being (GHQ) 
                                                 
9 Anchoring vignettes can be defined as descriptions of fixed levels of a latent construct. They are 
very useful sources of information because any systematic variation across individuals in the rating 
of the vignettes can be attributed to reporting heterogeneity. 
10 For further details about this procedure see Hernandez-Quevedo et al. (2005).  
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We use the reduced version of the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) 
(Goldberg and Williams, 1988) present in the BHPS. The GHQ is often used as an 
indicator of well-being but it was at first developed to detect psychiatric illness. 
For the 12 individual items present in the GHQ, respondents indicate on a four-
point scale (where 0 is the best scenario and 3 the worst) how they recently felt in 
relation to each item.11 In our analysis our dependent variable is the Likert scale 
(Likert, 1952), which reports an overall score summing the individual components 
of the GHQ. The Likert scale, therefore, ranges from 0 to 36. We rescale the 
original variable so that it is increasing in good psychological health. 
 
4.3.2. Independent variables 
 
Contractual conditions 
In our analysis the variables regarding contractual conditions are represented 
by having a part-time contract (part-time job), that is working less than 30 hours a 
week, and having a non-permanent contract (temp job).12 Both variables are 
dummy variables and the reference categories are having a full-time and a 
permanent contract.  
 
Working Conditions 
The BHPS is a rich source of information about the working conditions of 
the individuals interviewed. In order to facilitate the comparison between our 
results on the influence of these variables on health and psychological well-being 
and the evidence found in the previous literature, we group the working 
conditions according to some of the broad categories present in the models of 
Karasek et al. (1988) and Siegrist et al. (1990), mentioned in Section 4.2.2.13 We 
underline that the variables that we use to represent working conditions are only 
                                                 
11 The 12 items are: concentration, sleep loss due to worry, perception of role, capability in 
decision making, whether constantly under strain, perception of problems in overcoming 
difficulties, enjoyment of day to day activities, ability to face problems, loss of confidence, self-
worth, general happiness, whether suffering depression or unhappiness.      
12 To define if workers have a permanent or temporary job, they are asked “Leaving aside your 
own personal intentions and circumstances, is your current job permanent or non-permanent?” 
13 From waves 2 to 4 individuals were not asked information about some variables (not daytime, 
unions, payrise and promotion opportunities) if they were still in the same job as the previous 
year. For these cases, we assume that the value of these variables did not change from the last year 
it was recorded.  
 103
proxies for the conceptual categories used in the literature (described in Section 
4.2.2). Most of the previous studies are based on datasets that contain more 
detailed information on the working conditions of the employee. However, these 
studies usually consider only a very small sample of employees, (i.e. employees 
working in a particular firm, or a particular city) and their conclusions cannot be 
generalized at a national level. In contrast, the use of the BHPS, which comprises 
observations on workers from all over Great Britain, makes our conclusions more 
general and valid for all Great Britain. Accordingly there is a trade-off between 
accuracy of measurement and generalization of results. Here, we compromise by 
using proxy measures to obtain results that can be generalized to a wider 
population.        
 
Demanding job conditions 
We consider not working during regular office hours and working unpaid 
overtime hours as conditions of high job demands. Therefore, we use the variable 
not daytime, which is equal to l if respondents do not work during day time or if 
they have rotation shifts, and 0 otherwise.14 The variable overtime hours 
represents the number of overtime hours that are not paid that respondents work 
in a normal week. It is the difference between the total number of overtime hours 
and the number of paid overtime hours.15 We expect these two variables to have a 
negative relationship with health and psychological well-being, as shown in the 
literature on high job demand (Cheng et al., 2000; Lindberg et al., 2006; Martens 
et al., 1999).  
 
Control and social support 
To proxy the presence of social support at the workplace, we use the 
variable unions, which is equal to 1 if a union or staff association is present at the 
workplace of the respondent, and 0 otherwise. The extent of control over work is 
                                                 
14 Precisely, considering the categories present in the BHPS questionnaire, “not daytime” is equal 
to 0 if respondents report to be in the category “day”, while it is equal to 1 if they report to be in 
the categories "night", "rot shift", "day and night", "morning, afternoon or evening only" or 
"other".  
15 Considering just the total number of overtime hours worked a week could be misleading. Often, 
if the overtime hours are paid, they are paid more than the standard hours of work. Therefore, in 
this case, financial benefits could compensate the stress effect of overtime work. 
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approximated by the variable managerial supervision, which is equal to 1 if the 
respondent has a managerial or supervision role, and 0 otherwise. We expect 
unions and managerial supervision to have a positive relationship with health and 
psychological well-being, as shown for other variables denoting high job control 
and social support (Cheng et al., 2000; Godin and Kittel, 2004; Lindberg et al., 
2006)  
 
Reward 
To consider the possible rewards that respondents can have in their work, we 
include in our analysis the variable payrise, which is equal to 1 if the pay of 
respondents includes an annual increment, 0 otherwise, and promotion 
opportunities, which assumes value 1 if there are opportunities for promotion in 
the current job, and 0 otherwise.16 In the literature, the variables denoting positive 
reward at work have been shown to have a positive influence on health and well-
being (Borg et al., 2000; Marchand, 2005; Rugulies et al., 2006). Therefore, we 
expect payrise and promotion opportunities to have a positive influence on well-
being. 
 
Working environment   
We include the location/venue and the size of the company/institution where 
respondents work. The original variable representing the first condition is 
categorical, indicating if people are working at the employer’s location, at home, 
travelling or other. Given this variable, four dummy variables are derived as 
follows: workplace_employer, workplace_home, workplace_travel and 
workplace_other.  
The size of the company/institution is approximated by the number of 
employees. The original variable present in the BHPS is a categorical one, 
representing, for example, if respondents work in a place where there are 1-2 
employees, 3-9 employees, 10-24 employees, etc. We have created a continuous 
variable to reduce the number of dummy variables to include in our analysis, 
                                                 
16 To measure the variable payrise respondents to the BHPS are asked “Some people can normally 
expect their pay to rise every year by moving to the next point on the scale, as well as receiving 
negotiated pay rises. Are you paid on this type of incremental scale?”. To evaluate promotion 
opportunities respondents are asked “In your current job do you have opportunities of promotion?”  
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following the procedure described in Contoyannis and Rice (2001).17 Working in 
big companies/institutions might have a positive influence on the health and well-
being of employees, since it might allow better career opportunities or the use of 
better facilities.  
 
Work satisfaction  
We use satisfaction_total pay, satisfaction_security and satisfaction_work, 
which assume the value 1 if respondents are satisfied with the total pay for the 
job, the security of the job and the work itself, respectively, and 0 otherwise.  
We consider also the preferences for the number of hours worked each 
week. The BHPS contains a categorical variable reporting if individuals would 
prefer to work fewer hours (preference less hrs) or more hours (preference more 
hrs). Preferring the amount of hours actually worked is our base category.   
 
Other covariates 
We control for age, which is included in a cubic form (age, age^2 and 
age^3) to allow for a non-linear relationship with health and psychological well-
being, and for marital status, including the categories divorced or separated 
(divsep), never married (nevermar), or widowed (widowed) (the base category is 
being married or living as a couple).   
We take into consideration the ethnic origin of respondents (race), the 
number of individuals living in the household (household size), and the presence 
of children in the household (children). The base category is being white and not 
having children.  
We also control for individual income (income), which is measured as gross 
annual (labour and non-labour) income. For education and social class we include 
the variables high education and lower social class in the model.18 19 20 Year 
                                                 
17 “We created a continuous variable by taking the midpoint of each category for each individual. 
For those who could not report the category into which their establishment fell, but were able to 
report whether it was above or below a particular value, we estimated their observation as a 
weighted average of the midpoints of the relevant categories. The weights used are the proportions 
of the relevant sub-sample which are in the relevant categories” (Contoyannis and Rice, 2001, 
p.610). 
18 Income is transformed to natural logarithms to allow for the concavity of the health–income 
relationship (E.g. Ettner, 1996).  
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dummies are included to account for aggregate health shocks, time-varying 
reporting changes and possible effects of age which are not captured by the age 
variables we include in the model. 
Table 2 presents the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum for 
the regressors used in our empirical models for the sub-samples of women and 
men. Overall, the differences in means between the two sub-samples appear very 
small. A much higher percentage of women, however, have a part-time job than 
men. Moreover, a higher percentage of men than women work in a place different 
from the employer’s or at home, have a managerial or supervision role and have 
promotion opportunities. 
 
4.4. The Econometric Models and Estimation Strategy 
 
4.4.1. The econometric models  
To model self-assessed health we use a dynamic panel ordered probit 
specification with random effects. The ordered probit can be used to model 
discrete dependent variables taking ordered multinomial outcomes. Therefore, it 
applies well to our measure of self-assessed health, which has categorical 
outcomes “poor or very poor”, “fair”, “good or very good”, “excellent”.  
The latent variable specification of the model that we estimate can be written 
as: 
 
                h*it = β’xit-1 + γ’ hit-1+ αi  + εit                                        (1) 
 
i = 1,….N    (number of individuals in the sample) 
t = 2,….T    (number of waves of the survey) 
 
                                                                                                                                     
19 High education is equal to 1 if people have a qualification equal or superior to A level, and 0 
otherwise. Lower social class is equal to 1 if people belong to the BHPS categories "skilled 
manual” “armed forces”, "partly skilled", "unskilled”, and 0 otherwise. 
20 There are many variables that are worth trying to include in our regression model as controls, 
such as the worker employment sector. However, the use of the STATA program reoprob.ado, 
written by Frechette (2001) imposes restrictions on the number of variables that it is possible to 
include in the regression model. Therefore, we choose to adopt as controls only the basic socio-
economic conditions. In future work we could try to include in our analysis other controls, such as 
the worker employment sector. 
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where xit-1 is a set of observed variables which may be associated with the health 
indicator. These variables are lagged one period to account for delays between 
contractual conditions and working conditions impacts on health.21 Moreover, the 
SAH variable makes reference to health status over the last 12 months, while 
many of the job related variables makes reference to the present time. Therefore, 
to try to ensure that measures of contractual and working conditions are obtained 
before measures of health and well-being it is necessary to use the one-year lag of 
the former variables. αi is an individual-specific and time invariant random 
component while εit is a time and individual-specific error term. This error term is 
assumed to be normally distributed, uncorrelated across individuals and waves, 
and uncorrelated with αi. The xit-1 are assumed to be uncorrelated with εis for all t 
and s. We restrict the variance of the idiosyncratic error term to be equal to one, 
since we do not have a natural scale for the latent variable.  
The estimation of the effects of contractual and working conditions on 
health and psychological well-being may raise concerns about the presence of 
endogeneity bias, unless one can establish that the causation is unidirectional (as 
has been proposed, for example, by Adams et al., 2003). To reduce concerns 
about reverse causality (i.e. health and psychological well-being affecting 
contractual and working conditions) and following previous studies (Chapman 
and Hariharan, 1994; Contoyannis et al., 2004), we include previous health status 
lagged one period, hit-1, in our empirical models. This further allows us to identify 
the impact of working conditions and contractual conditions on changes in health 
status. 
Since we consider self reported data, we do not observe the latent level of 
health h*it , but only an indicator of the category in which the latent indicator falls, 
hit:  
 
                hit = j       if         mj-1 < h*it< mj   j = 1,….4                               (2) 
 
where m0 = - ∞, mj-1 <= mj , m4 = + ∞. 
                                                 
21 This has been stressed, for example, by Bartley et al. (2004). 
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Assuming that the error term is normally distributed, the probability of 
observing the particular category of SAH reported by individual i at time t (hit), 
conditional on the set of regressors and the individual effect, can be expressed as:  
 
 Pitj = P(hit = j) = Ф(mj -  β’xit-1 - γ’ hit-1 - αi) – Ф(mj-1 -  β’xit-1 - γ’ hit-1 - αi)         (3) 
 
Where  Ф(.) is the standard normal distribution function. This formulation shows 
that it is not possible to identify separately an intercept in the linear index (β0) and 
the cut points (m), since the model only allows identification of (mj  - β0).  We 
adopt a conventional normalization, setting β0 = 0, to deal with this issue. The 
random effect ordered probit specification is estimated with STATA (release 9.0, 
Stata Corporation) using the program reoprob.ado, written by Frechette (2001). 
In our analysis psychological well-being is measured using the GHQ. We 
model psychological well-being with a linear model. This model can be expressed 
by equation (1), keeping all the related assumptions. In this case, however, we 
need to underline that h*it does not represent a latent variable but the observed 
one.  
To allow for the possibility of a correlation between the observed regressors 
and the individual effect we parameterize the individual effect (Chamberlain, 
1984; Mundlak, 1978; Wooldridge, 2005), allowing it to be correlated with the 
within-individual means of the time-varying regressors. Moreover, since we 
estimate dynamic models, the problem of initial conditions needs to be 
considered. Two assumptions are typically made concerning a discrete time 
stochastic process with binary outcomes (Heckman, 1981). The same issues arise 
when we deal with ordered categorical outcomes (Contoyannis et al., 2004). The 
first assumption is that the initial observations are exogenous variables, while the 
second assumption is that the process is in equilibrium, meaning that the marginal 
probabilities have approached their limiting values and can be considered time-
invariant. If the error process is not serially independent and the first observation 
is not the true initial outcome of the process the first assumption is not valid, and 
the estimators we obtain are inconsistent. In our case, we know that the latter 
condition does not hold, since the first year for which we have observations does 
not coincide with the start of individuals` health trajectory. The second 
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assumption is not valid if non-stationary variables such as age and time trends are 
included in the model, as they are in our study.   
For both the linear and non-linear model, we deal with the initial condition 
problem by adopting the conditional maximum likelihood approach of 
Wooldridge (2005), modelling the distribution of the unobserved effect 
conditional on the initial value and any exogenous explanatory variables.22 The 
likelihood function resulting from Wooldridge’s approach is based on the joint 
distribution of the observations conditional on the initial observations. A 
limitation of this approach is that it requires specifying a complete model for the 
unobserved effects. This approach, therefore, may be sensitive to 
misspecification.  
Following the approach of Wooldridge, we parameterize the distribution of 
the individual effects as: 
 
              αi = α0 + α1 hi1 + α2 i
_
x  + ui                                        (4) 
  
where i
_
x  is the average over the sample period of the observations on the time-
varying socio-economic controls variables and ui is assumed to be distributed N(0, 
σ2u), independent of the regressors, the idiosyncratic error term (εit), and the initial 
conditions. 
 
4.4.2. Estimation Strategy  
Our approach to estimation is to first assess the distinct effects of contractual 
conditions and working conditions separately on health and psychological well-
being. We then estimate a model containing both working and contractual 
conditions and further assess the impact of employees’ job satisfaction and the 
effect of variables relating to the “demand-control-support” model of Karasek and 
the “effort–reward imbalance” model of Siegrist.  
The first models regress SAH and GHQ, respectively, on the contractual 
conditions variables only and the set of controls (age, age^2, age^3, divsep, 
                                                 
22 Wooldridge’s (2005) approach for dealing with linear panel models is also used by Hauck and 
Rice (2004).   
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neverm, widowed, race, household size, children, income, high education, lower 
social class, preference less hrs, preference more hrs). To assess the effects of 
voluntary or involuntary part-time employment, we introduce variables 
representing the joint effect of having a part-time job and being unsatisfied with 
the number of hours worked. Accordingly we introduce the interaction terms part-
time job*preference less hrs and part-time job*preference more hrs, with the 
baseline representing a part-time job where the employee is satisfied with the 
hours worked. We expect these interaction terms to be negatively related to health 
and well-being.  
For workers on temporary contracts we consider the potential impact of the 
individuals` chances of finding alternative employment (should they wish to do 
so) by considering variables representing potential employability (Silla et al., 
2005). In this study we consider higher levels of education as a proxy for higher 
employability. We, therefore, introduce the interaction terms temp job*high edu. 
We expect this term to have a positive effect on health and well-being, since 
temporary workers with a high level of employability should be less concerned 
about a lack of job security.   
We also try to consider the role that family structure plays on the health and 
psychological well-being of workers in part-time and temporary jobs, by allowing 
contractual conditions to have different effects according to whether an employee 
has children. Therefore, we introduce the interaction terms part-time job* children 
and temp job*children. The rationale for introducing the latter term is that the 
stress due to insecurity of job could be worse for workers who have children to 
support and accordingly we expect to observe a negative sign on the effect of this 
variable. It is harder to predict the influence of part-time job* children. Indeed, 
employees with children could benefit from having a part-time job, due to having 
more time to spend with their family. However, for workers who have to maintain 
children, the lower income associated with a part-time job could have stressful 
effects. Therefore, the final effect on health and psychological well-being could 
depend on which of these effects prevails. 
In the second model we regress SAH and the GHQ, respectively, on the 
working condition variables as set out in Section 4.3.2, conditional on the set of 
controls.   
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In the third model we use both the contractual and the working conditions 
variables as regressors, to assess the robustness of the results obtained in the 
previous models when we consider the two sets of regressors together. We further 
attempt to evaluate if our data provide support to the theoretical frameworks of 
Karasek et al. (1988) and Siegrist et al. (1990) (from now on, referred to as 
Karasek and Siegrist). Considering Karasek’s framework, we introduce the 
interaction term no daytime*managerial/supervision, where working outside 
normal daytime hours is an indicator of high job demand, and having a managerial 
supervision role is an index of high control. A positive coefficient would provide 
support for Karasek`s framework. Considering Siegrist’s framework, we introduce 
the interaction term no daytime*promotion opportunities, where not working 
during the day is an indicator of high effort while having promotion opportunities 
is an indicator of reward.23 A positive coefficient would lend support to Siegrist`s 
framework. We also introduce the variables about satisfaction with working 
conditions (satisfaction_total pay, satisfaction_security and satisfaction_work), 
because they reflect, at least partly, a balance between the effort and reward at 
work. We are aware that work satisfaction may be influenced not only by 
objective working conditions but can also reflect personality characteristics of 
respondents (i.e. if individuals have a tendency to be pessimistic or optimistic). 
Although not offering conclusive results, positive coefficients on these variables 
would provide some support for Siegrist`s model.  
We underline that in the model for SAH, since we are dealing with a non-
linear ordered categorical model, the estimated coefficients have only qualitative 
content. To provide information about the magnitude of the effects we present 
partial effects (Wooldridge, 2002). In particular, we report the change in the 
probability of reporting excellent health due to a marginal change for continuous 
                                                 
23 Actually, the interaction terms no daytime*managerial supervision and no daytime*promotion 
opportunities are not introduced contemporaneously in the third model, because the two terms are 
highly correlated. We estimate a model where we introduce no daytime*managerial supervision 
only and another model where we introduce no daytime*promotion opportunities only. Since the 
results of these two models are extremely similar, we have chosen to present the results of the 
latter model, and to report only the results related to no daytime*managerial supervision for the 
former model.  
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variables and to a discrete change for binary variables.24 We compute the effects 
for a hypothetical representative agent with “average characteristics”.25 Inference 
on the significance of the estimated coefficients is undertaken using the Wald test.  
When dealing with non-linear models, attention should be given to 
interaction terms, as highlighted by Ai and Norton (2003) and Norton et al. 
(2004). First, the partial effect for an interaction term could be non-zero even if 
the directly estimated coefficient of the interaction term is zero. Secondly, we 
cannot rely on standard tests on the coefficients of the interaction term to test the 
statistical significance of the interaction effect. Thirdly, the interaction effect is 
conditional on the independent variables and may have different signs for 
different values of the covariates. Therefore, to compute the magnitude of the 
interaction effects it is necessary to compute the cross derivative (for continuous 
variables) or differences (for categorical ones). Moreover, the statistical 
significance of the interaction effect must be tested for the cross partial derivative 
(difference) of the dependent variables and not for the directly estimated 
coefficient of the interaction term. In our analysis we adopt the strategy proposed 
by Ai and Norton (2003) and Norton et al. (2004) to compute the partial effect and 
the standard errors for the interactions.26  
 
4.5. Results 
For all of the models described in the previous Section, the coefficients for 
the lagged and the initial value of the dependent variable are statistically 
significant at the 1% level and substantial in magnitude. This result supports our 
                                                 
24 Notice that the direction of the effect of the covariates on the probabilities of reporting the 
extreme outcomes (“poor or very poor” and “excellent” health, in our study) is unambiguously 
determined by the sign of the coefficients (Wooldridge, 2002) 
25 We attribute the mean value to the covariates that are continuous and the modal value to the 
covariates that are categorical. To make the partial effects meaningful, when we compute the 
partial effects of part-time*pref less hrs, part-time*pref more hrs and part-time*children the 
representative agent is assumed to have a part-time job, while computing the partial effects for 
temp job*high education and temp job*children this individual is assumed to have a temporary 
job. Considering the partial effects for not daytime*manag-sup and no day time*prom opp, the 
representative agent is assumed not to work during the daytime.  
26 The standard errors of the interactions are computed by applying the delta method (Norton et al., 
2004). 
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use of a dynamic model and indicates that current health is a function of previous 
period health.27 
To verify if the parametrisation of the individual effect described in Section 
4.4.1 holds, we assess if the coefficient α2 in equation (4) is significantly different 
from zero. Since income is the only time-varying variable used as a control we 
include its within-individual mean as i
_
x . In all of the models presented below, 
the coefficient of this variable is statistically significant at the 1% level. The only 
exception is the model for females for psychological well-being. In all the other 
cases the correlated effects model has to be preferred to the pure random effects 
model. Accordingly, below we report the estimates derived from the correlated 
effects model. 
 
4.5.1. Self-assessed Health 
Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients and the standard errors for females 
and Table 4 for males, while Table 5 and Table 6 report the partial effects (the 
change in the probability of reporting excellent health) and standard error for 
women and men, respectively.28 The first column presents the model considering 
contractual conditions only; the second column considers working conditions 
only; and the third column, the full model, where we use both contractual and 
working conditions variables. To conserve space, we report the results only for the 
variables related to contractual and working conditions. Estimated coefficients for 
the control variables present in the model are available on request. Inference on 
the statistical significance of the relationship between the main terms and SAH is 
done by referring to the standard errors of the estimated coefficients, while 
considering the interaction terms we refer to the standard errors of the partial 
effects (as suggested by Ai and Norton, 2003 and Norton et al., 2004).    
The first column of results suggests that there is a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between health and having a part-time job (compared to 
                                                 
27 In our paper we do not consider the problem of health-related attrition. Contoyannis et al. (2004) 
and Jones et at. (2006), however, show that although health-related attrition exists in the BHPS 
data, it does not appear to distort the magnitude of the effects of socioeconomic variables when 
modelling the determinants of health. This result allows us to think that attrition should also not be 
relevant in the estimate of the effect of contractual and working conditions.  
28 To compute the partial effects and the related standard errors we use the STATA command 
“nlcom”, which implies the use of the delta method for calculations.  
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having a full time job), for employees satisfied with the number of hours worked 
or who do not have children. This result is consistent with previous studies (Price 
and Burgard, 2006). However, and as expected, not being satisfied with the 
number of hours worked or having children has a negative influence on the health 
of part time workers. This holds for both women and men. However, these effects 
are not significant at conventional levels. The magnitude of the computed partial 
effects, overall, is larger for men than for women.29 Notice that the partial effects 
for part-time*pref less hrs and part-time*pref more hrs are larger than that for 
part-time*children. This suggests that the health of part-time workers is 
influenced more by preferences for hours worked than by the demands of a 
family.  
Consistent with previous literature (Silla et al., 2005), our analysis reveals a 
negative relationship between health and having a temporary job (compared to 
having a permanent job) for women with a low level of education. Unexpectedly, 
however, this relationship appears positive for men. Having a high level of 
education positively influences health for women and men with a temporary job. 
A further asymmetry between women and men relates to the presence of children. 
The relationship between having a temporary job and health is positive for women 
with children, while the relationship is negative for men. Notice that the 
magnitude of the partial effect (in absolute terms) for temp job*children is smaller 
than that for temp job*high education for women, while the opposite result holds 
for men.30 Moreover, temp job*high education is statistically significant for 
women, while temp job*children is statistically significant for men. These results 
suggest that, for men with a temporary job, the family structure has a larger 
influence on reporting excellent health than their level of employability, while for 
women the opposite holds. The asymmetries we observe between women and men 
about the influence of temporary jobs on health could perhaps derive from the 
                                                 
29 For people satisfied with the number of hours worked or without children, a shift from full time 
to part-time increases the probability of reporting excellent health by 2.3% for women and 7.5% 
for men. If the person with the part-time job wishes to work less hours, the probability of reporting 
excellent health reduces by about 6% for both women and men, while if she/he wishes to work 
more hours the probability reduces by 2% and 4.8 % for women and men, respectively. If the part-
time workers have children, the probability reduces by 0.7% and 3.2% for females and males, 
respectively. 
30 In fact, the partial effect for the probability of reporting excellent health for temporary workers 
with a high level of education is 0.052 for females and 0.032 for males, while that partial effect for 
temporary workers with children is 0.021 and -0.091. 
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different roles women and men play within the family structure. Our results, 
indeed, could be explained in the light of a “traditional” view of the family, where 
taking care of children is mainly a responsibility of women while men are the 
ones with the main responsibility for child material sustenance.       
In the second model, where we consider working conditions, the partial 
effects of some conditions have the sign that we expect according to the previous 
literature (payrise and overtime hours for women and men, not daytime and 
managerial supervision for women, and promotion opportunities for men). 
However, the partial effect of other variables (promotion opportunities and unions 
for females, not daytime, managerial supervision and unions for males) does not 
exhibit the expected sign.31 The magnitude of all of these effects, however, is 
small.32 
Considering the variables related to the working environment, we observe an 
asymmetry between men and women. The relationship between working at home 
(compared to working at the employer’s workplace) and health is positive for 
women while it is negative for men, while the opposite holds for workers who 
travel or workers in places different from the employer’s workplace. For women, 
the magnitude of these partial effects seems to be large compared to that of most 
of the other working conditions variables. Notice that the partial effect of working 
at home for females is particularly high and is statistically significant. This could 
be due to the fact that working at home may allow a high level of flexibility 
(people can organize their time in a better way, they can reduce the travel time to 
work, they can take care of family or the house at the same time, etc). The 
relationship between the number of employees at the workplace and health is 
negative for women and positive and statistically significant for men. The 
magnitude of the related partial effects, however, appears very small. 33     
In the third model, where we consider both contractual and working 
conditions, the magnitude of the partial effects of these conditions and their level 
                                                 
31 Notice that the partial effect of promotion opportunities and unions for females is also 
statistically significant. 
32 The variation in the probability of reporting excellent health induced by any of these working 
conditions is smaller than 2.5%.  
33 The value reported in the table is about 0.00005 for females and 0.00006 for males, meaning 
that, for example, the presence of 100 more people at the workplace increases the probability of 
reporting excellent health by 0.5% for females and 0.6% for males.   
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of statistical significance change little compared to the models where contractual 
and working conditions are considered separately.34 This result suggests that our 
model is robust and that there is little collinearity between the regressors. An 
interesting finding, however, regards the magnitude of the partial effect of the 
variable temp job. For females, in the third model the partial effect is still negative 
but is smaller than in the model where only contractual conditions are considered. 
For males, the partial effect is still positive but becomes larger than in the first 
model. Although these results are not conclusive, they appear to suggest that when 
contractual conditions are analysed without considering working conditions, the 
estimate of the effect of having a temporary job (and a low level of education) 
might be biased by the omission of some working condition variable in the 
model.35 The fact that workers with adverse contractual conditions are often 
characterized by adverse working conditions has been underlined in the literature, 
for example, by Artazcoz et al. (2005), Aronsson (2001) and Letourneux (1998).   
Our findings appear to provide some support in favour of the Karasek`s 
framework for women, but not for men, since the partial effect of no 
daytime*managerial supervision is positive for females and negative for males 
(none of them, however, is statistically significant). Regarding the Siegrist`s 
framework, the interpretation of our findings is more ambiguous, since some of 
the factors considered are in favour of the framework while others are not. For 
both women and men, satisfaction_security and satisfaction_work itself appear to 
show a positive and highly statistically significant relationship with health, while 
no daytime*promotion opportunities exhibits a negative (and statistically non-
significant) relationship. Due to data limitation and the use of proxies to represent 
the working conditions present in the Karasek and Siegriest models, we are unable 
to test directly the theoretical foundations of those models. Instead we use a 
general framework t that allows us to examine their predictions to the extent that 
our data permit. Should more detailed information become available in the BHPS 
                                                 
34 In the model for males, the partial effect of promotion opportunities changes sign, but its 
magnitude continues to be very small and it is not statistically significant compared to first and 
second model.   
35 Notice that having a temporary job (in general, for people with both low and high education) is 
slightly correlated with some working conditions. For example, the correlation coefficient between 
having a temporary job and having promotion opportunities, or a managerial/supervision role, or 
pay rise is about 0.1.   
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about the working conditions of employees, a more precise evaluation of the two 
models could performed.     
 
4.5.2. Psychological Well-being 
Table 7 reports the coefficients and standard errors for the models for 
females, while Table 8 reports results for males.  
In the first model, the results concerning the relationship between 
contractual conditions and psychological well-being are similar to those found 
when analysing self-assessed health. Some differences, however, are apparent. 
Considering part-time employment, the coefficient of the interaction term for 
preferring less hours has an unexpected positive sign for men, and for preferring 
more hours has an unexpected positive sign for both women and men (the sign of 
the partial effects of these interactions is negative in the model for health). For 
men, the coefficient of the interaction term part-time*children is statistically 
significant and has a high magnitude compared to part-time, part-time*pref less 
hrs and part-time*pref more hrs. This suggests that having children and having a 
part-time job has a particular negative influence on the psychological well-being 
of men. Considering having a temporary job, for females the coefficient of the 
variable temporary job*children is negative (while the partial effect for this 
variable in the model for self-assessed health is positive) and its magnitude, in 
absolute terms, is bigger than that of temp-job and temp-job*high education. 
These differences suggest that family structure plays a larger role for 
psychological well-being than for general self-assessed health.   
In the second model, where we consider contractual conditions only, the 
results are generally similar to those found analysing self-assessed health. Even 
for this model, however, some differences can be seen.36 The relationship between 
psychological well-being and working unpaid overtime hours appears to be more 
relevant than in the case of self-assessed health. For both women and men, the 
coefficient of overtime hours is non-negligible and is statistically significant. The 
magnitude of the coefficients of the variables relating to the work place continues 
to be large and that of those relating to the number of employees at work place is 
                                                 
36 An interesting difference is that in the model for psychological well-being the coefficient of not 
daytime has the expected negative sign for both women and men.   
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still negligible. However, all of these coefficients are not statistically significant. 
For women, it is interesting to note that working at home has a positive 
relationship with health, while it seems to be negatively related to psychological 
well-being. The opposite holds for the variable workplace other, which is 
negatively related to health, and positively related to psychological well-being.  
 When we consider both contractual and working conditions simultaneously, 
the magnitude of the coefficients and their level of statistical significance change 
little compared to the relevant coefficients in the first and second model. Similar 
results found for self-assessed health in support or otherwise of Siegrist`s and 
Karasek`s models hold for psychological well-being.37 38  
In Annex 1 we report sensitivity analyses performed to assess the robustness 
of our results. First, the negative relationship between unions and health and 
psychological well-being suggested by our estimates is unexpected. To assess the 
robustness of this result, we define the variable unions in a different way (making 
reference to individual union membership instead of the presence of a union at the 
workplace) and re-estimate our models using this new variable. Secondly, we are 
aware that our results regarding Karasek`s and Siegrist`s frameworks could be 
affected by the choice of the specific variables we use to approximate the broad 
conceptual categories of “job demand” and “job reward” used in these models. 
Therefore, we evaluate alternative specifications of the interaction terms 
introduced to investigate these theoretical models, using overtime hours instead of 
not daytime to represent the conceptual category of “job demand”, and payrise 
instead of promotion opportunities to represent the category of “job reward”.  
Overall, the sensitivity analysis suggests that our results are not sensitive with 
regard to the definition of the union variable and the way we approximate the 
conceptual categories of “job demand” and “job reward”.   
 
 
                                                 
37 Notice that in the model for psychological well-being, the work satisfaction variables that are 
positive and highly statistically significant are satisfaction_total pay and satisfaction security.   
38 In a further specification (not reported here), we have run the model for GHQ not including the 
variables denoting satisfaction with work. The sign and the level of statistical significance of not 
daytime*promotion opportunites do not change. Therefore, the results in the main specification do 
not appear to be influenced by the presence of multicollinearity between the two sets of regressors 
related to Siegrist`s framework. 
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4.6. Final Remarks 
Our study analyses the influence that contractual and working conditions 
have on self-assessed health and psychological well-being of employees using 
twelve waves (1991/92 – 2002/2003) of the British Household Panel Survey. The 
results suggest that both contractual and working conditions have some influence 
on health and psychological well-being of employees. These empirical results, 
therefore, provide some evidence against the neoclassical theory of equalizing 
differences. It is interesting to note that asymmetries among women and men exist 
with regard to these effects. 
In our analysis we attempt to evaluate the role that preferences for the 
number of hours of work, the level of employability and family structure play in 
affecting the relationship between contractual/working conditions and health and 
psychological well-being. Our estimates show that being unsatisfied with the 
number of hours worked has a negative influence on the health of individuals who 
have a part-time job. Having a high level of employability (in our study 
approximated by having higher levels of education) appears to influence 
positively the health and psychological well-being of individuals with temporary 
job arrangements. Family structure appears to influence the health and well-being 
of workers with atypical contractual conditions. If workers have part-time or 
temporary work arrangements, the presence of children in the family is negatively 
related to health and psychological well-being (with the exception of women with 
temporary jobs).  
The results concerning the relationship between contractual/working 
conditions and psychological well-being are similar to those found when 
analysing self-assessed health. Some differences, however, are observed. In 
particular family structure and working unpaid overtime hours appear to play a 
larger role for psychological well-being than for general self-assessed health.  
Our results appear to provide limited support in favour of Karasek’s model 
for women (but not for men). The interpretation of our findings with regards to 
Siegrist’s model is more ambiguous, since this model does not receive direct 
support by the inclusion of the interaction term no daytime*promotion 
opportunities but it receives some indirect support considering the effects of the 
working satisfaction variables. 
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We assess the distinct effects of contractual and working conditions on 
health and psychological well-being, combining two distinct branches of the 
literature. As far as we are aware, previous studies have not considered explicitly 
the two factors jointly. Secondly, the analysis of the effects of contractual and 
working conditions on both self-assessed health and psychological well-being, for 
both women and men, allows us to highlight interesting asymmetries in these 
effects. Thirdly, most of the previous studies in the literature have focused on 
specific occupations (i.e. civil servants, nurses, etc.), and this makes the 
generalisation of their results to the entire workforce problematic. In our study we 
use the BHPS, a dataset containing a representative sample of the British 
population. Fourthly, the methodology we adopt for our analysis has several 
advantages compared to that one used by other studies in the literature. Indeed, we 
estimate dynamic panel data models, which allow us to account for the presence 
of individual specific effects and reduces concerns about reverse causality.  
Our study suggests that, under certain circumstances, adverse contractual 
and working conditions can have a negative influence on the health and 
psychological well-being of workers in Great Britain. Improving the health and 
psychological well-being of workers could not only improve population health 
and reduce health inequalities, but could also have positive implications for the 
wider economy (Bartley et al., 2004). Workers with better health and 
psychological well-being, indeed, are likely to suffer less from illnesses limiting 
their working capacity and to have better work performance and less sickness 
leave. The implications at a macro-economic level of an improvement in the 
health conditions of workers can be particularly relevant in Great Britain, given 
that this country reports a low level of labour productivity compared to the other 
G7 countries (Office for National Statistics, 2008). Policy makers, therefore, 
should make some efforts to consider the cost, both at a social and economic 
level, of the health limitations that might derive from adverse contractual and 
working conditions.    
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Annex 1. Sensitivity analysis 39  
 
 Unions  
The estimates presented in Section 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 suggest a negative 
relationship between unions and health and psychological well-being. This result 
is unexpected since studies in the literature suggest that social support at work 
positively influences health and psychological well-being (Cheng et al., 2000; 
Godin and Kittel, 2004) and we consider the presence of unions at workplace as 
an element of social support for employees. To check the robustness of this result 
we consider individual union membership instead of the presence of unions at 
workplace. The former variable is also present in the BHPS. This variable is equal 
to 1 if a worker is a member of a union or association, and 0 otherwise. We re-
estimate our models using this new variable for both self-assessed health and 
psychological well-being. The results for this alternative specification are 
extremely similar to those of the original specification. In particular, in the models 
for self-assessed health the coefficient has the same negative sign and the same 
level of significance as in the original models, while in the models for 
psychological well-being the coefficient remains negative but is not statistically 
significant. Therefore, our results appear not to be sensitive to the definition of the 
union variable.   
 
Karasek`s and Siegrist`s frameworks 
The results presented in Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 regarding Karasek`s and 
Siegrist`s frameworks could be affected by the choice of the specific variables we 
use to approximate the broad conceptual categories of “job demand” and “job 
reward” used in these models. Therefore, we evaluate alternative specifications of 
the interaction terms introduced to investigate these theoretical models, using 
overtime hours instead of not daytime to represent the conceptual category of job 
demand, and payrise instead of promotion opportunities to represent the category 
of job reward. First, we re-estimate our models substituting the interaction term 
not daytime*managerial supervision with overtime hours*managerial supervision 
                                                 
39 The results for these sensitivity checks are not reported here but are available on request 
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and not daytime*promotion opportunities with overtime hours*promotion 
opportunities in the model for both SAH and the GHQ, for both women and men. 
Generally, the results found with this new specification are very similar to those 
found with the original one, for both females and males, and for both self-assessed 
health and psychological well-being. In all cases the interaction terms are not 
statistically significant (as in the original specification), and some of them 
(overtime hours*promotion opportunities in the model for SAH for females, and 
overtime hours*managerial supervision and overtime hours*promotion 
opportunities in the model for the GHQ for males) change sign. Secondly, we re-
estimate our models substituting the interaction term not daytime*promotion 
opportunities with not daytime*payrise and overtime hours*promotion 
opportunities with overtime hours*payrise. The results are very similar to those in 
the original models, for both females and males, and for both self-assessed health 
and psychological well-being. In all the cases the interaction terms are not 
statistically significant (as in the original specification), and just one interaction 
term (overtime hours*payrise in the model for the GHQ for female) changes sign. 
Given that none of these effects are statistically significant, a change in sign is not 
of great concern. These sensitivity checks suggest that our specification is not 
sensitive to the way we approximate the broad conceptual categories of “job 
demand” and “job reward”, particularly for the models for SAH.   
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Table 1. Variable definitions 
 
 
Self-assessed health 
1 if “poor or very poor”, 2 if “fair”, 3 if “good or very good”, 
4 if “excellent” health 
GHQ Psychological well-being (0-36, where 0 is the worst 
level,  36 the best) 
CONTRACTUAL CONDITIONS  
part-time job 1 if current job is part-time, 0 otherwise 
temp job  1 if current job is temporary, 0 otherwise 
WORKING CONDITIONS  
Demanding job conditions  
not daytime 1 if not working during the day or having rotation shift, 0 
otherwise 
overtime hours number of overtime hours in normal week 
control  
unions  1 if there is a union or staff association at workplace, 0 
otherwise 
managerial supervision  1 if managerial or supervision duties, 0 otherwise 
reward  
payrise 1 if pay includes annual increment, 0 otherwise 
promotion opportunities 1 if opportunities of promotion in current job, 0 otherwise
working environment  
workplace home 1 if working at home, 0 otherwise 
workplace travel 1 if working travelling, 0 otherwise 
workplace other 1 if NOT working at the employeer, home or travelling, 0 
otherwise 
employed at workplace number of people employed at the workplace 
WORK SATISFACTION  
satisfaction_total pay 1 if satisfied with total pay of the job, 0 otherwise 
satisfaction_security 1 if satisfied with security of the job, 0 otherwise 
satisfaction_work itself 1 if satisfied with the work itself, 0 otherwise 
preference less hrs 1 if preferred working fewer hours, 0 otherwise 
preference more hrs 1 if preferred working more hours, 0 otherwise 
CONTROLS  
age Age in years at 1st December of current wave 
divsep 1 if divorced or separated, 0 otherwise 
nevermar 1 if never maried, 0 otherwise 
widowed 1 if widowed, 0 otherwise 
race 0 if white, 1 otherwise 
household size n. of people in the household including the respondent 
children 1 if in the household there is at least one child (less than 
16), 0 otherwise 
income log of Annual labour income (in pounds) 
high education 1 if people have a qualification equal or superior to A 
level, 0 otherwise 
lower social class 1 if "skilled manual” “armed forces”, "partly skilled", 
"unskilled”, 0 otherwise. 
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Table 2. Regressors` mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum 
 Females Males 
  N= 23,309 N= 22,349 
  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
CONTRACTUAL 
CONDITIONS             
part-time job 0.352 0.478 0 1 0.046 0.210 0 1 
temp job  0.070 0.256 0 1 0.050 0.218 0 1 
WORKING 
CONDITIONS         
Demanding job 
conditions         
not daytime 0.350 0.477 0 1 0.297 0.457 0 1 
overtime hours 1.540 4.349 0 71 2.296 5.485 0 80 
control         
unions  0.525 0.499 0 1 0.501 0.500 0 1 
managerial supervision  0.325 0.468 0 1 0.426 0.495 0 1 
reward         
payrise 0.499 0.500 0 1 0.435 0.496 0 1 
promotion opportunities 0.454 0.498 0 1 0.555 0.497 0 1 
working environment         
workplace home 0.011 0.104 0 1 0.008 0.088 0 1 
workplace travel 0.032 0.177 0 1 0.132 0.338 0 1 
workplace other 0.047 0.212 0 1 0.096 0.295 0 1 
employed at workplace 212.189 318.103 1 1000 257.645 329.004 1 1000 
WORK SATISFACTION         
satisfaction_total pay 4.865 1.627 1 7 4.655 1.616 1 7 
satisfaction_security 5.442 1.540 1 7 5.156 1.628 1 7 
satisfaction_work itself 5.572 1.337 1 7 5.404 1.376 1 7 
preference less hrs 0.309 0.462 0 1 0.356 0.479 0 1 
preference more hrs 0.082 0.274 0 1 0.075 0.263 0 1 
CONTROLS         
age 37.604 11.598 15 76 37.470 11.686 16 81 
divsep 0.085 0.279 0 1 0.043 0.203 0 1 
nevermar 0.176 0.381 0 1 0.216 0.412 0 1 
widowed 0.019 0.138 0 1 0.005 0.070 0 1 
race 0.027 0.163 0 1 0.028 0.164 0 1 
household size 2.989 1.196 1 10 3.085 1.264 1 11 
children 0.370 0.483 0 1 0.375 0.484 0 1 
(log) income 9.041 0.832 0.693 12.472 9.591 0.759 0 13.082 
high education 0.514 0.500 0 1 0.589 0.492 0 1 
lower social class 0.279 0.448 0 1 0.470 0.499 0 1 
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 Table 3. Correlated random effects model for self-assessed health. Estimated 
coefficients.  (FEMALES) 
 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
contractual conditions
part-time job 0.066 * 0.037 0.074 ** 0.037
temp job -0.036 0.066 -0.020 0.067
part-time*pref less hrs -0.115 ** 0.051 -0.113 ** 0.052
part-time*pref more hrs -0.089 0.068 -0.091 0.068
temp job*high educat 0.114 0.072 0.117 0.072
part-time*children -0.013 0.044 -0.015 0.044
temp job*children 0.056 0.072 0.065 0.072
working conditions
working environment
workplace home 0.228 ** 0.095 0.220 ** 0.095
workplace travel -0.049 0.053 -0.052 0.053
workplace other -0.056 0.043 -0.066 0.043
employed at workplace -1E-05 3E-05 -2E-06 3E-05
demanding job conditions
not daytime -0.022 0.022 -0.040 0.028
overtime hours -0.001 0.002 -3E-04 0.002
control and social support
unions -0.058 ** 0.024 -0.054 ** 0.024
managerial supervision 0.007 0.023 0.011 0.023
reward
payrise 0.019 0.020 0.019 0.020
promotion opportunities -0.041 ** 0.020 -0.047 * 0.024
satisfaction_total pay -0.008 0.006
satisfaction_security 0.015 ** 0.006
satisfaction_work itself 0.022 *** 0.007
pref less hrs -0.041 * 0.023 -0.036 0.023
pref more hrs 0.038 0.055 0.045 0.055
not daytime*manag-sup 0.021 0.042
no day time*prom opp 0.019 0.038
Log Likelihood
N
contractual 
conditions only full model
working 
conditions only
-22396.224
2330923309 23309
-22417.2 -22409.26
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
The other regressors included in our model are:  the lagged and the initial value of SAH, age, age^2, age^3, divsep, 
nevermar, widowed ,race, household size, children, income, high education , lower social class. 
The interaction terms “no daytime*managerial/supervision” and “no daytime*promotion opportunities” are not 
introduced contemporaneously in the third model. We estimate a model where we introduce “no 
daytime*managerial/supervision” only and another model where we introduce “no daytime*promotion opportunities” 
only. Since the results of these two models are extremely similar, we present the results of the latter model, and
report only the results related to the variable “no daytime*managerial/supervision” for the former model. 
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Table 4. Correlated random effects model for self-assessed health. Estimated 
coefficients.  (MALES) 
 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
contractual conditions
part-time job 0.189 *** 0.068 0.176 *** 0.069
temp job 0.003 0.080 0.051 0.080
part-time*pref less hrs -0.096 0.151 -0.107 0.151
part-time*pref more hrs -0.053 0.106 -0.053 0.106
temp job*high educat 0.030 0.090 0.026 0.090
part-time*children -0.078 0.140 -0.073 0.140
temp job*children -0.221 ** 0.103 -0.215 ** 0.103
working conditions
working environment
workplace home -0.006 0.111 -0.023 0.111
workplace travel 0.055 * 0.032 0.051 0.032
workplace other 0.012 0.034 0.008 0.034
employed at workplace 9E-05 ** 4E-05 1E-04 *** 4E-05
demanding job conditions
not daytime 0.031 0.024 0.031 0.030
overtime hours -5E-04 0.002 -4E-04 0.002
control and social support
unions -0.027 0.024 -0.015 0.024
managerial supervision -0.011 0.024 -0.017 0.024
reward
payrise 0.005 0.020 0.004 0.024
promotion opportunities 0.014 0.021 -0.003 0.021
satisfaction_total pay -0.009 0.007
satisfaction_security 0.035 *** 0.006
satisfaction_work itself 0.033 *** 0.007
pref less hrs -0.060 *** 0.021 -0.045 *** 0.210
pref more hrs -0.073 * 0.038 -0.066 * 0.038
not daytime*manag-sup 0.010 0.044
no day time*prom opp -0.023 0.041
Log Likelihood
N
contractual 
conditions only full model
working 
conditions only
-20545.725 -22409.26 -20510.123
22349 22349 22349
 
 
 
 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
The other regressors included in our model are:  the lagged and the initial value of SAH, age, age^2, age^3, 
divsep, nevermar, widowed ,race, household size, children, income, high education , lower social class.  
The interaction terms “no daytime*managerial/supervision” and “no daytime*promotion opportunities” are not 
introduced contemporaneously in the third model. We estimate a model where we introduce “no 
daytime*managerial/supervision” only and another model where we introduce “no daytime*promotion 
opportunities” only. Since the results of these two models are extremely similar, we present the results of the latter 
model, and report only the results related to the variable “no daytime*managerial/supervision” for the former 
model. 
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Table 5. Correlated random effects model for self-assessed health. Partial 
effect on probability of reporting excellent health. (FEMALES) 
 
Part Eff Std. Err. Part Eff Std. Err. Part Eff Std. Err.
contractual conditions
part-time job 0.023 0.021 0.026 0.023
temp job -0.013 0.020 -0.007 0.022
part-time*pref less hrs -0.062 0.019 -0.059 0.019
part-time*pref more hrs -0.020 0.016 -0.019 0.016
temp job*high educat 0.052 0.028 0.055 0.028
part-time*children -0.007 0.017 -0.008 0.017
temp job*children 0.021 0.031 0.024 0.031
working conditions
working environment
workplace home 0.089 0.036 0.074 0.062
workplace travel -0.019 0.021 -0.018 0.022
workplace other -0.022 0.017 -0.024 0.020
employed at workplace -5E-05 2E-05 -5E-05 2E-05
demanding job conditions
not daytime -0.009 0.002 -0.020 0.015
overtime hours -3E-04 1E-03 -2E-04 2E-03
control and social support
unions -0.015 0.007 -0.019 0.014
managerial supervision 0.003 0.009 0.004 0.008
reward
payrise 0.008 0.008 4E-04 0.008
promotion opportunities -0.023 0.009 -0.014 0.011
satisfaction_total pay -0.018 0.016
satisfaction_security 0.032 0.023
satisfaction_work itself 0.047 0.030
pref less hrs -0.016 0.009 -0.013 0.011
pref more hrs 0.015 0.022 0.016 0.026
not daytime*manag-sup 0.010 0.015
no day time*prom opp -0.011 0.013
N 23309 23309 23309
working 
conditions 
only
contractual 
conditions 
only full model
 
 
 
          
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
The other regressors included in our model are:  the lagged and the initial value of SAH, age, age^2, age^3, divsep, 
nevermar, widowed ,race, household size, children, income, high education , lower social class. 
The partial effects indicates the change in the probability of reporting excellent health due to a marginal change for 
continuous variables and to a discrete change for binary variables  
We compute the partial effects for a hypothetical representative agent with “average characteristics”. We attribute 
the mean value to the covariates that are continuous and the modal value to the covariates that are categorical. 
To compute the partial effect of "part-time*pref less hrs", "part-time*pref more hrs" and "part-time*children" we make 
reference to the representative individual with a part-time job. To compute the partial effect of "temp job*high educat" 
and "temp job*children" we make reference to the representative individual with a temporary job. 
The interaction terms “no daytime*managerial/supervision” and “no daytime*promotion opportunities” are not 
introduced contemporaneously in the third model. We estimate a model where we introduce “no 
daytime*managerial/supervision” only and another model where we introduce “no daytime*promotion opportunities” 
only. Since the results of these two models are extremely similar, we present the results of the latter model, and 
report only the results related to the variable “no daytime*managerial/supervision” for the former model. 
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Table 6. Correlated random effects model for self-assessed health.  Partial 
effect on probability of reporting excellent health. (MALES)  
 
 Part Eff Std. Err. Part Eff Std. Err. Part Eff. Std. Err.
contractual conditions
part-time job 0.075 0.029 0.070 0.026
temp job 0.001 0.031 0.020 0.030
part-time*pref less hrs -0.060 0.058 -0.061 0.059
part-time*pref more hrs -0.048 0.038 -0.046 0.038
temp job*high educat 0.032 0.035 0.034 0.035
part-time*children -0.032 0.054 -0.031 0.055
temp job*children -0.091 0.042 -0.089 0.042
working conditions
working environment
workplace home -0.002 0.044 -0.009 0.043
workplace travel 0.021 0.013 0.020 0.013
workplace other 0.005 0.013 0.003 0.013
employed at workplace 6E-05 2E-05 5E-05 7E-05
demanding job conditions
not daytime 0.012 0.009 0.012 0.012
overtime hours -5E-04 1E-03 -2E-04 9E-04
control and social support
unions -0.011 0.009 -0.005 0.010
managerial supervision -0.007 0.009 -0.005 0.002
reward
payrise 0.002 0.008 0.001 0.009
promotion opportunities 0.006 0.008 -0.001 0.008
satisfaction_total pay -0.021 0.016
satisfaction_security 0.081 0.030
satisfaction_work itself 0.077 0.031
pref less hrs -0.024 0.009 -0.019 0.010
pref more hrs -0.029 0.017 -0.026 0.019
not daytime*manag-sup -0.004 0.016
no day time*prom opp -0.011 0.019
N
working 
conditions 
only full model
contractual 
conditions 
only
22349 22349 22349  
 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
The other regressors included in our model are:  the lagged and the initial value of SAH, age, age^2, age^3, divsep, 
nevermar, widowed ,race, household size, children, income, high education , lower social class. 
The partial effects indicates the change in the probability of reporting excellent health due to a marginal change for 
continuous variables and to a discrete change for binary variables  
We compute the partial effects for a hypothetical representative agent with “average characteristics”. We attribute 
the mean value to the covariates that are continuous and the modal value to the covariates that are categorical. 
To compute the partial effect of "part-time*pref less hrs", "part-time*pref more hrs" and "part-time*children" we make 
reference to the representative individual with a part-time job. To compute the partial effect of "temp job*high educat" 
and "temp job*children" we make reference to the representative individual with a temporary job. 
The interaction terms “no daytime*managerial/supervision” and “no daytime*promotion opportunities” are not 
introduced contemporaneously in the third model. We estimate a model where we introduce “no 
daytime*managerial/supervision” only and another model where we introduce “no daytime*promotion opportunities” 
only. Since the results of these two models are extremely similar, we present the results of the latter model, and 
report only the results related to the variable “no daytime*managerial/supervision” for the former model. 
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Table 7. Correlated random effects model for psychological well-being. 
Estimated coefficients.  (FEMALES) 
 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
contractual conditions
part-time job 0.127 0.126 0.078 0.128
temp job -0.035 0.244 0.012 0.245
part-time*pref less hrs -0.356 * 0.191 -0.349 * 0.191
part-time*pref more hrs 0.327 0.252 0.300 0.251
temp job*high educat 0.013 0.262 0.020 0.262
part-time*children -0.080 0.150 -0.077 0.150
temp job*children -0.141 0.262 -0.115 0.262
working conditions
working environment
workplace home -0.429 0.315 -0.499 0.315
workplace travel -0.205 0.183 -0.197 0.183
workplace other 0.093 0.151 0.088 0.151
employed at workplace 2E-05 1E-04 5E-05 1E-04
demanding job conditions
not daytime -0.001 0.073 0.068 0.097
overtime hours -0.022 *** 0.008 -0.020 ** 0.008
control and social support
unions -0.235 *** 0.077 -0.219 *** 0.077
managerial supervision 0.042 0.077 0.044 0.077
reward
payrise 0.088 0.071 0.065 0.071
promotion opportunities -0.188 *** 0.070 -0.137 *** 0.084
satisfaction_total pay 0.056 *** 0.021
satisfaction_security 0.062 *** 0.023
satisfaction_work itself -0.008 0.026
pref less hrs -0.230 *** 0.083 -0.195 ** 0.084
pref more hrs -0.372 * 0.206 -0.336 0.206
not daytime*manag-sup 0.052 0.147
no day time*prom opp -0.212 0.135
N 23309 23309 23309
contractual 
conditions only
working 
conditions only full model
 
 
 
 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
The other regressors included in our model are:  the lagged and the initial value of GHQ, age, age^2, age^3, 
divsep, nevermar, widowed ,race, household size, children, income, high education , lower social class.  
The interaction terms “no daytime*managerial/supervision” and “no daytime*promotion opportunities” are not 
introduced contemporaneously in the third model. We estimate a model where we introduce “no 
daytime*managerial/supervision” only and another model where we introduce “no daytime*promotion 
opportunities” only. Since the results of these two models are extremely similar, we present the results of the latter 
model, and report only the results related to the variable “no daytime*managerial/supervision” for the former 
model. 
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Table 8. Correlated random effects model for psychological well-being. 
Estimated coefficients.  (MALES) 
  
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
contractual conditions
part-time job 0.455 ** 0.196 0.444 ** 0.199
temp job 0.137 0.245 0.299 0.247
part-time*pref less hrs 0.205 0.471 0.189 0.470
part-time*pref more hrs 0.251 0.326 0.238 0.326
temp job*high educat 0.248 0.275 0.245 0.275
part-time*children -0.811 * 0.419 -0.853 ** 0.419
temp job*children -0.587 * 0.321 -0.566 * 0.321
working conditions
working environment
workplace home -0.092 0.317 -0.134 0.317
workplace travel 0.116 0.086 0.109 0.086
workplace other -0.025 0.096 -0.030 0.096
employed at workplace 1E-04 9E-05 1E-04 9E-05
demanding job conditions
not daytime -0.100 0.064 -0.045 * 0.098
overtime hours -0.010 * 0.006 -0.011 * 0.006
control and social support
unions -0.217 *** 0.063 -0.174 *** 0.063
managerial supervision -0.036 0.066 -0.056 0.066
reward
payrise 0.084 0.059 0.064 0.059
promotion opportunities 0.006 0.061 0.025 0.071
satisfaction_total pay 0.015 0.019
satisfaction_security 0.113 *** 0.019
satisfaction_work itself 0.064 *** 0.023
pref less hrs -0.057 0.061 -0.007 0.062
pref more hrs 0.052 0.117 0.085
not daytime*manag-sup -0.020 0.127
no day time*prom opp -0.190 0.124
N 22349 2234922349
full model
contractual 
conditions only
working conditions 
only
 
 
 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
The other regressors included in our model are:  the lagged and the initial value of GHQ, age, age^2, age^3, 
divsep, nevermar, widowed ,race, household size, children, income, high education , lower social class.  
The interaction terms “no daytime*managerial/supervision” and “no daytime*promotion opportunities” are not 
introduced contemporaneously in the third model. We estimate a model where we introduce “no 
daytime*managerial/supervision” only and another model where we introduce “no daytime*promotion 
opportunities” only. Since the results of these two models are extremely similar, we present the results of the latter 
model, and report only the results related to the variable “no daytime*managerial/supervision” for the former 
model. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 
This thesis has been developed in the context of the Joint Doctoral 
Programme at the University of York and the University of Bologna. Since my 
research activity has been conducted partly in Great Britain and party in Italy, my 
thesis deals with topics which are relevant in these two countries.   
In the following section I give a short summary of the main research 
findings of Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Moreover, I discuss some 
research topics that have the potential for further development. 
 
In Chapter 2 “Market Structure and Technology: Evidence from the Italian 
National Health Service” we test empirically the existence of the relationship 
between market structure and technological profiles claimed by Sutton’s theory in 
a specific economic framework, that of hospital care services provided by the 
Italian National Health Service (NHS). Our results provide evidence in favour of 
the empirical predictions by Sutton. In markets where technological intensity is 
low the lower bound to market concentration converges monotonically to zero 
when the market size increases, for any level of product homogeneity. Conversely, 
in markets where technological intensity is high the lower bound to concentration 
converges to a positive value different from zero when the market size increases, 
while the lower bound increases from zero with the level of product homogeneity. 
Our results offer some useful indications for policy–makers about the 
functioning of the Italian NHS. To enhance the relevance of this evidence, 
however, we could investigate more thoroughly the institutional setting affecting 
the hospital care sector in Italy. The greater autonomy provided to regions by the 
reforms of the 1990s has increased the differences across regions in terms of 
organization of the regional services and funding of providers (France et al., 2005). 
These regional differences could have an influence on the relationship between 
market structure and technological profiles that we investigate. However, since 
each region has virtually its own organizational model (Mapelli, 2000), the 
 132
analysis taking the institutional setting into consideration appears too complex to 
be included in this thesis. Moreover, we could further exploit the structure of the 
hospital care markets identified here through the Elzinga and Hogarty (1978) 
approach in order to examine the potential effect of market structure on hospital 
technical efficiency. This would provide an empirical contribution regarding the 
Italian NHS to the literature on competition and hospital performance (i.e. 
Dalmau-Matarrodona and Puig-Junoy, 1998; Robinson and Luft, 1985). This sort 
of analysis would require the use of hospital performance measures such as, for 
example, technical efficiency scores computed through the application of the Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) technique. The application of the DEA technique 
would require the use of data about hospital inputs and outputs, not available in 
the dataset utilized in this thesis. Therefore, we leave this analysis for future 
research.  
 
Chapter 3 “The Geography of Hospital Admissions in a National Health 
Service with Patient Choice: Evidence from Italy” deals with patient mobility 
across LHAs in Italy. To analyse the determinants of this phenomenon, we 
estimate gravity equations in multiplicative form using a Poisson pseudo 
maximum likelihood method, as proposed by Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006). 
In most of the cases our results are consistent with the predictions of the gravity 
model. In particular, patient flows are affected positively by the number of 
enrolees of the LHA of origin and of destination, and negatively by the distance 
among LHAs. The contiguity of the LHAs plays a positive role for patient flows 
while the presence of institutional barriers to mobility a negative one. For 
complex surgery, the presence of autonomous hospitals has a negative (positive) 
role on exits (inflows). In general, the gravity model can be regarded as a good 
framework for explaining patient mobility for hospital care treatment across 
LHAs in Italy. The specification tests adopted in our analysis, however, suggest 
that only the models for complex surgery and cancer are correctly specified. The 
decision process governing patient mobility for basic surgery and basic medical 
treatments could have peculiarities requiring the development of different models, 
given the specific characteristics of these treatments. In our analysis we have not 
considered the role played by the waiting times in the hospital choice, which has 
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been shown in the literature to be of great importance for the choice of hospitals. 
Italian data about waiting times are available just at the regional level. Therefore, 
it has not been possible to include this variable in the present analysis (if we had 
included them in our regression model, their effects would have been captured by 
the regional dummies). Perhaps the omission of this variable is particularly 
relevant for the case of basic surgery and basic medicine. This could be a path for 
future research when more disaggregated data on waiting times become available. 
Another possible future development of our model relates to the role played 
by the hospital size in the patients` mobility phenomenon. In the literature about 
hospital choice this variable is often assumed to be an indicator of the quality of 
hospitals, and thus an attraction factor. This assumption, however, should be 
viewed with caution, since, according to some empirical considerations, this 
variable can be also thought of as a push factor. In hospitals whose size is above a 
certain threshold there could be congestion problems, doctors and nurses may 
provide less care to patients and, in general, more managerial problems can arise. 
These factors could decrease the quality of the services offered by larger hospitals 
and give potential patients the incentive to refer to other hospitals (Taroni, 2001). 
Therefore, as a future extension of our work, we could verify if our data do 
corroborate the hypothesis of a U shape (inverse U-shape) relationship between 
the dimension of the hospitals and the exit flows (inflows). 
Under the econometrical point of view, in the future we could try to perform 
some formal tests to detect the presence of spatial autocorrelation in the data 
regarding patient flows (using, for instance, the indexes developed by Moran 
(1950) and Geary (1954)). In case we detect the presence of spatial 
autocorrelation in the data, we could include additional terms in our model, either 
in the deterministic part of the model or in the stochastic one, to account for it  
 
Chapter 4 “Contractual conditions, Working conditions, Health and Well-
being in the British Household Panel Survey” analyses the influence that 
contractual and working conditions have on self-assessed health and 
psychological well-being of employees using the BHPS. The results suggest that 
both contractual and working conditions have some influence on health and 
psychological well-being of employees. Our estimates show that being unsatisfied 
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with the number of hours worked has a negative influence on the health of 
individuals who have a part-time job, while having a high level of employability 
has a positive influence on the health and psychological well-being of individuals 
with temporary job arrangements. Family structure also appears to influence the 
health and well-being of workers with atypical contractual conditions and it 
appears to play a larger role for psychological well-being than for the general self-
assessed health. As far as the two theoretical models investigating why working 
conditions affect health and psychological well-being, our results appear to 
provide some support in favour of Karasek’s model for women (but not for men), 
while the interpretation of our findings with regards to Siegrist`s model is more 
ambiguous, since some of the factors considered are in favour of the framework 
while others not. 
The analysis could be extended in future research in several directions. First, 
previous studies have shown that factors having a negative effect on health and 
psychological well-being can be different from those having a positive effect 
(Bartley et al., 2004; Borg et al., 2000; Lindberg et al, 2006). Accordingly, we 
could verify if our data support the hypothesis that contractual and working 
conditions have asymmetric effects on increases and decreases in the levels of 
health and psychological well-being. Secondly, it has been shown that the nature 
of the impact of socio-economic conditions on health may vary considerably over 
the life cycle (Smith, 2004). Considering this aspect, in the future we could 
attempt to develop a model for the consequences of contractual and working 
conditions on health and psychological well-being over the life cycle of workers. 
Considering the life cycle of workers we could take into consideration if the age 
of the children that the workers take care for plays any role in the way contractual 
and working conditions influence health and psychological well being. Thirdly, 
we could evaluate if characteristics at aggregate (and not individual) level, such as 
the percentage of workers in a certain area that have atypical contractual 
arrangements, affect the relationship between contractual/working conditions and 
health and psychological well-being. Shields and Wheatley Price (2005), for 
example, show that the negative effect of unemployment on psychological well-
being is greater in areas characterized by low employment deprivation. This result 
could be due, for instance, to stigma effects linked to unemployment status (Clark, 
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2003). Similar stigma effects could be linked to atypical contractual arrangements 
in areas where the majority of workers have traditional contractual arrangements. 
To evaluate this third hypothesis we would need additional information about 
contractual conditions at area level. Currently, these are not available in the BHPS.  
In recent years the availability of new data sources and the development of 
advanced econometric methods have offered huge scope for testing theoretical 
and empirical predictions regarding health and health care systems in different 
national contexts. The work contained in this thesis has attempted to contribute to 
this agenda in the context of two specific countries: Italy and Britain. 
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Abbreviations 
 
 
BHPS: British Household Panel Survey  
BM:  basic medicine  
BS: basic surgery  
CA: cancer  
CWW: compressed work week  
DE: delivery  
DEA: Data Envelopment Analysis  
DRGs: Diagnosis Related Groups  
ECHP: European Community Household Panel  
EM: emergencies  
GAZEL: Electricité De France–Gaz De France 
GHQ: General Health Questionnaire  
HAPIEE: Health, Alcohol and Psychosocial factors in Eastern Europe Study  
HMOs: health maintenance organizations  
IRCCS: Istituti di Ricovero e cura a carattere scientifico  
ISTAT: Italian National Institute of Statistics 
LHAs: Local Health Authorities  
NHS: National Health Service  
NPHS: Statistics Canada’s National Population Health Survey  
PPML: Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood  
SAH: Self-Assessed Health  
SSN: Servizio Sanitario Nazionale 
WLS: Wisconsin Longitudinal Study  
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